Jinks v. State
| Decision Date | 19 December 1901 |
| Citation | 40 S.E. 320,114 Ga. 430 |
| Parties | JINKS v. STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. The statute of limitations applicable in the trial of a criminal case is that which relates to the offense charged in the indictment, and not that which relates to any minor offense of which the accused might be convicted under the indictment.
2. When, in the trial of one charged with the offense of seduction, the judge erroneously charges the jury that the accused cannot be convicted of fornication, unless that offense was committed within two years immediately preceding the finding of the bill of indictment, such charge, although erroneous, will not require the granting of a new trial, when it is apparent, from the charge as a whole, that the jury must have understood that if they believed the accused was guilty of fornication, and not seduction, they should acquit him.
3. Under the provisions of Pen. Code, § 388, as amended by the act approved December 20, 1899 (Acts 1899, p. 42), a prosecution for seduction cannot be stopped by an offer of marriage unless such offer is made before arraignment and pleading.
4. In the trial of one charged with seduction, alleged to have been accomplished by persuasion and promises of marriage, it is not essential to a conviction that the evidence should disclose that there was a definite time fixed for the marriage to take place.
5. In the trial of one charged with seduction, alleged to have been accomplished in the manner above indicated, evidence of promises of marriage, made by the accused subsequently to the time when the alleged seduction was claimed to have been accomplished, is admissible.
6. The evidence authorized the verdict, and none of the rulings or charges complained of which were insisted on in the brief filed in this court by counsel for the plaintiff in error were, even if erroneous, of such a character as to require the granting of a new trial.
Error from superior court, Gwinnett county; R. B. Russell, Judge.
M. W Jinks was convicted of seduction, and he brings error. Affirmed.
Jno. R Cooper and Oscar Brown, for plaintiff in error.
C. H Brand, Sol. Gen., for the State.
The accused was convicted of the offense of seduction, and brings his case here upon a bill of exceptions assigning error upon the overruling of his motion for a new trial.
1, 2. The court charged the jury, in substance, that, while under an indictment for seduction the accused might be convicted of fornication, a verdict for fornication would not be authorized unless the jury believed that the offense had been committed within two years prior to the finding of the indictment. This charge was erroneous. It is settled law in this state that the statute of limitations applicable in a criminal case is that which relates to the offense charged in the indictment, and not to any minor offense included therein of which the accused might be found guilty. Reynolds v. State, 1 Ga. 222; Clark v. State, 12 Ga. 350; Wall v. State, 75 Ga. 474. There was evidence authorizing the jury to find that sexual intercourse took place between the accused and the daughter of the prosecutor within four years immediately preceding the finding of the indictment, and as an indictment for seduction would not be barred until after the lapse of four years, a verdict for fornication would have been warranted if the jury had believed that this offense was committed, notwithstanding the fact that the act of sexual intercourse took place more than two years prior to the finding of the indictment. While this charge was clearly erroneous, it will not be sufficient to require the granting of a new trial unless the accused was in some manner prejudiced thereby. When the charge of the judge is taken as a whole, we do not think the accused was prejudiced by this error. The charge, in substance, instructed the jury that, if the accused was guilty of seduction, they should so find, and that, if they believed that he was guilty only of fornication, and that offense was not committed within two years prior to the finding of the indictment, they should acquit him. Under this charge, if the jury believed that the accused was guilty only of the minor offense, they would have been compelled to return a verdict of acquittal. Their finding that he was guilty of seduction shows that they did not credit the statement of the accused, upon which alone a verdict of fornication could have been legally based. Taking the charge as a whole, it was upon this branch of the case more favorable to the accused than he had any right to demand.
3. During the progress of the trial, and after two arguments had been made to the jury, the accused, in open court, offered to marry the woman alleged to have been seduced, and at the time of this offer he produced a marriage license regularly granted by the ordinary, and a bond approved by that officer for the sum of $500, conditioned for the maintenance and support of the female and her child. The court declined to consider in any way this offer of marriage, upon the ground that it came too late, and refused to admit in evidence before the jury the offer of marriage, as well as the license and bond. These rulings of the court are assigned as error. There was no error in either of these rulings. The Penal Code, § 388, as amended by the act of 1899 (Acts 1899, p 42), provides that a prosecution for seduction may be stopped by a bona fide and continuing offer of marriage on the part of the alleged seducer, if such offer is made at any time...
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