Jim Butler Tonopah Mining Co v. West End Consolidated Mining Co

• Decision Date: 10 June 1918
• Docket Number: No. 249,249
• Parties: JIM BUTLER TONOPAH MINING CO. v. WEST END CONSOLIDATED MINING CO
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

247 U.S. 450

38 S.Ct. 574

62 L.Ed. 1207

JIM BUTLER TONOPAH MINING CO.

v WEST END CONSOLIDATED MINING CO.

No. 249.

Argued March 26 and 27, 1918.

Decided June 10, 1918.

[Syllabus intentionally omitted] Messrs. Curtis H. Lindley, of San Francisco, Cal., and Hugh H. Brown, of Tonopah, Nev., for plaintiff in error.

Messrs. W. H. Dickson, of Salt Lake City, Utah, S. S. Downer, of Reno, Nev., A. C. Ellis, Jr., of Salt Lake City, Utah, Peck, Bunker & Cole, of Oakland, Cal., and H. H. Atkinson, of Tonopah, Nev., for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice VAN DEVANTER delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is a suit by the owner of two lode mining claims, the Eureka and the Curtis, to enjoin the owner of an adjoining lode claim, the West End, from exercising an asserted extralateral right in respect of a vein extending beneath the surface from the latter claim into the others. All the claims are patented and their ownership is conceded. The Eureka adjoins the West End on the south and the Curtis lies immediately south of the Eureka. The state courts, both trial and appellate, upheld the defendant's asserted right to follow the vein extralaterally (39 Nev. 375, 158 Pac. 876), and the plaintiff seeks a reversal of that decision on the theory that it is in contravention of the mining laws of Congress, in that (a) the end lines of the West End claim are not parallel and straight, and therefore an essential element of the right to follow the vein extralaterally is wanting; (b) this right can be exercised only in one direction, that is, beyond one side line, not both, and as the discovery vein¹ dips to the north the right can be exercised only in that direction; and (c) the facts specially found do not show that the top or apex of the vein is within the vertical limits of the West End claim.

For present purposes the West End claim may be described as having the form of a parallelogram 1,500 feet in length from east to west and 600 feet in width from north to south, but with a small portion of the northeast corner cut off by a diagonal line and a somewhat larger portion of the southwest corner similarly cut off. See diagram, 39 Nev. 375, 158 Pac. 876. Thus what would be the end lines of the parallelogram, if it were complete, are substantially shortened, but the major part of each remains. These shortened lines are not only parallel, but straight. Are they the end lines of the claim in the sense of the statute? Or do its end lines consist of the shortened lines and the diagonal lines? End lines in the sense of the statute are those which are laid across the vein to show how much of it, in point of length, is appropriated and claimed by the miner. All other lines are side lines. True, the end lines must be both parallel and straight. Rev. Stat. §§ 2320, 2322 (Comp. St. 1916, §§ 4615, 4618); Walrath v. Champion Mining Co., 171 U. S. 293, 311, 18 Sup. Ct. 909, 43 L. Ed. 170. But it is not so with the side lines. They may have angles and elbows and be converging or diverging, so long as their general course is along the vein and the statutory restriction on the width of claims is respected. Del Monte Mining Co. v. Last Chance Mining Co., 171 U. S. 55, 84, 18 Sup. Ct. 895, 43 L. Ed. 72. Applying these tests to the bounding lines of the West End claim, we regard it as plain that the diagonal lines at the two corners are part of its side lines, and not of its end lines. In this respect the case is like Walrath v. Champion Mining Co., supra, where in determining what was the northerly end line of the Providence claim (see diagram, 171 U. S. 298, 18 Sup. Ct. 909, 43 L. Ed. 170), the line g, h, was held to be the true end line and the diagonal line f, g, to be no part of it. Thus the objection that the end lines of the West End claim are not parallel and straight is untenable.

What in mining cases is termed the extralateral right is a creation of the mining laws of Congress, and to learn what it is we must look to them rather than o some system of law to which it is a stranger. Besides, as Congress has plenary power over the disposal of the mineral-bearing public lands, it rests with it to say to what extent, if at all, the right to pursue veins on their downward course into the earth shall pass to and be reserved for those to whom it grants possessory or other titles in such lands. What it has said is this (Rev. Stat. § 2322 [Comp. St. 1916, § 4618]):

'The locators of all mining locations * * * on any mineral vein, lode, or ledge, situated on the public domain, their heirs and assigns, * * * shall have the exclusive right of possession and enjoyment of all the surface included within the lines of their locations, and of all veins, lodes, and ledges throughout their entire depth, the top or apex of which lies inside of such surface lines extended downward vertically, although such veins, lodes, or ledges may so far depart from a perpendicular in their course downward as to extend outside the vertical side lines of such surface locations. But their right of possession to such outside parts of such veins or ledges shall be confined to such portions thereof as lie between vertical planes drawn downward as above described, through the end lines of their locations, so continued in their own direction that such planes will intersect such exterior parts of such veins or ledges.'

It will be seen that the extralateral right so created is subject to three limitations. One conditions it on the presence of the top or apex inside the boundaries of the claim. Another restricts it to the dip or course downward, and so excludes the strike or onward course along the top or apex. And the last confines it to such outside parts as lie between the end lines continued outwardly in their own direction and extended vertically downward. But otherwise it is without limitation or exception and broadly includes 'all veins, lodes and ledges throughout their entire depth'—one as much as another, and all whether they depart through one side line or the other. Given two veins which in their descent pass, one through one side line and the other through the other side line, how could it be held that the right applies to one vein and not to the other, when the statute says 'all veins * * * throughout their entire depth'? By what rule would a court be guided in making a selection between the two when the statute makes none? And where a single vein in its descent separates into two limbs which depart through the opposite side lines, on what theory could the right be sustained as to one limb and rejected as to the other? The terms of the statute, as we think, do not lend themselves to any such distinctions, but, on the contrary, show that none such is intended.

In Mining Co. v. Tarbet, 98 U. S. 463, 467 (25 L. Ed. 253), this court in pointing out the intent of the statute said that 'the end lines are to cross the lode and extend perpendicularly downwards, and to be continued in their own direction either way horizontally.' And in Del Monte Mining Co. v. Last Chance Mining Co., 171 U. S. 55, 88, 18 Sup. Ct. 895, 908 (43 L. Ed. 72), a case in which the statute was much considered, it...