John Alden Life Ins. Co. v. Doe

• Decision Date: 16 April 1987
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 84-2327.
• Citation: 658 F. Supp. 638
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia
• Parties: JOHN ALDEN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. Edna DOE, et al, Defendants.

658 F. Supp. 638

JOHN ALDEN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. Edna DOE, et al, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 84-2327.

United States District Court, S.D. West Virginia, Charleston Division.

April 16, 1987.

Shawn P. George and Stephen B. Farmer, Jackson, Kelly, Holt & O'Farrell, Charleston, W.V., for plaintiff.

Frederick F. Waugh, Norwalk, Ohio, for defendants Carol Doe Bloe, Richard Doe and Gerald Doe.

All other defendants, pro se.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

HADEN, II, Chief Judge.

This is a case great in emotion and small in monetary significance.

I. Background

Sheldon Doe¹ died on June 26, 1983, at his residence in Culloden, West Virginia.² The cause of death was a single gunshot wound to the head. At the time of his death, Mr. Doe was married to Edna Doe. It was the second marriage for both. Mr. Doe had three children by a former marriage and Mrs. Doe had ten.³ No children were born of their union.

Suspected of causing the death of Mr. Doe, Mrs. Doe and one of her sons, John Roe, were indicted by a Cabell County jury for first-degree murder. Mrs. Doe died before her case could come to trial. On the other hand, John Roe was convicted of first-degree murder. He is currently incarcerated in the West Virginia State Penitentiary at Moundsville.

At the time of his death, John Alden Life Insurance Company had an insurance policy in effect on Mr. Doe's life for $15,000.00. Mrs. Doe was the named beneficiary. Because of the circumstances surrounding Mr. Doe's death, the insurance company was uncertain as to whom the proceeds of the policy should be paid. Accordingly, it paid the proceeds of the policy into the registry of the Court and initiated this interpleader action. The thirteen children and Mrs. Doe have been named as Defendants. All of the Defendants, with the exception of Mrs. Doe, have answered the complaint.⁴

The Court indicated in its Order of February 26, 1987, that this action appeared to be one capable of resolution without hearing or trial. Thus, the Court established March 15, 1987, as the date for dispositive motions. Now pending before the Court is the formal motion for summary judgment of Carol Doe Bloe, Richard Doe and Gerald Doe (the Doe Defendants).⁵ Defendant John Roe has moved for summary judgment, for leave to file an amended complaint and for the Plaintiff to pay all Court costs. Also pending is the Plaintiff's motion to dismiss and for costs and attorney fees. The Court turns first to the dispositive issues raised by the motion of the Doe Defendants.

II. Discussion

The argument made by the Doe Defendants is straightforward. They have produced evidence that Mrs. Doe was involved in the murder of Mr. Doe. Although she is named as the beneficiary of the life insurance policy, the Doe Defendants argue that she should not be allowed to profit by her own wrong. Because Mrs. Doe is deceased, the Doe Defendants further argue that her natural children should not be allowed to take through her pursuant to the laws of distribution.

The Doe Defendants concede that W.Va. Code, § 42-4-2 is not applicable by its terms to this situation. That statute provides as follows:

"No person who has been convicted of feloniously killing another, or of conspiracy in the killing of another, shall take or acquire any money or property, real or personal, or interest therein, from the one killed or conspired against, either by dissent and distribution, or by will, or by any policy or certificate of insurance, or otherwise; but the money or the property to which the person so convicted would otherwise have been entitled shall go to the person or persons who would have taken the same if the person so convicted had been dead at the date of the death of the one killed or conspired against, unless by some rule of law or equity the money or the property would pass to some other person or persons."

It is clear that the applicability of the above statute is conditioned upon a conviction. Although indicted, Mrs. Doe was not convicted for the murder of Mr. Doe. Hence, the statute does not control.

The Doe Defendants argue, however, that the statute is not exclusive. In other words, they contend that the statute supplements rather than supplants the common law. The common law principle upon which they rely is that a person may not profit by his own wrong. Hence, they urge the proposition that Mrs. Doe, though never convicted, may not take under the policy because of her wrongdoing.

