Kelly v. Lockheed Martin Services Group

• Decision Date: 31 August 1998
• Docket Number: No. Civ. 97-2265(DRD).,Civ. 97-2265(DRD).
• Citation: 25 F.Supp.2d 1
• Parties: Earle W. KELLY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. LOCKHEED MARTIN SERVICES GROUP, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

Page 1

25 F.Supp.2d 1

Earle W. KELLY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. LOCKHEED MARTIN SERVICES GROUP, et al., Defendants.

No. Civ. 97-2265(DRD).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

August 31, 1998.

Roberto Lefranc-Romero, Santurce, PR, for Plaintiffs.

Alcides A. Reyes-Gilestra, Schuster Usera Aguilo & Santiago, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

DOMINGUEZ, District Judge.

Pending before the Court is Defendants Lockheed Martin Services Group, Lockheed Martin Corp., and Martin Marietta Services, Inc.'s¹ (Defendants') motion to dismiss. (Docket No. 14.) Plaintiffs oppose Defendants' motion. (Docket No. 19.) Plaintiff Earle Kelly brings his claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.; Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a; the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 793; Law No. 44, 1 L.P.R.A. § 501 et seq., 31 L.P.R.A. § 5141; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.; and Law No. 100 of June 30, 1959, as amended, 29 L.P.R.A. §§ 146-151. (Complaint, ¶ 2.) Plaintiff's wife Paige Kelly alleges that she has suffered mental anguish and emotional distress because of the discrimination allegedly suffered by Plaintiff Earle Kelly. (Complaint, ¶ 57.) The conjugal partnership formed by Mr. Earle Kelly and Mrs. Paige Kelly brings a cause of action for economic loss and lost profit because of the discrimination allegedly suffered by Mr. Kelly. (Complaint, ¶ 55.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants Defendants' motion, which requests dismissal of all of Plaintiffs' Puerto Rico claims and ADEA claims, all of Paige Kelly's claims, and all of the conjugal partnership's claims.

I. Factual Background

Plaintiff Earle Kelly worked for Defendants at the Roosevelt Roads Naval Station (Roosevelt Roads) in Ceiba, Puerto Rico from March 1981 through September 1996. Defendants are federal defense contractors who operated the MK-30 shop² for the Department of the Navy at Roosevelt Roads. Plaintiff Earle Kelly alleges that while employed by Defendants he performed duties as a weapons technician and a launch master. He alleges that due to overwork at his job, he developed two hernias and back problems. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants did not provide Plaintiff with the accommodation, including equipment and assistance needed to safely perform his tasks. Plaintiff alleges that he became aware that his employer was not complying with applicable federal and state employment laws and regulations. He claimed his proper benefits and informed other employees of their rights. Plaintiff alleges that because these actions, his employer "commenced a campaign of coercion, harassment, retaliation and discrimination against [him]." (Complaint, ¶ 25.) Plaintiff alleges that in June 1995 he applied for a promotion but was denied the promotion because of his age, disability, and workers' rights activity.

Plaintiff suffered another injury in July 1995. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to pay him the proper disability benefits. The United States Department of Labor ordered Defendants to pay Plaintiff the proper benefits. In January 1996, Plaintiff was injured on the job again. Plaintiff was terminated in September 1996 based on the company's medical leave of absence policy.

II. Plaintiffs' State Law Claims

A. Exclusive Federal Legislative Jurisdiction in a Federal Enclave

Defendants allege that Puerto Rico law has no application to Plaintiff with regard to his employment with Defendants at Roosevelt Roads because the alleged discriminatory actions occurred solely in relation to Plaintiff Earle Kelly's employment at Roosevelt Roads, a federal enclave under the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government.

A federal enclave is a portion of land over which the United States government exercises exclusive federal legislative jurisdiction.³ The federal government obtains control over an enclave through one of three methods. Under the first method, the United States purchases land with the state's consent and the state transfers complete jurisdiction to the United States pursuant to Clause 17 of Section 8 of Article One of the United States Constitution. Under the second method, the federal government purchases land over which a state exercises jurisdiction. The state may cede some or all of its jurisdiction to the federal government after the purchase. Under the third method, the federal government reserves jurisdiction over portions of a state when the state enters the Union.

