Joanne S. v. Carey

• Decision Date: 25 February 1986
• Citation: 115 A.D.2d 4,498 N.Y.S.2d 817
• Parties: JOANNE S., Rosemary C., George G., Roger S., Habeba M., Jerome M., Margaret L., Audrey S., Edward A., Charles C., and Raymond S., on their behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Hugh L. CAREY, as Governor of the State of New York, James A. Prevost, as Commissioner of the New York State Office of Mental Health, Christopher Richmond, as Associate Commissioner of Mental Health for Downstate Operations, Sarah Connell, as Director of the New York City Regional Office of the Office of Mental Health, Michael Ford, as Acting Director of Manhattan Psychiatric Center, Defendants-Respondents, and James A. Krauskopf, Commissioner of the New York City Human Resources Administration and Sara Kellermann, Commissioner of the New York City Department of Mental Health, Mental Retardation, and Alcoholism Services, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 817

498 N.Y.S.2d 817

115 A.D.2d 4

JOANNE S., Rosemary C., George G., Roger S., Habeba M. Jerome M., Margaret L., Audrey S., Edward A., Charles C. and Raymond S., on their behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Hugh L. CAREY, as Governor of the State of New York, James A. Prevost, as Commissioner of the New York State Office of Mental Health, Christopher Richmond, as Associate Commissioner of Mental Health for Downstate Operations Sarah Connell, as Director of the New York City Regional Office of the Office of Mental Health, Michael Ford, as Acting Director of Manhattan Psychiatric Center Defendants-Respondents, and James A. Krauskopf, Commissioner of the New York City Human Resources Administration and Sara Kellermann, Commissioner of the New York City Department of Mental Health, Mental Retardation, and Alcoholism Services, Defendants-Appellants.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

Feb. 25, 1986.

Pamela Seider Dolgow, of counsel (Fay Leoussis, with her on brief, Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., New York City, attorney), for defendants-appellants.

Arnold D. Fleischer, of counsel (O. Peter Sherwood, with him on brief, Robert Abrams, attorney), for defendants-respondents.

Before MURPHY, P.J., and SANDLER, FEIN and ASCH, JJ.

ASCH, Justice.

There has been a bitter battle, not only in New York, but throughout America as to whether state or local governments, or private resources, alone, should bear the responsibility for sheltering the homeless. (See, e.g., Note: "Building a House of Legal Rights: A Plea for the Homeless", 59 St. John's L.Rev. 530 (Spring, 1985); "New Plan to Aid Homeless", New York Times, 12/20/85, p. B1). The matter before us is a skirmish in that battle.

The instant action was commenced by 11 State psychiatric hospital patients at Manhattan Psychiatric Center ("MPC") who have been found ready for discharge but have not been released to the community because of a lack of adequate residential placements. Plaintiffs, representing 140 similarly situated persons, claim that State officials have failed to provide them with appropriate residential placement, supervision and aftercare and that, as a result thereof, they have been and continue to be unlawfully confined at MPC. Plaintiffs seek a declaration of their right to receive residential placement, supervision and care upon their release from MPC. They also seek orders directing the State defendants to release them into community treatment settings and, generally, to "develop and provide sufficient community treatment settings to provide needed shelter and aftercare to the remainder of the plaintiff class".

Initially, the State defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, inter alia, on the ground that it presented a non-justiciable controversy. That motion was granted and the complaint dismissed. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals held that the issues raised in the complaint were justiciable. See Joanne S. v. Carey, decided together with Klostermann v. Carey, 61 N.Y.2d 525, 475 N.Y.S.2d 247, 463 N.E.2d 588.

On remand from the Court of Appeals, the State defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Prior to the return date of that motion, the State defendants also moved, pursuant to CPLR 1001, to join appellants, two New York City Commissioners and their agencies, the New York City Human Resources Administration ("HRA") and the New York City Department of Health, Mental Retardation and Alcoholism Services ("MHMRAS"). The motion to dismiss was stayed pending determination of the joinder motion.

Special Term granted the State defendants' motion to join HRA and MHMRAS as party defendants in this action. The court stated that the proposed municipal defendants "have a substantial interest in the subject matter before the court and are persons who ought be parties 'if complete relief is to be accorded between the persons who are parties to the action' (CPLR 1001)". Special Term apparently misconstrued appellants' argument when it stated that "the City officials concede that their joinder may be required at some stage in this litigation." In fact, the City opposed the joinder motion on the basis that the proposed City agencies were not necessary parties pursuant to CPLR 1001(a) and the governing case law. In the alternative, the City argued that the joinder motion was premature since the State had moved to dismiss the complaint and that such motion was sub judice, and that the State's joinder theory was based on speculation as to hypothetical court orders and not on any claim that City agencies are not presently performing any required acts. Thus, the City contended that, at most, joinder of the City agencies might be warranted at such time as the State was found to be required to provide additional services, and then only if the court were to entertain consideration of a remedy involving City participation. See CPLR 1003.

Appellants maintain that "where the State defendants have the primary obligation under § 29.15 of the Mental Hygiene Law to prepare and implement written service plans governing the discharge and conditional release of plaintiffs from a State psychiatric facility to the community, and where local social service officials and directors of local governmental units are only required under the statute to cooperate, where appropriate, with the State's discharge efforts, the court below erred in ordering municipal defendants joined as necessary parties in this action".

A party who ought to be joined is a party whose presence is necessary if complete relief is to be accorded to the persons who have already been joined or who might be inequitably affected by a judgment in the action (CPLR 1001). The primary reason for compulsory joinder of parties is to avoid multiplicity of actions and to protect nonparties whose rights should not be jeopardized if they have a material interest in the subject matter. Steinbach v. Prudential Ins. Co., 172 N.Y. 471, 65 N.E. 281; Matter of Figari v. New York Telephone Co., 32 A.D.2d 434, 303 N.Y.S.2d 245.

In making the determination whether an absentee need be joined as an indispensable party, it must be decided if the proposed party has such an interest in the litigation that the court cannot settle the controversy without necessarily considering the interests of the proposed party. It also must be determined if the court's decision in the case, in the absence of the proposed parties, will have the element of finality for the protection of those before the court. Henshel v. Held, 13 A.D.2d 771, 216 N.Y.S.2d 41; China Sugar Co. v. Andersen, Meyer & Co., 6 Misc.2d 184, 185, 152 N.Y.S.2d 507.

The State defendants founded their joinder motion solely on the obligation of officials of HRA and MHMRAS, under section 29.15(f), (h) and (n) of the Mental Hygiene Law, to cooperate with the director of a psychiatric facility such as MPC in the State's discharge efforts on behalf of a patient to be discharged or conditionally released to the community.

Essentially, the State defendants urged that since each plaintiff in this action asserts rights to housing and aftercare services under these statutory provisions, HRA and MHMRAS have the same responsibilities, if any, that the court may later find apply to the State defendants under the statute.

However, under section 29.15 of the Mental Hygiene Law, the primary responsibility for assuring that discharged State mental patients are placed in appropriate aftercare programs upon discharge rests with the State. According to the statute, certain local governmental units are merely to cooperate with the State's efforts to plan for living arrangements and aftercare for patients who are being discharged from State mental hospitals. The State has the chief responsibility for such planning process, whereas the...