Jinks v. Richland County
Decision Date | 22 April 2002 |
Docket Number | No. 25446.,25446. |
Citation | 563 S.E.2d 104,349 S.C. 298 |
Parties | Susan JINKS as Personal Representative of the Estate of Carl H. Jinks, Respondent, v. RICHLAND COUNTY and Dr. Charles Eskridge, Defendants, of whom Richland County is Appellant. |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Andrew F. Lindemann, William H. Davidson, II, David L. Morrison, and Alice Price Adams, of Davidson, Morrison and Lindemann, P.A., of Columbia, for appellant.
Bradford P. Simpson, Theile Branham, and John D. Kassel, of Suggs & Kelly Lawyers, P.A.; and James M. Griffin, of Simmons & Griffin, L.L.C., all of Columbia, for respondent.
James E. Parham, Jr., of Irmo, for defendant Dr. Charles Eskridge.
Respondent Susan Jinks brought this wrongful death and survival action on behalf of her husband, Carl H. Jinks (Jinks and his wife are referred to collectively as "Jinks"), who died while incarcerated at Appellant Richland County's (County's) Detention Center. The jury returned an $80,000 verdict in Jinks' favor for wrongful death. County appeals.
On October 14, 1994, Jinks was arrested for failure to pay child support, booked, and confined at County's Detention Center. He died at the Detention Center four days later.
In 1996, Jinks brought an action in the United States District Court against County, its detention center director, and the detention center physician alleging the defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). In addition, the complaint alleged supplemental state claims of outrage and negligence under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act (the Tort Claims Act). See S.C.Code Ann. §§ 15-78-10 to -200 (Supp.2001). The district court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment on the Section 1983 claim,1 issued an order declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state claims, and dismissed the state claims without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(C)(3) (1993).
On December 18, 1997, sixteen days after the federal judge issued his order dismissing the state claims, Jinks filed the present wrongful death and survival action alleging various negligent acts by County and its detention center physician. County answered, claiming immunity from suit under the Tort Claims Act, violation of the statute of limitations, collateral estoppel, and other defenses.
Does 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(d) violate the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution?
County contends Jinks failed to bring this state court action within the two year statute of limitations provided by the Tort Claims Act and, therefore, the claim is barred. See § 15-78-100(a).2 Jinks maintains the statute of limitations was tolled pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) ( ) while the original lawsuit was pending in federal court. In response, County asserts in enacting § 1367(d), Congress exceeded its Article III and Necessary and Proper Clause3 powers, thereby violating the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Specifically, County claims § 1367(d) infringes on South Carolina's sovereign immunity by extending the length of time in which a person may sue a political subdivision of the State on grounds of negligence. We agree with County.
In relevant part, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367 provides:
Section 1367 was adopted as part of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990. Pub.L. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990). "The statute ... gives federal courts supplemental jurisdiction to the limits the case-and-controversy clause of Article III of the [United States] Constitution permits." Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Edward H. Cooper, 13 Federal Practice and Procedure § 3523.1 at 143 (2d ed. Supp.2001).4 The Tenth Amendment provides "the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively or to the people." U.S. Const. amend X. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992).
[W]e ask two questions to determine whether a statute violates [the Tenth Amendment]. First, whether the regulation it embodies is within Congress' power as being within those enumerated in the Constitution. Second, whether, even if so, the means of regulation employed yet impermissibly infringe upon state sovereignty.
United States v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 476, 480 (4th Cir.1997), referring to New York v. United States, supra.
Article III of the United States Constitution establishes the basis for the judicial power of federal courts. By virtue of Article III and the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress has power to enact laws that govern the practice and procedure in federal courts. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 85 S.Ct. 1136, 14 L.Ed.2d 8 (1965).
The Necessary and Proper Clause, referred to as the "Sweeping Clause," provides that Congress is empowered "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. Gary Lawson and Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper" Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 274 (1993). Within the Sweeping Clause, "necessary" does not mean absolutely required but "convenient, or useful, or essential to another." McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 413, 17 U.S. 316, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819). In order for a law to be "proper" within the meaning of the Clause, it must not violate the principles of state sovereignty. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 117 S.Ct. 2365, 138 L.Ed.2d 914 (1997).
County maintains § 1367(d) is neither necessary nor proper. First, County asserts since the tolling provision does not apply until after the federal action is dismissed, the statute is not "necessary" to federal practice and procedure. Second, County argues § 1367(d) is not "proper" because it interferes with a state's sovereignty by abrogating the statute of limitations. More particularly, County claims Congress lacks the constitutional authority to extend the statute of limitations governing actions in which the State has waived its sovereign immunity.
County correctly asserts § 1367(d) regulates state court practice and procedure as it tolls the statute of limitations for a state claim asserted in state court. However, the tolling provision also affects federal practice as it allows litigants to pursue actions in federal court without giving up access to state court in the event the federal jurisdictional basis is determined not to exist. It governs federal practice and procedure as it eliminates the need for federal judges to retain supplemental claims which would be dismissed as stale if pursued in state court.5 Section 1367(d) is a useful "aid to the exercise of federal jurisdiction," and, therefore, is "necessary" within the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause. Brief for Petitioner at 27, Raygor v. Regents of the Univ. of Minnesota, 2001 WL 913842 (Case No. 00-1514).
We conclude, however, that, as applied to the States and their political subdivisions in tort actions, passage of § 1367(d) is not "proper" within the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause. In these circumstances, the tolling provision interferes with the State's sovereign authority to establish the extent to which its political subdivisions are subject to suit.
[T]he constitution of the United States, which recognizes and preserves the autonomy and independence of the states,—independence in their legislative and independence in their judicial departments. Supervision over either the legislative or the judicial action of the states is in no case permissible except as to matters by the constitution specifically authorized or delegated to the United States. Any interference with either, except as thus permitted, is an invasion of the authority of the State and, to that extent, a denial of its independence.
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938).
As a matter of sovereignty, the State has the authority to determine whether it consents to suit within its own court system. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 749, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999) (); Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 414, 99 S.Ct. 1182, 59 L.Ed.2d 416 (1979) (...
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