JF v. Carmel Cent. Sch. Dist.

• Citation: 168 F.Supp.3d 609
• Decision Date: 01 March 2016
• Docket Number: 13-cv-8830 (NSR)
• Parties: JF, Individually and on behalf of DF, a Minor, Plaintiff, v. Carmel Central School District; Ryan Dall, Individually; Kevin Carroll, Individually; and John Fink, Individually., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

168 F.Supp.3d 609

JF, Individually and on behalf of DF, a Minor, Plaintiff,

v.Carmel Central School District; Ryan Dall, Individually; Kevin Carroll, Individually; and John Fink, Individually., Defendants.

13-cv-8830 (NSR)

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Signed March 1, 2016

Filed March 2, 2016

Jonathan Matthew Victor, Law Office of Jonathan Victor PLLC, Mahopac, NY, for Plaintiff.

Brian Stuart Condon, Maurizio Savoiardo, III, Michael A. Miranda, Robert E.B. Hewitt, III, Miranda Sambursky Slone Sklarin Vervenioits, LLP, Mineola, NY, for Defendants.

OPINION & ORDER

NELSON S. ROMÁN, United States District Judge

Plaintiffs JF and DF bring this action against Defendants Carmel Central School District (the “School District”), Ryan Dall, Kevin Carroll, and John Fink alleging violations of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, as well as state law claims for breach of contract, negligence, assault, and battery.

Defendants now move for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' federal claims and request that this Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. For the following reasons, Defendants' motion is GRANTED and the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the Complaint and the parties' respective Local Civil Rule 56. I submissions, exhibits, and affidavits.

At the time the Complaint was filed, DF was a sophomore at Carmel High School in Carmel, New York (Compl. ¶¶ 3-4.) DF is African-American. (Id. ¶ 80.) JF is DF's father. (Id. at ¶ 2.) Ryan Dall was a social studies teacher at Carmel High School at the time of the events in question. (Id. ¶ 5.) During the same time period, Kevin Carroll and John Fink were the Principal and Assistant Principal of Carmel High School, respectively. (Id. ¶¶ 6-7.)

The events at issue occurred on or about September 24, 2012 and February 26, 2013. Plaintiffs also reference additional events in their opposition papers and related submissions that occurred after the filing of the Complaint. The relevant events are summarized below.

1. The Events of September 24, 2012

On September 24, 2012, DF and another student, JM, were involved in a fight at Carmel High School. Although DF claims that JM initiated the fight by shoving him, DF admits that he threw the first punch, hitting JM in the face. (Pls.' 56.1¹ ¶¶ 17² -18; Declaration of Maurizio Savoiardo, Docket No. 35 (“Savoiardo Decl.”), Ex. E, at 96:12-13.)

The fight arose “over a girl” named Nicole, who DF previously dated. (Savoiardo Decl., Ex. E, at 75:10-15; Pls.' 56.1 ¶ 12.)³ DF sent text messages to JM at some point prior to the fight, instructing JM to “[t]ell your girl don't disrespect me ... or we're going to have problems.” (Savoiardo Decl., Ex. E, at 79:13-18.) DF does not recall, however, why he felt disrespected by Nicole. (Id. at 78:5-9.) In those same text messages, DF threatened to harm JM in various ways; threatened to steal his belongings; and attempted to extort money from him in exchange for not seriously harming him. (See Savoiardo Decl., Ex. M (DF wrote: “u deserve a good ass kicking”; “ima break ur bones”; “u either getting ur ass kicked or coughing up 500dollars two options pick now”; “I been waiting to beat that ass how they gonna like u with 2 teeth”; “I'm taking ur shoes phone chains everything breaking ur shit lil bitch”.))⁴

After the fight was broken up, Assistant Principal Fink escorted DF back to his office. (Pls.' 56.1 ¶ 19.) Once there, Fink asked DF what happened; why it happened; if DF was ok; and if DF wanted to see the nurse. (Id. ¶ 22.) Although the parties dispute whether DF admitted to Fink that he searched for JM and instigated the fight, (id. ¶ 23), and whether DF stated that the fight would not be over until he put JM in the hospital, (id. ¶ 26), DF admitted that he sent threatening text messages to JM prior to the fight. (Pls.' 56.1 ¶ 24; see also Savoiardo Decl., Ex. E, at 79:13-18, Ex. M.)⁵

Fink then decided to search DF and his backpack, purportedly as a result of DF's continued threats to harm JM. (Pls.' 56.1 ¶ 52.)⁶ After searching DF's backpack, Fink informed DF that he was going to search his person. (Pls.' 56.1 ¶ 54.) DF protested, at which time Deputy Sheriff Claire Pierson, the Carmel High School Resource Officer, informed DF that she and Fink had the right to search him. (Id. ¶¶ 51, 57, 58.) At this point, Pierson claims that DF handed her a pair of pliers from his pocket. (Id. ¶ 59.) DF claims that Pierson shoved her hand into his pocket and removed the pliers. (Id. ¶ 60.)

