Jicarilla Apache Nation v. RIO ARRIBA, 22,336.

Decision Date09 June 2003
Docket NumberNo. 22,336.,22,336.
Citation92 P.3d 642,135 N.M. 630,2004 NMCA 55
CourtCourt of Appeals of New Mexico
PartiesJICARILLA APACHE NATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RIO ARRIBA COUNTY ASSESSOR, Arthur Rodarte, in his official capacity only, Defendant-Appellee.

Wayne H. Bladh, Nordhaus, Haltom, Taylor, Taradash & Bladh, L.L.P., Santa Fe, NM, Daniel I.S.J. Rey-Bear, Stephen H. Greetham, Nordhaus, Haltom, Taylor, Taradash & Bladh, L.L.P., Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant.

Dennis Luchetti, Ted J. Trujillo, Española NM, for Appellee.

Richard B. Cole, Alfred A. Park, Keleher & McLeod, P.A., Albuquerque, NM, for Amicus New Mexico Elk Producers Association.

Certiorari Granted, No. 28,128, July 15, 2003.

OPINION

FRY, Judge.

{1} Appellant Jicarilla Apache Nation (the Nation) appeals a decision by the Rio Arriba County Valuation Protests Board (the Board), affirming in relevant part a June 2000 amended notice of valuation issued by the Rio Arriba County Assessor (the Assessor), for a 32,075.8-acre property known as the Lodge at Chama (the Ranch). We consider the statutes and regulations governing the special mode of valuation for agricultural property and conclude that the Board's interpretation of this law was erroneous. We reverse the Board's determination.

BACKGROUND

{2} The Ranch is a 32,075.8-acre property located near Chama, New Mexico, formerly known as the "Chama Land and Cattle Company." The name was changed to the "Lodge at Chama" in 1989 or 1990. The Nation purchased the Ranch in 1995. In 1996, and in all subsequent years through 1999, the Assessor valued 32,061 acres of the Ranch as agricultural land and imposed ad valorem livestock taxes on the Nation's private elk herd. In June 2000 the Assessor issued an amended notice of valuation that revoked the Ranch's long-standing agricultural-use classification, reclassified the property as "miscellaneous non-residential," and assessed its full value at $21,301,191, which constituted nearly a ten-fold increase over the 1999 tax year value. The Assessor gave three reasons for its reclassification: (1) privately owned elk are not "livestock," (2) the primary use of the Ranch had changed to non-agricultural, and (3) non-agricultural income at the Ranch exceeded agricultural revenues.

{3} The Nation protested the amended valuation, and the Assessor requested a hearing before the Board. Prior to the hearing, the Nation and the Assessor resolved several matters by stipulation. Among other things, the parties stipulated to the valuation of the westernmost 5,035 acres of the ranch: 5,000 acres are subject to a grazing lease and are considered agricultural land; 20 acres qualify as irrigated agricultural land; 11 acres are valued as miscellaneous land; and the remaining 4 acres upon which the actual lodge and various residences are located are also valued as non-agricultural land. The parties agreed that the only issue before the Board was "whether the remaining 27,040.80 acres. . . should be classified and valued as agricultural land." They also stipulated that, "since at least 1996, the County [had] issued annual notices of property valuation recognizing 32,061 acres of the [Ranch] as used primarily for agricultural purposes."

{4} The Nation introduced the testimony of Frank Y. Simms, the president and general manager of the Ranch, who has been with the Ranch since 1990. He described the Nation's activities on the Ranch as being "livestock grazing and related elk production," timber production, a commercial lodge, and recreational use.

{5} The Nation grazes a private elk herd on 6400 acres of the disputed property, and from 1996 to 1999 the Nation paid livestock taxes on the herd. The private herd has been at the Ranch for more than forty years. The Nation extensively manages the 6400 acres by irrigating to produce feed, and it subjects the private herd to a rigorous genetic improvement breeding program. The elk are then harvested through organized hunts, although some elk are sold commercially to other farms. Hunt packages, which include food, lodging, and guide services, cost each hunter between $5,500 and $13,000. Ninety-nine percent of the hunters who harvest elk at the Ranch take the entire animal with them in the form of cut, wrapped, and frozen meat, and ninety-eight percent have the animal mounted.

{6} The Nation manages the remaining portion of the disputed property "for the production, quality, and health of the wild elk herd there." This management includes manipulation of the Nation's timber stand to maximize the production of forage for the wild herd. The Nation then sells permits, obtained via contract from the State, to hunters who harvest elk that are part of the wild herd.

{7} At the conclusion of the hearing, the Board affirmed the Assessor's valuation and concluded that "the use of that property is primarily as a habitat for elk, [and] that all other uses, including arguably agricultural uses, are secondary and incidental to that primary use." Because the Board concluded that elk are not "livestock" for purposes of the Property Tax Code (the Code), NMSA 1978, §§ 7-36-1 to -33 (1973, as amended through 2001), it also concluded that the use of the Ranch primarily for elk habitat "does not pass muster as land used primarily for agricultural purposes under [Section 7-36-20]."

