Jillson v. Com.
| Decision Date | 19 June 1970 |
| Citation | 461 S.W.2d 542 |
| Parties | Charles JILLSON, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
Thomas A. Conroy, Cincinnati, Ohio, John C. Ryan, Frankfort, for appellant.
John B. Breckinridge, Atty. Gen., Douglas E. Johnson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Frankfort, for appellee.
Charles Jillson was found guilty of arson under KRS 433.010 and was sentenced to five years in the penitentiary. He appears. We affirm.
Shortly after midnight on August 13, 1966, the dwelling house of Charles Jillson in Covington, Kentucky, was discovered to be on fire. Firemen were called and extinguished the blaze. The firemen found on the premises an empty can that had contained paint thinner, a highly inflammable substance, and a half-gallon milk bottle also containing inflammable fluid. The bottle was equipped with a wick that had burned. After returning to their quarters, the firemen were called again to the same address and discovered the house burning with more intensity than it was earlier. More inflammable fluid was found. The appellant arrived on the scene as the firemen were leaving the second time. He was requested to go to the firehouse. There, he protested ignorance of any wrongdoing and insisted that he had spent the night with in-laws in Newport, Kentucky. He denied at that time that he had any fire insurance on the house or its contents. Several days after the fire, Jillson reported that he had discovered in his toolbox a fire insurance policy on the house and its contents.
Appellant contends that the verdict is contrary to the evidence and that he was entitled to a directed verdict.
Appellant claimed that he was nowhere near his home when it burned. To bolster this position as to his whereabouts on the night of the fire, he introduced five witnesses, all relatives except one. All substantiated his claim of absence from his home at the time of the happening.
The Commonwealth introduced two eye-witnesses who stated that they saw the appellant around his dwelling on the night the house burned, some time before the first fire. Also introduced was a picture showing the articles possessing incendiary capabilities. The insurance policy was presented for consideration. Firemen testified that the amount of clothing and furniture in the house was meager. A car similar to the appellant's was seen leaving the scene of the burning building soon before the first fire was discovered.
We said in Mullins v. Commonwealth, 276 Ky. 555, 124 S.W.2d 788, and incorporated in Moore v. Commonwealth, Ky., 446 S.W.2d 271, 273:
'When the evidence, even though it be circumstantial, affords fair and reasonable ground upon which the verdict of a jury might be rested, the case should go to the jury. * * *'
We have repeatedly held that where there is a direct conflict in the evidence, then the weight of evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are functions peculiarly within the province of the jury, and the jury's determination will not be disturbed. Brown v. Commonwealth, 310 Ky. 306, 220 S.W.2d 870; Jones v. Commonwealth, Ky., 281 S.W.2d 920; Cissell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 419 S.W.2d 555.
The credibility of the witnesses in the instant case was a jury determination. There was substantial evidence, though circumstantial, sufficient to incriminate the accused and warrant his conviction. The appellant was not entitled to a directed verdict.
Appellant claims he was prejudiced because the Commonwealth attempted to show as a motive for the crime the collection of insurance. Appellant cites no cases to substantiate his claim.
It was proper to show that the appellant had fire insurance to prove the criminal intent and malice requisite in KRS 433.010.
In Wright v. Commonwealth, 221 Ky. 226, 298 S.W.2d 673, as to introducing motive as an element of crime, we said:
* * *'
It is pertinent to point out that willfulness is a requisite of the offense of arson.
Since it is possible to consider motive as tending to prove the requisite element of willfulness, we should consider whether it also tends to prove the element of malice. In order to be convicted of arson for burning one's own property, malice must be shown. 'Malicious' means the doing of 'a wrongful act by one person against another intentionally or with evil intent without just cause or excuse or as the result of ill will.' Combs v. Commonwealth, Ky., 356 S.W.2d 761, 763.
In Combs v. Commonwealth, supra, we said:
'The question of whether an act was committed maliciously and feloniously is ordinarily one for the jury to determine in the light of all the surrounding facts and circumstances. * * *'
In Davidson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 340 S.W.2d 343, we said:
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Brown v. Com.
...during voir dire. We review the trial court's denial of Appellant's new trial motion for abuse of discretion. Jillson v. Commonwealth, 461 S.W.2d 542, 545 (Ky.1970). A. Extrajudicial In his affidavit, Juror 25 reported that another juror, whose name he did not recall, told the jury during d......
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Brown v. State
...376, 144 So. 843 (1932); State v. Dunn, 199 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1972); State v. Willing, 129 Iowa 72, 105 N.W. 355 (1905); Jillson v. Commonwealth, 461 S.W.2d 542 (Ky.1970); Commonwealth v. Lamothe, 343 Mass. 417, 179 N.E.2d 245 (1961); State v. Spino, 61 Wash.2d 246, 377 P.2d 868 (1963). As s......
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Partin v. Com.
...are functions peculiarly within the province of the jury, and the jury's determination will not be disturbed." Jillson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 461 S.W.2d 542, 544 (1970); Leigh v. Commonwealth, Ky., 481 S.W.2d 75, 79 (1972). See also, Owsley v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 743 S.W.2d 408, 409 (1987......
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White v. Com., No. 2004-SC-000082-MR.
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