Jimenez v. Superior Court

• Citation: 82 Cal.App.4th 856,98 Cal.Rptr.2d 587
• Decision Date: 01 August 2000
• Docket Number: No. D034723.,D034723.
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: Filipina JIMENEZ et al. Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of San Diego County, Respondent; T.M. Cobb Company et al. Real Parties in Interest.

98 Cal.Rptr.2d 587

82 Cal.App.4th 856

Filipina JIMENEZ et al. Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of San Diego County, Respondent T.M. Cobb Company et al. Real Parties in Interest.

No. D034723.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1.

August 1, 2000.

Review Granted November 15, 2000.

Eppsteiner & Associates, Stuart M. Eppsteiner, San Diego, and Neal A. Markowitz for Petitioners.

No appearance for Respondent.

Acker, Kowalick & Whipple and Brian F. Drazich as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Respondent.

McAtee & Harmeyer and Jeff G. Harmeyer, San Diego, for Real Party in Interest Viking Industries, Inc.

Horton & Ryan and William B. Sullivan, San Diego, for Real Party in Interest T.M. Cobb Company.

McDONALD, J.

In this opinion we conclude manufacturers of defective windows installed in mass-produced homes may be subject to strict products liability. In reaching our conclusion, we disagree with the contrary holding in Casey v. Overhead Door Corp. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 112, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 603 (Casey).

Petitioners Filipina and Nestor Jimenez (Plaintiffs) filed a petition for a peremptory writ of mandate and/or prohibition seeking reversal of the trial court's orders granting the summary adjudication motions of Real Parties in Interest T.M. Cobb Company (Cobb) and Viking Industries, Inc. (Viking, and together with Cobb, Defendants).¹ Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred by relying on Casey to conclude that as a matter of law Defendants, who manufactured allegedly defective windows installed in Plaintiffs' home, were not subject to strict products liability. We grant the petition.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs own a home in the Galleria subdivision of 82 single family homes in the Scripps Ranch area of San Diego. McMillin Scripps II (McMillin) apparently was the developer of the Galleria subdivision. McMillin also was the developer of the Renaissance subdivision of 86 single family homes in the Scripps Ranch area. McMillin entered into a contract with Minnoch Supply Co. (Minnoch) to supply and install windows and glass doors in at least some of the Renaissance homes. Cobb designed and manufactured aluminum frames, windows and glass doors installed by Minnoch. McMillin also apparently entered into a contract for the installation of windows manufactured by Viking in certain homes in the Galleria and Renaissance subdivisions.²

The windows installed in the Galleria and Renaissance homes leaked and caused damage to the homes. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and other Galleria and Renaissance homeowners, filed a class action complaint against Defendants, Minnoch and Medallion, alleging causes of action for strict products liability and negligence. The complaint alleged Defendants, Minnoch and Medallion "designed, developed, manufactured, produced, supplied and placed into the stream of commerce the defective windows" and that the windows "failed due to defective design, development and manufacturing, causing property damage."³

Cobb filed a motion for summary adjudication on the strict products liability cause of action. Cobb argued Casey held that, absent a special relationship with the developer of the homes, a manufacturer of windows or other components installed in mass-produced homes as a matter of law has no strict products liability to the homeowner. Cobb submitted a separate statement of undisputed material facts in which it stated it did not have a special relationship or any agreement with McMillin.

Plaintiffs opposed Cobb's motion for summary adjudication, arguing that Casey was incorrectly decided and factually distinguishable. They argued Cobb, as a manufacturer of component parts of massproduced homes, placed defective windows in the stream of commerce and should be subject to strict products liability. They further argued triable issues of material fact existed that precluded summary adjudication. Plaintiffs submitted a separate statement of facts in which they stated that Cobb's windows were defectively designed and manufactured and "caused damage to other parts of the Plaintiffs['] homes, including stucco, insulation, framing, drywall, paint, wall coverings, floor coverings, baseboards, and other parts of the homes."

Viking apparently filed a motion to join in Cobb's motion for summary adjudication.