{8} The Board found that the Assessor first learned in November 1999 about the Nation's "new business plans and goals and income information" for the Ranch via a letter to the Nation's president from the acting regional director of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). This letter constituted the BIA's evaluation of the Nation's request that the Ranch be conveyed to the United States to hold in trust for the Nation. The Board found that this letter along with internet websites advertising the Ranch as a "recreational retreat[ ]" supported the Assessor's determination that the Ranch was used primarily for non-agricultural purposes.

{9} The Board further found that, although the Ranch's timber and grazing activities were bona fide agricultural uses, the Ranch's other activities, such as fishing, elk hunting, and skeet-shooting, were non-agricultural. In addition, the Board found that the Nation's soil conservation agreement with the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) had, "as its primary purpose, the development and maintenance of a habitat suitable for the maintenance of elk," and that a significant portion of the Ranch was used for producing elk for big game hunting. Thus, because the Board found that elk are not "livestock," it found that the Ranch's primary activities did not constitute agricultural use as defined by Section 7-36-20(B). The Board also found that the Ranch's non-agricultural income exceeded its agricultural income.

{10} The Nation appealed the Board's decision to the district court and filed a motion asking the district court to certify the appeal to this Court. The district court granted the motion and we accepted certification.

DISCUSSION
Certification

{11} We asked the parties to address whether this Court has the discretion to set aside the district court's certification order. The trial court certified this case under NMSA 1978, § 39-3-1.1(F) (1999), a subsection of the statute governing judicial review of certain agency final decisions, which provides as follows:

The district court may certify to the court of appeals a final decision appealed to the district court, but undecided by that court, if the appeal involves an issue of substantial public interest that should be decided by the court of appeals. The appeal shall then be decided by the court of appeals.

For the reasons that follow, we find that the district court properly certified this case as invoking issues of substantial public interest. We also find that the statutory language "shall then be decided" plainly requires this Court to decide the appeal. See NMSA 1978, § 12-2A-4(A) (1997). See also High Ridge Hinkle Joint Venture v. City of Albuquerque, 1998-NMSC-050, ¶ 5, 126 N.M. 413, 970 P.2d 599

(recognizing that "plain language of a statute is the primary indicator of legislative intent") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

{12} An issue of "substantial public interest" necessarily affects entities beyond the parties themselves. Moreover, both common sense and case law suggest that an issue is one of "substantial public interest" when it raises a question of first impression that is likely to recur, and when the need for uniformity is great. Although we are not aware of case law interpreting Section 39-3-1.1(F), we find support for our view in Supreme Court decisions accepting certification from this Court on questions of first impression. See, e.g., Sunwest Bank of Albuquerque v. Nelson, 1998-NMSC-012, ¶ 13, 125 N.M. 170, 958 P.2d 740

(accepting certification to resolve as a matter of first impression whether "a national banking association . . . [was] a resident of New Mexico for purposes of venue selection"); Carmona v. Hagerman Irrigation Co., 1998-NMSC-007, ¶ 6, 125 N.M. 59, 957 P.2d 44 (accepting certification to clarify application of attractive nuisance doctrine to owners and operators of irrigation ditches).

{13} In this case, the Nation presented evidence that the Assessor's application of Section 7-36-20 differed from the approach of nine other county assessors. As Amicus New Mexico Elk Producers points out, the application of Section 7-36-20 affects elk production enterprises throughout the state. We agree with the Nation and Amicus that the classification and valuation of agricultural land under the Code presents issues of substantial public importance because of the effects on elk farmers statewide. The question is likely to recur with respect to other elk producers in other counties, and the public has an interest in uniform application of the Code provisions designed by the legislature to benefit agricultural land users. Ac...

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    • United States
    • New Mexico Supreme Court
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    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit
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    ...The Court of Appeals agreed with the Nation and reversed the decision of the Protests Board, see Jicarilla Apache Nation v. Rio Arriba County Assessor, 135 N.M. 630, 92 P.3d 642 (2003), but the New Mexico Supreme Court reversed the decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals in September 20......
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    • New Mexico Supreme Court
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    ...the public herd in the uplands region did not. Jicarilla Apache Nation v. Rio Arriba County Assessor, 2004-NMCA-055, ¶¶ 28, 35, 135 N.M. 630, 92 P.3d 642. The Court of Appeals also held that the agreement between the Lodge and the USDA represented a valid soil conservation agreement, and th......
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    • Court of Appeals of New Mexico
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    ...the question to us, and we accept the certification. See Jicarilla Apache Nation v. Rio Arriba Cnty. Assessor, 2004–NMCA–055, ¶ 13, 135 N.M. 630, 92 P.3d 642,rev'd on other grounds by Jicarilla Apache Nation v. Rodarte, 2004–NMSC–035, 136 N.M. 630, 103 P.3d 554.II. DISCUSSION {5} Enacted in......

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