Jezek v. Vordemaier, 2016
| Decision Date | 10 October 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. 2016,2016 |
| Parties | Frank J. JEZEK, Appellant, v. Harry VORDEMAIER, Sr., Chairman, James Churchwell, Walter B. Decker, and the Florida Real Estate Commission, a State agency and an instrumentality of the State of Florida, Appellees. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Jack B. Nichols, of Gurney & Skolfield, Winter Park, for appellant.
Frank A. Wilkinson, Winter Park, for appellees.
This is an appeal from an order dismissing with prejudice plaintiff's complaint against the Florida Real Estate Commission seeking declaratory judgment.
Frank Jezek had been a registered real estate broker for approximately six years but inadvertently failed to renew his certificate of registration when it expired on September 30, 1966. He discovered his oversight on April 13, 1967, and promptly submitted an application for renewal of his certificate. The application for renewal was disapproved because if had not been submitted within six months of its expiration date as required by Section 475.01(4), F.S.1967, F.S.A., and the Commission's rules 315A--1.03 and 315A--7.04, Florida Administrative Code. The statute and these two rules are quoted in the margin. 1 Mr Jezek twice applied for and was granted informal hearings before the Real Estate Commission by which he requested the latter to reconsider its decision in denying his application for renewal. In each instance the commission refused to renew Mr. Jezek's certificate on the basis of the above-cited rules of the Florida Administrative Code.
Mr. Jezek then filed in the Circuit Court of Orange County his complaint for declaratory judgment reciting substantially the above matters, and also alleging the invalidity of such commission rules, seeking a declaration of their invalidity under Section 120.30(1), F.S.1967, 2 F.S.A. Although the complaint was expressly filed pursuant to the latter statute, plaintiff's prayer for relief asked the court to determine the validity of the commission's denial of plaintiff's request to renew his broker's certificate. Praying for this relief could be understood either As seeking appellate review of the order, or As seeking declaration of the invalidity of the rules upon which the order was based. This obfuscation undoubtedly is directly responsible for appellant's present predicament. Defendant moved to have the court dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, on the grounds that under the guise of seeking declaratory relief plaintiff was actually seeking appellate review of an order of the Florida Real Estate Commission. The court's order dismissing the complaint did not state the grounds upon which it was entered, although this would have been better practice where some of the grounds of the motion went to the merits while others went to the court's jurisdiction. 3
At the outset it should be emphasized that the statute 4 expressly provides, and cases clearly hold, 5 the proper method of Appellate review of a quasi-judicial order entered by the Florida Real Estate Commission is by petition for writ of certiorari to the appropriate district court of appeal. If, as appellee argues, appellant's circuit court action was simply to obtain judicial review of the commission's ruling, he was simply in the wrong forum and the trial court correctly dismissed the complaint.
On the other hand, appellant being affected by an administrative rule had a right expressly provided by statute 6 and repeatedly recognized in the case law of this state, 7 to obtain a judicial declaration as to the Validity of such rule. Thus, if the purpose of appellant's circuit court action was to seek judicial determination of the validity of the rules of the Florida Real Estate Commission (notwithstanding that if plaintiff were successful the end result might conceivably give him relief from the Ruling) then appellant was in the correct forum and his complaint should not have been dismissed.
The term 'rule' referred to in Section 120.30, F.S. (authorizing a person to obtain a judicial declaration as to the validity of any rule) was intended to apply only to a rule or order promulgated by the agency in the exercise of its quasi-legislative authority having a general application and which uniformly affects the rights of the public or other interested parties coming within the agency's jurisdiction. This is to be distinguished from a 'ruling' which is an order rendered by the agency in the conduct of a quasi-judicial proceeding which applies only to the issues in that proceeding and affects only the parties thereto (as to which ruling there would be no right to a judicial declaration under Section 120.30, F.S.) 8.
Appellant contends, as part of his argument, that he could not have been seeking review of a quasi-judicial ruling because the 'hearings' before the Real Estate Commission were not judicial in nature. In support of this argument appellant submits in his appendix copies of correspondence between his attorneys and the Real Estate Commission, and suggests in argument in the brief, that there was an absence of (1) sworn testimony, (2) a transcript of proceedings before the commission, and (3) a formal order or ruling of the commission containing its ultimate findings and conclusions. None of these matters were alleged in the complaint for declaratory judgment, and hence are not properly before this court. We simply note, as obiter dictum, that were these matters properly before this court as part of the record, it would be clear that the two 'hearings' held by the real estate commission would not be sufficient to convert the purely administrative action (which it had taken pursuant to its rules) into a quasi-judicial action, reviewable only by certiorari. 9
Our decision in this case does not turn upon the question of whether the ruling entered by the Real Estate Commission was purely an administrative action in applying its own rules, or whether it was in fact a quasi-judicial action. Rather, our decision turns upon a determination of the purpose of appellant's declaratory suit. Notwithstanding the inartful language of the prayer in the complaint for declaratory judgment, the allegations contained in the complaint satisfy us that the clear purpose of appellant's action in the circuit court was to seek an original determination of the invalidity of those rules of the Florida Real Estate Commission upon which the denial of appellant's application was based. No direct review of...
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School Bd. of Leon County v. Mitchell
...pass upon the issue of whether the petition for review was the sole method for challenging agency action.12 Citing Jezek v. Vordemaier, 227 So.2d 69 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969).13 Now renumbered as § 120.54(16), Fla.Stat. (1976 Supp.).14 The hearings envisioned by §§ 120.54 and 120.56 are to be con......
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East Naples Water Systems, Inc. v. Board of County Com'rs of Collier County, 83-1539
...is entitled to a declaration of rights at all. Tavares v. Allstate Insurance Co., 342 So.2d 551 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Jezek v. Vordemaier, 227 So.2d 69 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969); Hankins v. Title and Trust Company of Florida, 169 So.2d 526 (Fla. 1st DCA Water Systems is entitled to proceed with its......
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Charbonier v. Wynne
...which uniformly affect the rights of the public or other interested parties coming within an agency's jurisdiction. Jezek v. Vordemaier, 227 So.2d 69, 72 (4th D.C.A.Fla.1969); See also, Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 146 So.2d 609 (1st D.C.A.Fla.1962). In this sense the word 'ap......
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City of Gainesville Code Enforcement Bd. v. Lewis, 88-305
...DCA 1969). Although the better practice would have been for the trial court to state the grounds for dismissal, see Jezek v. Vordemaier, 227 So.2d 69, 71 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969), nothing in the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure requires a trial court to specify the grounds for dismissal. Without......