Jia v. Board of Bar Examiners

• Decision Date: 09 July 1998
• Citation: 696 N.E.2d 131,427 Mass. 777
• Parties: Wei JIA v. BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 131

696 N.E.2d 131

427 Mass. 777

Wei JIA v. BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Suffolk.

Argued May 5, 1998.

Decided July 9, 1998.

Robert A. Stolzberg, Boston, for petitioner.

Edward J. Barshak, Boston, for the Board of Bar Examiners.

Before WILKINS, C.J., and ABRAMS, LYNCH, GREANEY, FRIED, MARSHALL and IRELAND, JJ.

MARSHALL, Justice.

In 1993, the Board of Bar Examiners (board) denied an application by the petitioner, Wei Jia, to sit for the Massachusetts bar examination because he had not been graduated with a bachelor of laws or juris doctor degree from a law school approved by the American Bar Association (ABA), as required by S.J.C. Rule 3:01, § 3.3, as appearing in 382 Mass. 753 (1981), nor had he demonstrated that he had obtained an "equivalent" legal education, as provided in S.J.C. Rule 3:01, § 3.4, as appearing in 382 Mass. 753 (1981). ¹ The petitioner, the holder of a primary law degree from an institute in the People's Republic of China and two advanced law degrees from Tulane Law School (Tulane) in Louisiana, sought equitable relief in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk, compelling the board to permit him to sit for the Massachusetts bar examination, or, in the alternative, ordering the board to identify those legal courses he would be required to complete before he could sit for the examination. He also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction and a motion to expedite discovery. The board moved to dismiss the petition. After a hearing, a single justice denied the petitioner's motion for a preliminary injunction and the board's motion to dismiss. He permitted the petitioner to take limited discovery. In January, 1998, the petitioner and the board filed cross motions for summary judgment, and the case was reported to this court by the single justice "to decide whether summary judgment is appropriate, and, if so, for which party." We conclude that the petitioner is not entitled to the relief he seeks, and that summary judgment shall enter for the board.

1. Facts. The material facts are not in dispute and, if appropriate, summary judgment may enter as a matter of law. Mass. R. Civ. P. 56(c), 365 Mass. 824 (1974). See Augat, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 410 Mass. 117, 120, 571 N.E.2d 357 (1991). The petitioner graduated from the Northwest Institute of Political Science of Law in Xian, People's Republic of China, in 1989, receiving a certificate of graduation and a master of law degree in private international law. ² He thereafter earned a master's degree of comparative law (M.C.L.) and a doctor of juridical science (S.J.D.) from Tulane, a law school accredited by the ABA. Admission to the M.C.L. program at Tulane is limited to students who have received a juris doctor degree from a United States law school, or who have received a first (basic) law degree from a foreign law school approved by the committee on graduate admissions at Tulane. The M.C.L. degree requirements at Tulane include, inter alia, satisfactory completion of twenty-four semester hours of course work and, for graduates of foreign law schools, enrollment in "introduction to American law," a two-credit class lasting for three weeks, and "legal research and writing for international graduate students," a three-credit class offered in the fall semester. The S.J.D. program at Tulane is a two-year, full-time program.

In 1992, after receipt of his M.C.L. from Tulane, but prior to completion of his S.J.D. degree, the petitioner applied for admission to the bar of the State of Louisiana. He was admitted in October, 1992. ³ He thereafter applied for, and was admitted to, the bar of the State of New York in March, 1994. ⁴

In October, 1993, the petitioner moved to Boston, and applied to take the Massachusetts bar examination. In December, 1993, the board informed the petitioner that his legal education did not comply with S.J.C. Rule 3:01, § 3.3, and did not appear to be equivalent to that provided in law schools approved by the ABA, as required by S.J.C. Rule 3:01, § 3.4. The board advised him that he would be required to receive a degree of juris doctor from a law school approved by the ABA before he could take the Massachusetts bar examination. The petitioner subsequently submitted additional information to the board for its further consideration of his application, including a transcript from Tulane showing the courses that he had successfully completed, ⁵ letters from faculty members at Tulane confirming that he had audited, but had not received credit for, one course in torts, one course in civil procedure, and one course in criminal law, and evidence of his admission to the bars of Louisiana and New York. After reviewing the additional information the board again denied his application. ⁶

