Jimmie Luecke Children P'ship, Ltd. v. Pruncutz
| Decision Date | 16 August 2013 |
| Docket Number | NO. 03-10-00840-CV,03-10-00840-CV |
| Parties | Jimmie Luecke Children Partnership, Ltd., Appellant v. Elaine Pruncutz, John Pruncutz, and Amy Peters, Appellees |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
NO. 11,936, HONORABLE TERRY L. FLENNIKEN, JUDGE PRESIDING
Appellant Jimmie Luecke Children Partnership, Ltd. (Partnership) challenges a final judgment in which the district court, following a bench trial in a partition suit, approved a commissioners' report partitioning land owned by the Partnership and Appellees Elaine Pruncutz, her husband John Pruncutz, and her daughter Amy Peters (collectively, Pruncutz).
Pruncutz filed this suit to partition in kind a 525.39-acre tract of land between their interest and the interest owned by the Partnership. The trial court rendered an interlocutory judgment finding that the property was susceptible to partition, determined Pruncutz and the Partnership each owned a 50% interest, ordered that Pruncutz's share of the property should include the homestead, and appointed three commissioners to partition the property. We affirmed the interlocutory judgment in a memorandum opinion. Jimmie Luecke Children P'ship, Ltd. v. Pruncutz, No. 03-03-00388-CV, 2005 WL 910144 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 21, 2005, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
In this appeal from the trial court's final judgment approving the commissioners' report, the Partnership challenges only the location of the access easement granted to its severed tract by the partition. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
BACKGROUND
The commissioners' report approved by the trial court partitioned the 525.39-acre property at issue into two tracts: (1) a 300-acre tract awarded to the Partnership running along the western and southern borders of the property, with a narrow strip of land extending north to connect to the only public road with access to the property, Farm-to-Market Road 2239 (FM 2239), and (2) a 225.39-acre tract awarded to Pruncutz on the northeast portion of the property which includes Pruncutz's homestead.1
With regard to access, the commissioners' report provides the Partnership a direct means of access by granting it a narrow strip of undeveloped land in the northwest portion of the Partnership's tract that connects directly to FM 2239.2 Because the commissioners awarded the Partnership a direct means to access its property from a public road, the Texas Property Code did not require the commissioners to award the Partnership an easement across Pruncutz's severed tract. See Tex. Prop. Code § 23.006 ().Nevertheless, the commissioners elected to also grant the Partnership an additional means to access its property by granting it an easement along the eastern edge of Pruncutz's tract.3 This easement provides the Partnership with access to the southeastern corner of its tract from an undedicated roadway connecting to the easement on the northeast corner of Pruncutz's tract and running to FM 2239 across an adjoining landowner's property. The only commissioner present at trial testified that the commissioners wanted to impartially provide both parties with "good access" to their tracts and that they granted the additional easement to provide the Partnership access to the back of its property during flooding.
The commissioners did not, however, agree to the Partnership's request to provide another means of access via an easement across the middle of Pruncutz's tract. The easement sought by the Partnership would run along an undedicated roadway extending horizontally across the middle portion of Pruncutz's tract—from its northeastern corner to the western border where it meets the Partnership's tract—and would bring the Partnership's route within a couple hundred feet of Pruncutz's homestead. This roadway does not have direct access to a public road, but rather connects to the undedicated roadway on the northeast corner of Pruncutz's tract that extends to FM 2239 across the adjoining landowner's property. Although the parties have historically accessed their property from FM 2239 via the undedicated roadway extending across their neighbor's property, neither party has a recorded easement to travel across the adjoining landowner's property.
The Partnership filed an objection to the commissioners' report—as authorized by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 771—objecting to the access granted to the severed tracts by the partition. In support of the Partnership's objections, Jimmie Luecke—the general partner for the Partnership—testified that the access granted to the Partnership in the partition was "a lot worse" than the access granted to Pruncutz because the Partnership's easement was prone to flooding in heavy rain, but the roadway extending across the middle of Pruncutz's tract had never flooded and had existed as long as he could remember. After hearing the evidence, the trial court issued a final judgment confirming and partitioning the land in accordance with the commissioners' report. The Partnership filed a motion for new trial alleging there was insufficient evidence to support the judgment.