DF was ultimately suspended for five days for assaulting JM. (Pls.' 56.1 ¶¶ 10⁷ , 68.) JM was not suspended, as the School District determined he was not at fault. (Id. ¶ 69.)

2. The Events of February 26, 2013

On February 26, 2013, DF was searching Carmel High School for his cellular phone. (Id. ¶¶ 80, 83.) DF attempted to enter a class in which he was not currently a student, but was stopped by Ryan Dall, a teacher who was on hall monitor duty at the time. (Id. ¶¶ 80-81.) Dall asked DF whether he was a student in the class and DF responded that he was not. (Id. ¶¶ 82-83.) Dall then instructed DF to return to his current class. (Id. ¶ 84.)

DF refused to return to class, prompting Dall to position himself between DF and the classroom door. (Id. ¶ 85.) The parties dispute whether Dall then shoved DF multiple times or merely put his arm in between DF and the door. (Id. ) Next, Dall purportedly informed the class' teacher, Ms. Flynn, not to let “this boy”—referring to DF—into the classroom. (Id. ¶ 88.) DF asserts that Dall called him “boy” in a pejorative and discriminatory manner. (Compl. ¶ 41.) When Dall attempted to close the door after speaking to Ms. Flynn, DF stuck his foot in the doorway to keep it open. (Pls.' 56.1 ¶ 89.)⁸ Dall then purportedly “guided” DF back with his arm to shut the door. (Id. ¶ 90.) DF jumped back and told Dall to take his hands off of him. (Id. )

Principal Carroll interviewed Ms. Flynn after the incident, who stated that she did not see Dall touch DF in any way or speak inappropriately to him. (Id. ¶¶ 91-93.)

3. The Events of March 11, 2014

On March 11, 2014, JM sent DF a text message in which he used a racial slur to refer to DF. (Id. ¶ 94.) After receiving the text message, DF entered the classroom in which JM was sitting and punched him. (Id. ¶ 96.) DF was suspended for five days for punching JM; JM was suspended for two days for using a racial slur. (Id. ¶¶ 97-98.)

4. Events Involving Ms. Romanovsky

Two incidents involving DF's science teacher, Ms. Romanovsky, are at issue in this matter. The dates on which these incidents occurred are not clearly stated in the parties' submissions.

First, Romanovsky purportedly accused DF of cheating because DF finished his exam before every other student in his class. (Id. ¶¶ 70-71, 146.) Despite her accusation, DF passed the class and was never disciplined for cheating. (Id. )

Second, DF claims that Romanovsky would not let him go to the bathroom during class, while permitting other students to do so. (Id. ¶ 145.) This refusal followed purported accusations by Romanovsky that DF took too long to return from the nurse's office after obtaining a medical note for gym class. (Id. ¶ 73.) DF did not recall how long he was out of class when he went to the nurse's office. (Id. ¶ 74.) Neither DF nor his father could recall whether they ever made an allegation that this treatment was a result of DF's race. (Id. ¶ 75.) DF was not disciplined as a result of this incident. (Id. ¶ 78.)

STANDARD ON A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides: “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of pointing to evidence in the record, “including depositions, documents [and] affidavits or declarations,” id. at 56(c)(1)(A), “which it believes demonstrate[s] the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The moving party may also support an assertion that there is no genuine dispute by “showing ... that [the] adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). If the moving party fulfills its preliminary burden, the onus shifts to the non-moving party to identify “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). A genuine dispute of material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ; accord Benn v. Kissane , 510 Fed.Appx. 34, 36 (2d Cir.2013) (summary order). Courts must “constru[e] the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw[ ] all reasonable inferences in its favor.” Fincher v. Depository Trust & Clearing Corp. , 604 F.3d 712, 720 (2d Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). In reviewing the record, “the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter,” nor is it to determine a witness's credibility. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Rather, “[t]he inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a trial.” Id. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

Summary judgment should be granted when a party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex , 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The party asserting that a fact...