Joaquin-Del Orbe v. United States
| Decision Date | 18 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:13-cr-00174-8,1:13-cr-00174-8 |
| Parties | JOSE LUIS JOAQUIN-DEL ORBE, Petitioner v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
(Judge Kane)
Presently before the Court is Petitioner Jose Luis Joaquin-Del Orbe ("Petitioner")'s motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Doc. No. 1323.) For the following reasons, the Court will grant in part and deny in part Petitioner's § 2255 motion.
On November 5, 2014, Petitioner was charged in a second superseding indictment with: (1) conspiracy to import, manufacture, distribute, and possess with the intent to manufacture and distribute one thousand (1000) grams or more of heroin, five (5) kilograms and more of cocaine hydrochloride, and fifty (50) grams or more of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count I); and (2) manufacturing, distributing, and possessing with the intent to manufacture and distribute one thousand (1000) grams or more of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (Count II). (Doc. No. 542.)
Petitioner subsequently entered into a plea agreement with the Government. (Doc. No. 1123.)1 The plea agreement called for Petitioner to plead guilty to Count I of the second superseding indictment. (Id. ¶ 1.) On January 6, 2017, Petitioner appeared before MagistrateJudge Carlson for a change of plea hearing. (Doc. No. 1143.) Magistrate Judge Carlson concluded that Petitioner was fully competent to enter an informed plea and understood the consequences of his plea, that he was pleading guilty knowingly and voluntarily, and that the plea was supported by an independent basis in fact. (Doc. No. 1145.) Magistrate Judge Carlson recommended that the Court accept Petitioner's guilty plea (id.), and on January 24, 2017, former District Judge William W. Caldwell accepted the plea of guilty (Doc. No. 1158). On July 14, 2017, Judge Caldwell sentenced Petitioner to one hundred forty (140) months' imprisonment followed by five (5) years' supervised release. (Doc. No. 1256.)
On April 16, 2018, Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Doc. No. 1305.) The above-captioned action was reassigned to the undersigned on April 23, 2018. After Petitioner completed a notice of election form indicating that he wished to withdraw his initial § 2255 motion (Doc. No. 1322) and then filed the instant (operative) § 2255 motion (Doc. No. 1323), the Government filed a brief in opposition to his first § 2255 motion (Doc. No. 1333). Petitioner filed a traverse on October 12, 2018 (Doc. No. 1343), and on June 20, 2019, the Court ordered the parties to submit additional briefing regarding Petitioner's claim that his sentencing counsel was ineffective for failing to file an appeal (Doc. No. 1379). The parties filed additional briefing in July and August of 2019 (Doc. Nos. 1383, 1385), and the Court appointed counsel to represent Petitioner (Doc. Nos. 1388, 1389) and scheduled an evidentiary hearing (Doc. No. 1390). On February 26, 2020, the Court canceled the evidentiary hearing (Doc. No. 1399) based on the parties' agreement that a hearing was unnecessary (Doc. Nos. 1397, 1398). Finally, upon the Court's directive (Doc. No. 1400), the Government filed a brief in opposition to the instant motion (Doc. No. 1406), andPetitioner filed a reply (Doc. No. 1412). Accordingly, Petitioner's motion (Doc. No. 1323) is ripe for disposition.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a), a federal prisoner may file a motion requesting that the sentencing court vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence on the basis "that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the [C]ourt was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack." See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). However, § 2255 does not afford a remedy for all errors that may have been made at trial or during sentencing. See United States v. Essig, 10 F.3d 968, 977 n.25 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185 (1979)). Rather, § 2255 is implicated only when the alleged error raises "a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice." See Addonizio, 442 U.S. at 185.
In his § 2255 motion, Petitioner requests a new sentencing hearing based on ineffective assistance of counsel. (Doc. No. 1412 at 6.) Petitioner asserts six bases in support of his request for such relief. (Doc. No. 1323.) The Court will address each asserted basis for relief in turn.
In order to establish entitlement to relief, a collateral attack of a sentence based upon a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must meet a two-part test established by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694 (1984). See George v. Sively, 254 F.3d 438, 443 (3d Cir. 2001). The first Strickland prong requires Petitioner to "establish first that counsel's performance was deficient." See Jermyn v. Horn, 266 F.3d 257, 282 (3d Cir.2001). This prong requires Petitioner to show that "counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment." See id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). To that end, Petitioner must demonstrate that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. See id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). However, "[t]here is a 'strong presumption' that counsel's performance was reasonable." See id.
Under the second Strickland prong, Petitioner "must demonstrate that he was prejudiced by counsel's errors." See id. This prong requires Petitioner to show that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." See id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). Reasonable probability is defined as "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." See id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
Petitioner first asserts that his sentencing counsel "rendered ineffective assistance of counsel when [he] did not file a [n]otice of [a]ppeal, as [Petitioner] had requested him [to do] several times." (Id. at 4.) Petitioner contends that throughout plea negotiations, he "was very clear when [he] told [his sentencing] counsel that [he] did not want to waive [his] right to appeal." (Id.) Petitioner alleges that he asked his sentencing counsel to file a notice of appeal after sentencing, but sentencing counsel failed to do so. (Id.) The Government initially argued that Petitioner's sentencing counsel could not have been ineffective for failing to file a notice of appeal given the appellate waiver in the plea agreement. (Doc. No. 1333 at 13.) However, the Government later conceded that Petitioner should be permitted to file a notice of appeal pursuant to Garza v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738 (2019), based on a letter submitted by his sentencing counselon September 13, 2019, indicating that Petitioner had asked him to file an appeal (Doc. No. 1387).2 (Doc. No. 1397 at 5-6.)
Under Strickland, "[i]n certain Sixth Amendment contexts, prejudice is presumed." See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692. One such context is where "counsel's constitutionally deficient performance deprives a defendant of an appeal that he otherwise would have taken." See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 484 (2000). In Garza, the Supreme Court clarified that the presumption of prejudice applies "even when the defendant has signed an appeal waiver." See Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 744. "Following Garza, [c]ourts have found that an appropriate remedy for a successful petitioner demonstrating that his counsel was ineffective for not filing a notice of appeal is to reenter the criminal judgment so that his appeal rights are reinstated." United States v. Pridgen, No. 17-cr-291, 2019 WL 5537893, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 25, 2019) (citing Rojas-Medina v. United States, 924 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2019)).
In response to Petitioner's request that an appeal be filed, sentencing counsel sent Petitioner a letter stating that Petitioner could not appeal his sentence (Doc. No. 1387-1), and a review of the docket indicates that a timely notice of appeal was not filed. Accordingly, the Court finds that Petitioner has sufficiently stated a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel based on sentencing counsel's failure to file a notice of appeal. See Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 744. The Court will therefore vacate and reenter Petitioner's criminal judgment and afford Petitioner fourteen (14) days to file a notice of appeal. See United States v. Lawbaugh, No. 16-cr-49, 2020 WL 954017, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 2020) (). Petitioner's appellate rights will be reinstated subject to the waiver contained in his plea agreement, which, for the reasons discussed, infra, Petitioner has failed to successfully challenge.
Petitioner next argues that his sentencing counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to request a downward departure on the basis of Petitioner's "poor health," including his diabetes, and his mother's diabetes and daily kidney dialysis. (Id.) Neither of these arguments establishes ineffective assistance of counsel.
Regarding his own health, Petitioner asserts that he had...
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