Jimenez v. Wood County
Decision Date | 22 September 2010 |
Docket Number | No. 09-40892.,09-40892. |
Parties | Oscar Gabriel JIMENEZ; Chandra Rae Jimenez, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. WOOD COUNTY, TEXAS; Sheriff Dwaine Daugherty, Defendants-Appellants. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Edwin E. Wright, III, Stradley & Wright, Dallas, TX, Joe C. Tooley, Rockwall, TX, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Robert Scott Davis, David Ryan Herring Iglesias, Flowers Davis, P.L.L.C., Tyler, TX, for Defendants-Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.
Before GARZA and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges, and LYNN * , District Judge.
Appellants Wood County, Texas, and Sheriff Dwaine Daugherty (collectively “the County”) appeal the judgment against them pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as the district court's award of attorney fees. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm.
Plaintiffs Oscar and Chandra Jimenez (“the Jimenezes”) operated a bar in an area of Wood County that Sheriff Daugherty identified as associated with significant amounts of drug activity. Agents of the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission(“TABC”), in coordination with officers of the Wood County Sheriff's Department, conducted a raid on the bar. During the raid, the TABC agents had an initial confrontation with Mr. Jimenez, after which Mr. Jimenez fled and the agents were unable to find him. Agents eventually discovered him locked in the trunk of an automobile registered to the Jimenezes. Ms. Jimenez, who had the keys to the automobile, unlocked the trunk for the agents after multiple requests. Ms. Jimenez was arrested for hindering apprehension, which the parties agree was a Class A misdemeanor under these circumstances. She was taken to the Wood County jail where an employee of the Wood County Sheriff's Department performed a strip search on her. The parties agree that, at the time, it was the department's policy to perform strip searches on all detainees entering the jail who were arrested for a felony, Class A misdemeanor, or Class B misdemeanor. 1 Mr. Jimenez was also arrested.
The Jimenezes sued the TABC, Wood County, and Sheriff Daugherty under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of their constitutional rights arising out of their arrests, the TABC's alleged use of excessive force against Mr. Jimenez, and the strip search of Ms. Jimenez. The claims against the TABC were eventually settled and dismissed. The claim against the County based on the strip search of Ms. Jimenez proceeded to trial. The jury entered a verdict finding the County liable for violating Ms. Jimenez's rights under the Fourth Amendment and imposing actual damages of $55,000, as well as punitive damages of $5,000 against Sheriff Daugherty. The Jimenezes then sought $222,780 in attorney fees and $43,337.83 in expenses pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Upon review of the claimed fees, the district court granted $157,394.60 in fees and $37,153.95 in expenses. The County appeals from both the judgment against it and the fee award.
The County argues that it was not required to base its search of Ms. Jimenez on reasonable suspicion for two reasons. First, it argues that we should reverse our prior precedents and hold that, under Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979), the Fourth Amendment permits visual strip searches of all jail detainees upon being booked into a detention facility, regardless of reasonable suspicion. Second, the County argues in the alternative that the district court erred in classifying hindering apprehension as a “minor offense,” and that the nature of Ms. Jimenez's offense therefore justified the search regardless of the lack of individualized reasonable suspicion. For the following reasons, we disagree.
The County argues that we should hold that there is no requirement of reasonable suspicion for strip searches of newly arrested detainees regardless of the offense giving rise to the arrest, overruling a number of cases we have decided under Wolfish. 2 In Wolfish, the Supreme Court held that strip searches in a prison setting could be performed based on “less than probable cause.” 441 U.S. at 560, 99 S.Ct. 1861. We have repeatedly concluded that, under Wolfish, a strip search of an individual arrested for a minor offense must be premised on reasonable suspicion that the detainee is carrying weapons or contraband. See, e.g., Kelly v. Foti, 77 F.3d 819, 821 (5th Cir.1996) (); Watt v. City of Richardson Police Dep't, 849 F.2d 195, 198 (5th Cir.1988) ( ); Stewart v. Lubbock County, Tex., 767 F.2d 153, 156-57 (5th Cir.1985) ().
The County argues that we should overrule those cases to bring our precedents into line with “the growing trend” among courts. As the County concedes, interpretations of Wolfish vary greatly between circuits. See, e.g., Bull, 595 F.3d at 980-81 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc) ( ); Powell, 541 F.3d at 1314 (en banc) ( ); Roberts v. Rhode Island, 239 F.3d 107, 112-13 (1st Cir.2001) ( ); Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d 796, 802 (2d Cir.1986) (, )cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1020, 107 S.Ct. 3263, 97 L.Ed.2d 762 (1987).