In two issues on appeal, the Partnership challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's final judgment, contending (1) the Partnership was entitled to an implied easement as a matter of law along the roadway extending across the middle of Pruncutz's tract, and (2) the trial court's implied finding that the commissioners' report was equal and just is factually insufficient because the easement given to the Partnership is prone to flooding. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 771.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Two judgments are rendered in a partition suit. Griffin v. Wolfe, 610 S.W.2d 466, 466 (Tex. 1980) (per curiam). The first judgment, sometimes referred to as an interlocutory decree, determines the interest of each of the joint owners and whether the property is susceptible to partition. Tex. R. Civ. P. 760, 761; see also Snow v. Donelson, 242 S.W.3d 570, 572 (Tex. App.—Waco 2007, no pet.); Carson v. Hagaman, 884 S.W.2d 194, 195 n.1(Tex. App.—Eastland 1994, no writ). If the property is susceptible to partition, the trial court will appoint commissioners to partition the property in accordance with the respective interests of the joint owners. Tex. R. Civ. P. 761. The commissioners then will issue a report partitioning the land in accordance with the interlocutory decree and the requirements of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 769. Tex. R. Civ. P. 769. Within thirty days of the date the commissioners' report is filed, either party to the suit may file objections to the report. Tex. R. Civ. P. 771. The party objecting to the commissioners' report has the burden of proving that the report is materially erroneous or that it unequally and unjustly partitions the property. Id.; Ellis v. First City Nat'l Bank, 864 S.W.2d 555, 557 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1993, no writ).
The second judgment, sometimes referred to as the final decree, approves the report of the commissioners and partitions the property. Snow, 242 S.W.3d at 572; Marmion v. Wells, 246 S.W.2d 704, 705 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1952, writ ref'd). If the trial court finds the report to be "erroneous in any material respect, or unequal and unjust," the trial court must reject the report and appoint other commissioners to partition the land. Tex. R. Civ. P. 771; see also Snow, 242 S.W.3d at 572. Although the first judgment is often characterized as preliminary or interlocutory, both judgments are final for purposes of appeal. Marmion, 246 S.W.2d at 705. Matters decided in the interlocutory decree cannot be reviewed in an appeal from the final decree. Id.
The Partnership here challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's final decree. The trial court's findings in a partition suit, as in the trial of all other cases, may be attacked on appeal for legal and factual sufficiency. Carson, 884 S.W.2d at 198. However, the Partnership made no request to the trial court for findings of factand conclusions of law. Absent such findings and conclusions, we will assume the trial judge found every fact proposition necessary to sustain the judgment. Grimes v. Collie, 733 S.W.2d 338, 341 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1987, no writ). A trial court's findings are reviewable for legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence by the same standards that are applied in reviewing evidence supporting a jury's findings. Catalina v. Blasdel, 881 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. 1994).
Because the Partnership attacks the legal sufficiency of the trial court's finding that there was not an implied easement along the undedicated roadway extending across Pruncutz's tract—an issue upon which the Partnership had the burden of proof—it must demonstrate its claims were established as a matter of law by the evidence in the trial record. See Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 767 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Tex. 1989). In reviewing a "matter of law" challenge, the reviewing court must first examine the record for evidence that supports the finding, while ignoring all evidence to the contrary. Id. If there is no evidence to support the finding, the reviewing court will then examine the entire record to determine if the contrary proposition is established as a matter of law. Id. The point of error should be sustained only if the contrary proposition is conclusively established. Id.
For its factual sufficiency challenge to the trial court's implied finding that the partition report was just and equal, the Partnership must demonstrate on appeal that the adverse finding, upon which it had the burden of proof, is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46...
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