Neosho R-V School Dist. v. Clark

• Decision Date: 15 January 2003
• Docket Number: No. 01-2975.,No. 01-2889.,01-2889.,01-2975.
• Citation: 315 F.3d 1022
• Parties: NEOSHO R-V SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Kathy CLARK, Garry Clark, as parents of Robert Clark; Robert Clark, a minor, by his next friends Garry Clark & Kathy Clark, his parents, Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

315 F.3d 1022

NEOSHO R-V SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Kathy CLARK, Garry Clark, as parents of Robert Clark; Robert Clark, a minor, by his next friends Garry Clark & Kathy Clark, his parents, Appellees/Cross-Appellants.

No. 01-2889.

No. 01-2975.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: May 13, 2002.

Filed: January 15, 2003.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Thomas A. Mickes, argued, St. Louis, MO (Teri B. Goldman and John F. Brink, on the brief), for appellant.

Ernest Trakas, argued, Jefferson City, MO (Michael H. Finkelstein and Joshua E. Douglass, on the brief), for appellee.

Before HANSEN, Chief Judge, MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judge, and PRATT,¹ District Judge.

HANSEN, Circuit Judge.

This dispute involves a disabled student's right to a free appropriate public education within the meaning of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1487 (Supp. III 1997). The Neosho R-V School District (hereinafter "the School District") appeals the district court's² judgment that it failed to provide Robert Clark with a free appropriate public education and awarding attorneys' fees and costs to Robert Clark's parents (hereinafter "the Clarks"). The Clarks cross appeal the denial of their request for expert witness fees. We affirm.

I.

Robert Clark was a twelve-year-old special education student in the Neosho R-V School District during the 1997-98 school year. Because he suffers from Autism-Asperger's Syndrome, Robert is prone to inappropriate behavior, which, when unmanaged, largely prevents him from interacting with his peers in an acceptable manner. He also is diagnosed as having a learning disability. During the 1997-98 school year, Robert's age was equal to children in the sixth grade, but he was placed in the fifth grade resource room for special education. His instructional level was that of fourth grade, but he needed assistance with this work, and the special education teacher often moved him back to third-grade level work to decrease his misbehaviors and to increase his self-confidence.

Before the school year began, Robert's parents had initiated a due process proceeding against the School District, which resulted in a settlement agreement providing that the School District would place Robert in a self-contained classroom with mainstreaming in music. The settlement agreement also provided for a full-time paraprofessional to help Robert in school and required the School District to provide specific interventions and strategies to manage Robert's inappropriate behavior. In August 1997, and again in October 1997, the School District developed Individualized Education Plans (IEPs) for Robert. Consistent with the settlement agreement, the IEPs placed Robert in a self-contained classroom except for music class, established an IEP team to meet every two weeks and consider the possibility of additional mainstreaming, and called for a full-time paraprofessional to accompany Robert in all classes. The IEPs also stated that a behavior plan was attached to them, but the attachments were merely short-term goals and objectives that did not provide specific interventions and strategies to manage Robert's behavior problems.

Robert's special education teacher, Mrs. Sweet, and his IEP-required paraprofessional, Larry Shadday, attempted to manage Robert's behavior problems to the best of their ability. They employed several methods that might be found in a behavior management plan but which had not been actually analyzed or approved by Robert's IEP team. They also used a checklist that had been included in a plan developed during the prior school year by an outside agency, the Judevine Center for Autism. The IEP team never adopted this document and had agreed that a new behavior management plan was necessary to meet Robert's needs during the 1997-98 school year. The IEP team agreed that the new plan should not be based on Robert's past behavior. Robert's special education teacher did not begin to formally chart data in a format that could be used to develop a new behavior management plan until March 1998.

As the 1997-98 school year progressed, Robert's behavior problems increased dramatically. His challenging behaviors numbered 3 in the month of August, 10 in the month of September, and 394 by March. The School District did not attempt to formulate a new behavior management plan for Robert until April 1998, close to the end of the school year. Robert's increasingly inappropriate behavior prevented him from being included in mainstreamed classes beyond music and substantially interfered with his ability to learn.