“[A] panel of this court can only overrule a prior panel decision if ‘such overruling is unequivocally directed by controlling Supreme Court precedent.’ ” Martin v. Medtronic, Inc., 254 F.3d 573, 577 (5th Cir.2001) (quoting United States v. Zuniga-Salinas, 945 F.2d 1302, 1306 (5th Cir.1991)). Thus, even if there is a trend in favor of abolishing reasonable suspicion requirements in this setting, a trend alone does not justify a panel reversing prior decisions of the court. Because the County has not identified a Supreme Court case that unequivocally directs us to do otherwise, we must consider this case under our existing precedents.
The County argues next that the district court erred in concluding that hindering apprehension is a “minor offense” and by instructing the jury accordingly. Specifically, it argues that the seriousness of the offense and the fact that it could result in up to a year of incarceration establish that the offense is not “minor.” A party challenging a jury instruction must show that the charge, as a whole, created a “substantial and ineradicable doubt” as to whether the jury was properly instructed and that the error “could ... have affected the outcome of the case.” Taita Chem. Co. Ltd. v. Westlake Styrene, LP, 351 F.3d 663, 667 (5th Cir.2003) (quoting FDIC v. Mijalis, 15 F.3d 1314, 1318 (5th Cir.1994); Bender v. Brumley, 1 F.3d 271, 276-77 (5th Cir.1993)). Under our precedents, the question of whether hindering apprehension is a minor offense is a component of the broader Wolfish balancing test for determining the reasonableness of the search. See Stewart, 767 F.2d at 156-57 ( ). “We review questions of law, including whether the district court's ultimate conclusions of Fourth Amendment reasonableness are correct, de novo.” United States v. Maldonado, 472 F.3d 388, 392 (5th Cir.2006) (citing United States v. Paige, 136 F.3d 1012, 1017 (5th Cir.1998)).
The Jimenezes argue that this challenge was not sufficiently preserved due to the cursory nature of the County's objection at trial, in particular the fact that the objection did not explicitly challenge the court's instruction to the jury that reasonable suspicion was required for the search. The County, however, did note its objection to the district court's “finding that [misdemeanor hindering arrest] was a minor offense as a matter of law,” and the district court replied that it had considered the relevant precedent and concluded that it was. The County is correct to point out that, under our precedents, the “minor offense” determination foreclosed the possibility of a ruling that reasonable suspicion was not required. Although the County might have been better served by a more thorough and explicit challenge, its actions were sufficient to preserve the issue of whether hindering apprehension was a minor offense.
An individual commits hindering apprehension when he, “with intent to hinder the arrest, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of another for an offense ... (1) harbors or conceals the other; (2) provides or aids in providing the other with any means of avoiding arrest or effecting escape; or (3) warns the other of impending discovery or apprehension.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.05(a). The County concedes that, under these circumstances, hindering apprehension is a Class A Misdemeanor punishable by a fine not to exceed $4,000, incarceration for a term not to exceed one year, or both. Id. § 38.05(c), § 12.21. However, “if the person who is harbored, concealed, provided with a means of avoiding arrest or effecting escape, or warned of discovery or apprehension is under arrest for, charged with, or...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Gilmore v. Audubon Nature Inst., Inc.
...1974) [, abrogated on other grounds by Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 109 S.Ct. 939, 103 L.Ed.2d 67 (1989) ]. Jimenez v. Wood Cnty., 621 F.3d 372, 379-80 (5th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted) (emphasis added)."The lodestar may not be adjusted due to a Johnson factor, however, if the crea......
-
Bame v. Dillard
...strip searched on less than reasonable suspicion that they are hiding contraband or weapons. More recent cases include Jimenez v. Wood Cnty., 621 F.3d 372 (5th Cir. 2010); Sterns v. Clarkson, 615 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir 2010); Archuleta v. Wagner, 523 F.3d 1278, 1282, 1286 (10th Cir. 2008); and......
-
Jimenez v. Wood Cnty.
...$157,394.60 in attorneys' fees, and $37,153.95 in costs. The County appealed, and a panel of this court affirmed. Jimenez v. Wood Cnty., Tex., 621 F.3d 372 (5th Cir.2010). We granted rehearing en banc and vacated the panel opinion. Jimenez v. Wood Cnty., Tex., 626 F.3d 870 (5th Cir.2010).II......
-
Saldivar v. Rodela
...the lodestar amount, the Court multiplies the reasonable hourly rate by the number of hours reasonably expended. Jimenez v. Wood Cnty., Tex., 621 F.3d 372, 379 (5th Cir.2010). For Attorney Brown, the Court multiplies 71.8 hours by the rate of $250, to arrive at the lodestar amount of $17,95......