The trial court granted Cobb's motion for summary adjudication, stating:

"A component part supplier in a mass residential development cannot be held strictly liable for damage which is caused to the home absent some special type of relationship. Casey v. Overhead Door Corp.[, supra,] 74 Cal.App.4th 112, 119-120 and La Jolla Village Homeowners['] [Assn.] v. Superior Court (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1131, 1142, 1144-[1146] . It is undisputed that this case involves a mass[-]produced residential development.... It is also undisputed that there was no special relationship between [Cobb] and McMillin which would place additional responsibilities on [Cobb].... [Cobb] was responsible for the design and manufacturing of the windows at the Renaissance project.... Based on the recent law as set forth in Casey, [supra], [Plaintiffs] cannot as a matter of law hold [Cobb] responsible for the defective windows because [Cobb was] merely a component part manufacturer and this is not allowed when dealing in construction defect claims arising from a mass residential development."

The court denied Viking's joinder motion on the ground it was untimely filed and served.

The parties stipulated that the trial court's order granting Cobb's summary adjudication motion would apply also in favor of Viking. The parties further stipulated that Plaintiffs' period for filing a petition for class certification would be extended until 20 days after our decision on Plaintiffs' petition. The trial court issued an order approving the parties' stipulation, thereby in effect granting summary adjudication in favor of Viking.

Plaintiffs filed this petition; we issued an order to show cause why the relief requested in the petition should not be granted and heard oral argument.⁴

DISCUSSION

I Summary Adjudication Standard of Review

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication is "to discover whether the parties possess evidence requiring the fact-weighing procedures of a trial. [Citations.]" (Appalachian Ins. Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1, 10, 262 Cal. Rptr. 716.) Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (f)(1)⁵ provides: "A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action ... if that party contends that the cause of action has no merit.... A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action...." The moving party may show a cause of action has no merit by negating an essential element or by establishing a complete defense to that cause of action. (Toigo v. Town of Ross (1998) 70 Cal.App.4th 309, 324, 82 Cal. Rptr.2d 649; City of Emeryville v. Superior Court (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 21, 23-25, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 826.) "A motion for summary adjudication proceeds in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment." (Toigo, supra, at p. 324, 82 Cal. Rptr.2d 649; Lunardi v. Great-West Life Assurance Co. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 807, 819, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 56; Westlye v. Look Sports, Inc. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1715, 1727, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 781.) As an appellate court, we conduct a de novo review to determine whether there are any triable issues of material fact that preclude summary adjudication. (Lunardi, supra, at p. 819, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 56; Westlye, supra, at p. 1727, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 781; Appalachian Ins. Co., supra, at p. 11, 262 Cal.Rptr. 716.) An appellate court "make[s] its own independent determination of the construction and effect of the papers submitted [citation], and the validity of the ruling is reviewable irrespective of the reasons stated. [Citation.]" (Preis v. American Indemnity Co. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 752, 757, 269 Cal.Rptr. 617.)

II Strict Products Liability Generally

California first adopted the doctrine of strict products liability in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 57, which stated at pages 62 and 63, 27 Cal.Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897: "A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being.... [¶] ... [¶] ... The purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves."

The doctrine of strict products liability applies to all persons in the chain of distribution of a defective product, including manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers. (Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548, 560, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 607, 882 P.2d 298; Bay Summit Community Assn. v. Shell Oil Co. (1996) 51 Cal. App.4th 762, 773, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 322.) In Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co. (1964) 61 Cal.2d 256, at pages 262-263, 37 Cal.Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d 168, the court applied the doctrine of strict products liability to a retailer, stating: "Strict liability' on the manufacturer and retailer alike affords maximum protection to the injured plaintiff and works no injustice to the defendants, for they can adjust the costs of such protection between them in the course of their continuing business relationship." Strict products liability may also apply to persons who are not directly in the vertical chain of distribution of a defective product, but who "play an integral role in the `producing and marketing enterprise' of a defective product and profit from placing the product into the stream of commerce. [Citations.]" (Bay Summit Community Assn., supra, at p. 773, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 322.) "Unlike negligence, in which the focus is on the...