The Clarks sought an administrative hearing as provided by the IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f). Before the hearing, the Clarks were seeking, among other things, a private placement for Robert or a more inclusive placement within the district. By the time of the administrative hearing, the issues had been narrowed to the question of whether the School District had provided the required behavior management plan necessary to ensure that Robert received a free appropriate public education.

At the hearing, the Clarks presented the expert witness testimony of Dr. Lonny Morrow. In his opinion, Robert's autism and resulting challenging behavior required the adoption of a formal behavior management plan that would include a functional behavior assessment and develop consequences and reinforcements appropriate to Robert's disability. The three-member state administrative panel chose to credit this expert testimony. Based on this testimony, the panel found that although the IEPs identified some goals and strategies for dealing with Robert's behavior problems, these were insufficient to qualify as a cohesive behavior management plan. The panel also found that the School District's late-in-the-year attempt to formulate the required behavior management plan was insufficient to meet Robert's needs.

The School District contended that Robert's academic record demonstrated he had received some benefit from his education, even if the behavior plan did not meet the expert's requirements. The administrative panel did not credit that evidence, finding it contradicted by other evidence and unsupported by the record as a whole. The panel found that the conflicting evidence left it with no clear evidence from which it could determine if or to what extent Robert had progressed or obtained any educational benefit.

Thus, the administrative panel concluded that the School District failed to develop and implement the required behavior management plan calculated to meet Robert's needs and to enable him to gain an educational benefit. The panel ordered the School District to seek the expertise of a consultant or qualified expert to devise a behavior management plan including (1) an ongoing functional behavior analysis to identify causative factors and objectionable behaviors, and (2) a list of replacement behaviors and strategies to eliminate Robert's objectionable behavior and enable him to receive educational benefits. The panel also ordered the School District to provide its staff with development training for working with students who have Asperger's Syndrome and high functioning autism.

The School District brought suit in federal district court, seeking judicial review of the administrative panel's decision. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2). On cross motions for summary judgment, the district court affirmed the panel decision that the School District had failed to provide Robert with a free appropriate public education. The district court concluded that the Clarks were prevailing parties and ordered the School District to pay attorneys' fees of $15,689.50. The district court denied the Clarks' request for expert witness fees. The School District now appeals, and the Clarks cross appeal the denial of their request for expert witness fees.

II.

A. Free Appropriate Public Education

One purpose of the IDEA is "to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs." 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). States accepting federal funding under the IDEA must "provide a disabled student with a free appropriate public education." Gill v. Columbia 93 Sch. Dist., 217 F.3d 1027, 1034 (8th Cir. 2000); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a). Congressional policies indicate a preference for educating disabled children in a mainstreamed classroom whenever possible. Gill, 217 F.3d at 1034; 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(5)(D). A team must develop a specialized course of instruction, known as an individualized education program, or "IEP," for each disabled student, taking into account that child's capabilities. Gill, 217 F.3d at 1034; 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d).

In a suit by an aggrieved party under the IDEA, the court engages in a twofold inquiry, asking (1) "has the State complied with the procedures set forth in the Act?" and (2) is the IEP "reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits?" Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-07, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982). "If these requirements are met, the State has complied with the obligations imposed by Congress and the courts can require no more." Id. at 207, 102 S.Ct. 3034. While the IDEA requires school districts to provide disabled children with a free appropriate public education, it "does not require that a school either maximize a student's potential or provide the best possible education at public expense." Fort Zumwalt Sch. Dist. v. Clynes, 119 F.3d 607, 612 (8th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1137, 118 S.Ct. 1840, 140 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1998). Instead, the requirements of the IDEA "are satisfied when a school district provides individualized education and services sufficient to provide disabled children with `some educational benefit.'" Blackmon v. Springfield R-XII Sch. Dist., 198 F.3d 648, 658 (...