2. The petitioner's eligibility to take the bar examination. General Laws c. 221, § 37, and S.J.C. Rule 3:01 delineate the procedures and requirements for admission to the bar in Massachusetts. The statute provides that the board shall ascertain the "acquirements and qualifications" of each applicant for admission. G.L. c. 221, § 37. If the board reports that an applicant is "of good moral character and sufficient acquirements and qualifications" and recommends his admission, the applicant shall be admitted "unless the court otherwise determines." Id. S.J.C. Rule 3:01, § 1.3, as appearing in 382 Mass. 753 (1981), provides that all petitions for admission to the bar of the Commonwealth shall be referred to the board for a report "as to the character, acquirements and qualifications" of each applicant. S.J.C. Rule 3:01, §§ 3.1 to 3.3, further describes the qualifications required of each applicant for admission by examination. Rule 3:01, § 3.4, delegates to the board the determination of the prelegal and legal equivalency qualifications of those applicants who receive their primary legal education at foreign law schools.

The board, in turn, has published policy guidelines that provide advice to applicants, including those from foreign countries, who apply to sit for the bar examination. ⁷ With respect to its implementation of S.J.C. Rule 3:01, § 3.4, and its assessment of the legal education equivalency of applicants who are graduates of foreign law schools, ⁸ the board distinguishes among (1) graduates from the "common-law faculties of Canadian law schools which are eligible to be members of the Law School Admissions Council": they are permitted to sit for the Massachusetts bar examination "on the same basis as graduates of law schools approved by" the ABA; (2) graduates of the "common-law faculties of law schools in foreign countries (other than Canada) whose jurisprudence rests upon the common-law tradition": they "may be" permitted to sit for the Massachusetts bar examination "upon successful completion of such academic legal study at an ABA-approved law school as the Board may require"; and (3) graduates of faculties of other foreign countries. As to the last, the board informs these graduates that acquisition of a master of law degree from a law school approved by the ABA "may be considered" by the board in determining equivalency, that the board "[g]enerally" will require applicants to take courses such as American constitutional law, Federal courts and jurisprudence, the Uniform Commercial Code, and the "core curricular courses offered in the first year at ABA-approved law schools," and that it "may require" acquisition of a juris doctor degree from a law school approved by the ABA. In evaluating an applicant's qualifications, the board may also consider "graduate legal studies other than those in Master of Law programs in ABA-approved law schools, admission to practice in other American jurisdictions, and length and nature of practice or teaching in an American jurisdiction."

The petitioner does not claim to meet the requirements of S.J.C. Rule 3:01, § 3.3, but maintains that he meets the equivalency requirements of S.J.C. Rule 3:01, § 3.4, and that he is eligible to take the bar examination. He recognizes that we have delegated to the board in the first instance the duty to evaluate his legal education, and argues that the board failed to make a good faith evaluation of his qualifications and failed in his case to follow its own rules and practices. In the alternative, the petitioner says that we may review the record of his legal education "de novo" to determine whether he has met the equivalency requirements of S.J.C. Rule 3:01, § 3.4. The board responds that, whether its decision should be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, see Mead, petitioner, 372 Mass. 253, 255-257, 361 N.E.2d 403 (1977) (denial of bar applicant's claim not an abuse of discretion by board), or whether we review the matter de novo, the record demonstrates that its decision should be affirmed.

We consider first the appropriate standard of review of the petitioner's claim. Although the initial scrutiny of the qualifications of each applicant is delegated by statute and by rule to the board, we retain the inherent and exclusive jurisdiction over any decision to admit an attorney to the practice of law in this Commonwealth. See G.L. c. 221, § 37; S.J.C. Rule 3:01. While we grant substantial deference to a decision of the board, and rely on the accumulated knowledge and experience of its members in interpreting and applying our rules, we have the final authority to determine who may practice law in the Commonwealth. See Matter of Prager, 422 Mass. 86, 91, 661 N.E.2d 84 (1996) ("[w]hile deference is given to the decision of the board, this court retains ultimate authority to decide a person's fitness to practice law in the Commonwealth"); Matter of Allen, 400 Mass. 417, 421, 509 N.E.2d 1158 (1987), quoting Matter of Gordon, 385 Mass. 48, 58, 429 N.E.2d 1150 (1982) ("[o]rdinarily, this court gives deference to the recommendations of the Board, but 'the ultimate duty of decision rests...