Jochims v. Hous. Methodist Sugar Land Hosp.
| Decision Date | 14 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 4:19-cv-04838 |
| Parties | MARIA JOCHIMS, Plaintiff. v. HOUSTON METHODIST SUGAR LAND HOSPITAL, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending before me is Defendant Houston Methodist Sugar Land Hospital's Motion for Summary Judgment. Dkt. 26. Having reviewed the briefing, the record, and the applicable law, I recommend that the motion be GRANTED.
On November 18, 2013, Plaintiff Maria Jochims (“Jochims”) began working for Houston Methodist Sugarland Hospital (“Houston Methodist”) as an EMT-Paramedic in the Emergency Services Department. She held that role until she was terminated on April 25, 2017. Jochims reported to Rita Richards (“Richards”), the Nurse Manager.
Jochims's employment at Houston Methodist was uneventful until she had a difficult pregnancy in 2016. Around June 2016, Jochims was seen in Houston Methodist's emergency room. After that visit, Jochims complained that an unknown employee had violated her rights under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 by telling others about her pregnancy based on information learned during her emergency room visit. The Director of Emergency Services responded to the complaint and addressed the issue with hospital staff.
Notwithstanding, Jochims claims that afterward, Houston Methodist treated her differently.[1]
A short time later, on August 2, 2016, Jochims was placed on light duty after receiving work restrictions from her doctor. Several days later, on August 6, Jochims experienced a pregnancy-related blood clot that caused her admission to the hospital for treatment. As a result, Jochims was put on a leave of absence until August 25.
At Houston Methodist, leaves of absence are controlled by Houston Methodist's HR29 Leaves of Absence Policy. See Dkt. 26-7. Under the policy, two types of leaves of absence are applicable to this case: (1) a Family and Medical Leave of Absence (“FML”); and (2) a Medical Leave of Absence (“MLA”). In accordance with the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), an eligible employee at Houston Methodist is “grant[ed] up to 12 weeks of unpaid job protected [FML] leave commencing from day one of a qualified event (480 hours if used intermittently) during any 12-month period.” Id. at 3. “The twelve weeks are measured in a ‘rolling' 12-month period measured backward from the date an employee uses any FML leave.” Id. If an eligible employee exhausts his or her FML leave, the employee may take an unprotected MLA. See Id. at 4-5. Pursuant to HR29 Leaves of Absence Policy “[L]eaves of absence of any kind” cannot exceed “six (6) months in any rolling twelve (12) month period.” Id. at 2.
After her August 2016 leave of absence, Jochims continued to experience pregnancy-related complications, which required her to take another light-duty assignment and additional intermittent protected FML leave. As her delivery date approached, Jochims's doctor provided a note stating that she “need[ed] to be off work from 12/7/16 until delivery.”[2] Dkt. 26-9 at 2. Jochims went on leave, giving birth without complications on January 9, 2017. After the delivery, Jochims's use of leave see-sawed between unprotected MLA leave and protected FML leave. The alternating dates are immaterial here. The only date that is important is February 5, 2017-the date Jochims exhausted her protected FML leave.
On February 6, 2017, Houston Methodist posted Jochims's former position within the emergency department to be filled. See Dkt. 26-12 at 2. Several days later, on February 13, Gabriel Pigneri (“Pigneri”) applied for the position. See Dkt. 29-1 at 22. Over the next few days, Richards and an interview committee interviewed Pigneri. See Id. at 23. On February 23, after the interviews were complete, Richards instructed human resources to offer Pigneri the 11-11 FT Paramedic position “ASAP.” Dkt. 27-5 at 2. Pigneri accepted the job offer on February 24.[3] See Dkt. 26-14. That same day Jochims emailed Richards that she could return to work on February 28. See Dkt. 26-15 at 2. The email also included a note dated February 22 from Jochims's medical provider indicating that she would be able to return to work without restrictions on February 27. See Id. at 3.
On February 27, Richards responded to Jochims's February 24 email, informing her, “[w]e have already offered a candidate the 11-11 position who has accepted.” Dkt 26-25 at 2. Richards also let Jochims know about another position with the exact same pay but a different shift:
We currently have a night 7p-7a paramedic position that is available if you would like to come back to that. If not, you have the opportunity to apply to other positions in our system within 30 days of your return to work date per policy. Please let me know as soon as possible so we can stop recruiting for that position, and start creating a schedule with you.
Id. Jochims declined to apply for the position because the shift did not work for her.
Having declined to accept the position with the different shift, Jochims became subject to another provision of Houston Methodist's HR29 Leaves of Absence Policy:
If the employee returns from [a leave of absence] to find his/her position has been filled or eliminated, the employee will be referred to the Human Resources department at their business unit for instructions on next steps. . . . [T]hese employees will have thirty (30) days to look for an alternative position within Houston Methodist. If an alternative position cannot be located within thirty (30) days, the employee will be terminated.
Dkt. 26-7 at 2. Jochims failed to obtain a suitable position within 30 days. Houston Methodist gave Jochims an extension to locate and obtain an alternative position, but she failed to secure a new position within the extended time. Plaintiff was terminated effective April 25, 2017, under Houston Methodist's HR29 Policy.
Based on this sequence of events, Jochims filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), alleging sex and pregnancy discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and failure-to-accommodate and disability discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”). After the EEOC issued her a Notice of Right to Sue, Jochims filed this suit seeking to vindicate her rights.
Houston Methodist now moves for summary judgment on Jochims's (1) ADA disability-discrimination claim; (2) ADA failure-to-accommodate claim; and (3) Title VII retaliation claim.[4] I address each cause of action in turn.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that summary judgment is proper when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit, and a factual dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Estate of Miranda v. Navistar, Inc., 23 F.4th 500, 503 (5th Cir. 2022).
To survive summary judgment, the nonmovant must “present competent summary judgment evidence to support the essential elements of its claim.” Cephus v. Tex. Health & Hum. Servs. Comm'n, 146 F.Supp.3d 818, 826 (S.D. Tex. 2015). The nonmovant's “burden will not be satisfied by some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, by conclusory allegations, by unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a scintilla of evidence.” Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). Rather, the “nonmovant must identify specific evidence in the record and articulate how that evidence supports that party's claim.” Brooks v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 86 F.Supp.3d 577, 584 (S.D. Tex. 2015). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, I must construe “the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor.” Cadena v. El Paso Cnty., 946 F.3d 717, 723 (5th Cir. 2020).
Houston Methodist moves for summary judgment on Jochims's disability-discrimination claim under the ADA. To prevail, Jochims must “either present direct evidence that she was discriminated against because of her disability or alternatively proceed under the burden-shifting analysis first articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).” E.E.O.C. v. LHC Grp., Inc., 773 F.3d 688, 694 (5th Cir. 2014). Jochims does not present direct evidence of discrimination, so I must apply the burden-shifting analysis, which requires Jochims to first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. See Id. In the Fifth Circuit, to make a prima facie showing, Jochims must establish that: (1) she has a disability; (2) she was qualified for her job; and (3) she was “subject to an adverse employment decision on account of [her] disability.” Id. at 695 (quotation omitted). The burden of production then shifts to Houston Methodist to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Jochims's termination. See Id. at 694. Lastly, the burden shifts back to Jochims to show that Houston Methodist's proffered reason is pretextual. See id.
Because the burden for establishing a prima facie case is minimal, I will assume, without deciding, that Jochims has established a prima facie case and proceed to the remaining steps of the burden-shifting framework. See Pacovsky v. City of Booneville Miss., 347 Fed.Appx. 42, 44 (5th Cir. 2009) (assuming that plaintiff had established prima facie case and moving forward with...
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