Jimenez v. CRC Prop. Mgmt. W.
| Decision Date | 17 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | 3:19-CV-01547-JAH-MSB |
| Parties | JESUS JIMENEZ, in a Representative capacity only, on behalf of all aggrieved employees, Plaintiff, v. CRC PROPERTY MANAGEMENT WEST INC., a California Corporation; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
(1) DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND TO STATE COURT [DOC. NO. 14]; AND
(2) DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL EVIDENCE [DOC. NO. 44]
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (Doc. No. 14) and Defendant's Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Evidence (Doc. No. 44). For the reasons set forth below, both motions are DENIED.
On July 8, 2019, Plaintiff Jesus Jimenez (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (“PAGA”) (“Complaint”) in the Superior Court of California against Defendants CRC Property Management West Inc. (“Defendant”) and Does 1 through 10 for wage-and-hour violations of the California Labor Code. (Doc. No. 1-4). Plaintiff's Complaint alleges claims for (1) meal and rest period violations, (2) minimum wage violations, (3) overtime violations, (4) wage statement violations, and (5) failure to reimburse for necessary business expenditures. (Id.). From approximately May 18, 2015, Plaintiff has been employed by Defendant as a non-exempt employee working in San Diego County, California. (Id. at 11-12). On July 18, 2019, the Complaint and Summons were personally served on Defendant. (Doc. No. 1 at 3). On August 16, 2019, Defendant removed the action to federal court, asserting this Court has federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1441(a) pursuant to the Federal Enclave Doctrine. (Id. at 4-5). On September 13, 2019, Plaintiff filed the pending Motion to Remand. (Doc. No. 14). On October 7, 2019, Defendant filed an opposition to Plaintiff's Motion. (Doc. No. 24). On October 11, 2019, Plaintiff replied. (Doc No. 25).
In addition, on April 17, 2020, Defendant filed a Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Evidence in support of notice of removal and opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Remand. (Doc. No. 43). On May 4, 2020, Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendant's Motion. (Doc. No. 45). On May 11, 2020, Defendant replied. (Doc. No. 46).
The federal court is one of limited jurisdiction. See Gould v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. New York, 790 F.2d, 774 (9th Cir. 1986). As such, it cannot reach the merits of any dispute until it confirms its own subject matter jurisdiction. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't., 523 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1998). “Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.” Id. at 94 (quoting Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514 (1868)). District courts must construe the removal statutes strictly against removal and resolve any uncertainty as to removal in favor of remanding the case to state court. Boggs v. Lewis, 863 F.2d 662, 663 (9th Cir. 1988).
Removal jurisdiction is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1441 et seq. A state court action can only be removed if it could have originally been brought in federal court. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). The Court determines its jurisdiction from the complaint as it existed at the time of removal, not as subsequently amended. Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy Co., 592 F.2d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 1979). Thus, for an action to be removed based on federal question jurisdiction, the complaint must establish either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on the resolution of substantial questions of federal law. See Franchise Tax Bd. of State of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 10-13 (1983). At the same time, “a plaintiff may not defeat removal by omitting to plead necessary federal questions.” Id. at 22. If the plaintiff uses “artful pleading” in a claim, a court may uphold removal regardless of whether a federal question appears on the face of the complaint. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-67 (1987).
The defendant has the burden of establishing that removal is proper and supporting its jurisdictional allegations with competent proof. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566-67 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam); Nishimoto v. Federman-Bachrach & Assocs., 903 F.2d 709, 712 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990). In addition, the defendant must file a timely notice of removal. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). The notice of removal must be filed within 30 days after receipt of a copy of the initial pleading if removal can be determined from its text. Id. If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
Defendant removed this action on the basis that all of Plaintiff's claims relate to his employment with Defendant at Naval Base San Diego, an alleged federal enclave (, his employment at Pacific Beacon Property [“Pacific Beacon”]).[1] (Doc. No. 1 at 4). Whether the United States has acquired exclusive jurisdiction over a federal enclave is a federal question that falls under this Court's jurisdiction. Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 267 (1963).