The United States obtained exclusive federal legislative jurisdiction over Roosevelt Roads through a series of events which has aspects of the first and second means of creating a federal enclave. These events are well described in Judge Pieras's recent decision in Koren v. Martin Marietta Services., Inc., 997 F.Supp. 196, 199-202 (D.P.R.1998), and need not be repeated by this Court. See also People of Puerto Rico v. Koedel, 927 F.2d 662, 664-666 (1st Cir.1991) (reviewing exclusive jurisdiction of United States over Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico). Suffice it to say, under the relevant events and laws, the United States obtained exclusive legislative jurisdiction over Roosevelt Roads through the consent of Puerto Rico and the agreement of the United States by 1955 at the latest.⁴ See Sopena v. Colejon Corp., 920 F.Supp. 259, 264 (D.P.R.1996) (Roosevelt Roads "fall[s] within the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of Congress").

"Whether federal enclave jurisdiction, a form of federal question jurisdiction, exists is a complex questions, resting on such factors as whether the federal government exercises exclusive, concurrent or proprietarial jurisdiction over the property, when the property became a federal enclave and what the state law was at that time, whether the law is consistent with federal policy, and whether it has been altered by national legislation." Celli v. Shoell, 40 F.3d 324, 328 n. 4 (10th Cir.1994) (citations omitted). The extent and application of legislative federal enclave jurisdiction form a similarly complex question resting on the same factors.

There are three theories as to the development of federal enclave law in relation to state law.⁵ Under the first theory, when an area becomes a federal enclave, the local law in effect at the time of cession continues to apply until it is abrogated by federal law. See James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 100, 60 S.Ct. 431, 434, 84 L.Ed. 596 (1940); Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific RR. v. McGlinn, 114 U.S. 542, 546, 5 S.Ct. 1005, 29 L.Ed. 270 (1885). In effect, the state law at the time of cession becomes federal law. Only that federal law applies in the enclave unless Congress specifically makes a provision for the application of law legislated by Congress. Under this theory, the status quo at the time the federal enclave became an enclave is maintained no matter how much time has passed since the creation of the enclave, unless Congress acts to change the status quo.⁶ Celli, 40 F.3d at 328 n. 4. Under the second theory, the Paul rule, subsequent state regulatory changes consistent with the state law in place at the time of cession are applicable within a federal enclave. Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 269, 83 S.Ct. 426, 9 L.Ed.2d 292 (1963). Thus, the state/federal law is not frozen in time as of cession, but continues to develop as the state develops the law. Under the third regime, all state law rules of the state in which the enclave exists are applicable within the federal enclave unless they interfere with the federal government's jurisdiction. See, e.g., Howard v. Commissioners of the Sinking Fund of the City of Louisville, 344 U.S. 624, 73 S.Ct. 465, 467, 97 L.Ed. 617 (1953). Neither the United States Supreme Court nor the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has determined which of these regimes apply under the present circumstances. In fact, in Goodyear Atomic Corporation v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 182, 108 S.Ct. 1704, 1710, 100 L.Ed.2d 158 (1988), the United States Supreme Court specifically bypassed deciding whether a state could directly regulate operations at a federal facility operated by a private contractor.

"It is well settled that activities on federal installations are shielded by the Supremacy Clause from direct regulation unless Congress provides `clear and unambiguous' authorization for such regulation." Goodyear Atomic Corp., 486 U.S. at 180, 108 S.Ct. at 1709. Of note, "Hancock, thus establishe[d] that a federally owned facility performing a federal function is shielded from direct state regulation, even though the federal function is carried out by a private contractor, unless Congress clearly authorizes such regulation." Id., 486 U.S. at 181, 108 S.Ct. at 1710 (citing Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 179, 96 S.Ct. 2006, 2012-13, 48 L.Ed.2d 555 (1976)). This rule is all the more applicable when the enclave is a facility of the United States Navy, and a private contractor performs only one of many federal functions on the base.

This Court finds that the application of either the first or second theory is most consistent with the language of the Constitution and federal enclave jurisprudence. Application of either regime leads to the dismissal of Plaintiffs' state law claims.⁷ See Celli v. Shoell, 995 F.Supp. 1337, 1341-46 (D.Ut.1998) (state laws not enacted at time of cession of air force base were not applicable to employees of private employer at base); Miller v.. Wackenhut Servs., Inc., 808 F.Supp. 697, 699-700 (W.D.Mo.1992) (state antidiscrimination laws not applicable to employee of private contractor on federal enclave); see also George v. UXB Int'l, Inc., 1996 WL 241624, at *3-*4 (N.D.Ca. May 3, 1996) (state wage and hours legislation not applicable to employment of employees of private contractor performing work at federal enclave). Plaintiffs allege claims under Puerto Rico laws which only came into effect...