The statute quoted above does not address two possibilities: nonfelonious conviction and no conviction. In this case there was no conviction. In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Hill, 115 W.Va. 515, 177 S.E. 188 (1934), there was a conviction, but it was for involuntary manslaughter. The Hill court conceded that the statute did not bar the convicted person from receiving the proceeds of the policy on the life of the victim. Nevertheless, the Court held "that the statute was designed to raise the felony conviction as but another bar to recovery in a civil action, and that the statute gives no implication that a lesser verdict would furnish basis for such a recovery." 115 W.Va. at 519, 177 S.E. 188. The Hill court concluded that the legislature had not intended to change the common law rule barring a beneficiary who intentionally caused the death of the insured, whether felonious or not.

A logical extension of the Hill decision is the conclusion that the lack of a conviction does not necessarily allow the beneficiary to recover the policy proceeds either. One commentator, in discussing a South Carolina statute similar to the West Virginia statute, had the following to say:

"Analogous to the nonfelonious killing is the problem of whether the statute requires the conviction of the beneficiary. This question is most likely to arise where the beneficiary murders the insured and then commits suicide. Such a factual situation was faced by the South Carolina court in Smith v. Todd 155 S.C. 323, 152 S.E. 506 (1930). It was held that the statute merely raised the conviction of murder as a conclusive bar to the beneficiary's right to recover. The statute did not abrogate the common law principle that the beneficiary could be denied recovery on grounds of not being allowed to profit from his wrong, notwithstanding the fact that no conviction had been obtained...."

Note, Recovery of Insurance When Beneficiary Causes Death of Insured, 57 W.Va. Law Review 85, 86 (1955).

Based on the foregoing, the Court decides that the lack of a conviction is not conclusive. Mrs. Doe may be barred from collecting the policy proceeds if she intentionally played a part in the unlawful killing of Mr. Doe. Moreover, the standard in this civil action is not proof beyond a reasonable doubt, as in a criminal case; proof by a preponderance of the evidence is sufficient. The Court does not sit to decide the guilt of Mrs. Doe per se, but must only decide her entitlement to the insurance proceeds. Admittedly, the central issue is her culpability in the death of Mr. Doe.

The Court is asked to decide this case on the facts of record. Before the Court are two affidavits: the affidavit of Charles M. Hatcher, Jr. and the affidavit of John Roe. Mr. Hatcher is the Assistant Prosecuting Attorney of Cabell County, West Virginia, who successfully prosecuted the first-degree murder indictment against John Roe. His affidavit is offered in support of the Doe Defendants' summary judgment motion. Mr. Hatcher testifies substantially as follows: Sheldon Doe, Edna Doe and John Roe were drinking alcoholic beverages together at the family residence. An argument ensued. During the course of the argument John Roe shot his step-father. The shooting occurred in the living room. Roe and Edna Doe then moved the body into a bedroom. They agreed that they would tell the authorities that Mr. Doe had committed suicide.⁶ The evidence at Roe's trial showed that an ambulance was then called. Shortly thereafter, however, Mr. Doe, lying in the bed where he had been placed, was observed to move. Mrs. Doe then called the ambulance service and stated that a mistake had been made. She told them not to come. Four hours later the ambulance service was called again. This call was placed after it was ascertained that Mr. Doe was dead.

Hatcher, in summarizing, states that the evidence at trial established that Mrs. Doe cleaned up the blood in the room where Mr. Doe was shot, helped carry him to the bed in the bedroom, told the paramedics that a mistake had been made in the initial request for ambulance service and permitted Mr. Doe to die on the bed in the bedroom before requesting ambulance service.

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth a procedure which allows judgment to be entered without a trial. For the benefit of the unrepresented, the Court would explain that a trial is for the resolution of disputed facts. When there are no disputed facts, there is no need for a trial. The Court (i.e, the Judge) may apply the law to the undisputed facts to arrive at a correct result. Rule 56 provides that a party who believes the facts to be undisputed may move for summary judgment, setting forth the facts which he claims to be undisputed. Once that is done, the burden then falls upon the nonmoving party, or parties as in this case, to bring to the Court's attention other facts or contradictory facts which make trial a necessity.

The testimony of Hatcher, presented by affidavit, clearly shows the involvement of Mrs. Doe in the homicide. On the other hand, the affidavit of John Roe merely states that Mrs. Doe was not convicted of the offense for which she was indicted. This fact is restated in the letters and responses submitted by other children of Mrs. Doe. As the Court discussed above, however, a conviction is not necessary for the common law rule to work its bar. The Court accepts that Mrs. Doe was not convicted. The burden of the...