To determine whether to remand the pending action, the Court must first address four issues: whether the grant of partial jurisdiction over Pacific Beacon is sufficient to establish federal enclave status; whether Pacific Beacon is a federal enclave; whether the Court has federal subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims; and whether Defendant's removal is valid despite Defendant's suspended business entity status with the California Secretary of State at the time of removal. Based on the following reasons, the Court finds removal appropriate.
Parties concede that (i) Naval Base San Diego has varying legislative jurisdiction throughout the base; and (ii) Pacific Beacon is subject to partial legislative jurisdiction of the United States. (Doc. No. 14-1 at 19; Doc. No. 24-1 at 7). Notably, all four properties that make up Pacific Beacon are also subject to the same partial jurisdiction.[2] Parties dispute, however, whether Pacific Beacon qualifies as a federal enclave. Plaintiff argues Pacific Beacon is not a federal enclave because federal enclave status requires a grant of exclusive jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 14-1 at 18). Defendant asserts exclusive jurisdiction is not necessary for federal enclave status because a federal enclave is defined as land over which the federal government exercises legislative jurisdiction, including partial legislative jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 24 at 19). The Court holds that Pacific Beacon is a federal enclave for the reasons set forth below.
A federal enclave is land over which the federal government exercises legislative jurisdiction, except to the extent that the state reserves to itself certain jurisdiction at the time of cession. Hammer v. Dynamic Aviation Grp., Inc., No. CV 08-8174 ODW(CWX), 2009 WL 10675681, at *2 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (citing Taylor v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 78 Cal.App.4th 472, 478 (2000)); George v. UXB Intern., Inc., 1996 WL 241624, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (citing Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 264 (1963)); see also U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. When a state cedes jurisdiction and Congress accepts that cession, the federal government can obtain either exclusive, concurrent, or partial jurisdiction. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 542 (1976); United States v. Jones, 921 F.3d 932, 935 n.2 (10th Cir. 2019); Allison v. Boeing Laser Tech. Servs., 689 F.3d 1234 (10th Cir. 2012); 3 U.S. General Accountability Office, Principles of Federal Appropriations Law, 13 GAO-RB pt. D, s. 1 WL 6969324, at *3 (3rd ed. 2008). As is relevant here, partial legislative jurisdiction exists where the state of California has ceded all its jurisdiction except the powers to tax and serve process. (Doc. No. 24-1 at 7).
The Court finds Plaintiff's reliance on Kelly v. Lockheed Martin Services Group to support its argument that federal enclave status requires a grant of exclusive jurisdiction is misplaced. (Doc. No. 14-1 at 18); Kelly v. Lockheed Martin Servs Grp., 25 F.Supp.2d 1, 3-4 (D. Puerto Rico 1998). The Kelly court clarifies that exclusive jurisdiction is not the only form of federal enclave jurisdiction. Kelly, 25 F.Supp.2d 1, 3 n.3. Notably, a reservation of authority by the state in a grant of jurisdiction does not negate federal enclave status. Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 264 (1963) (“a state [can] complete the ‘exclusive' jurisdiction of the Federal Government over such an enclave by ‘a cession of legislative authority and political jurisdiction.'”); see also Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518, 530 (1938); Mersnick v. USProtect Corp., 2006 WL 3734396, at *6 (N.D. Cal. 2006); Kerr v. Delaware North Companies, Inc., 2017 WL 880409, at *5 (E.D. Cal. 2017). The main principle of the federal enclave doctrine is that the federal government has exclusive authority over a federal enclave, not that a grant of exclusive jurisdiction is required for a land to obtain federal enclave status. See U.S.C. art. 1, § 8, cl. 17; see also Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245 (1963); Kennicott v. Sandia Corporation, 314 F.Supp.3d 1142 (D.N.M. 2018).
Accordingly, Pacific Beacon is a federal enclave because California has ceded all jurisdiction over Pacific Beacon to the federal government except the powers to tax and serve process. (Doc. No. 24-1 at 7).
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