Smith v. Todd

• Decision Date: 15 March 1930
• Docket Number: 12857.
• Citation: 152 S.E. 506,155 S.C. 323
• Parties: SMITH v. TODD.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

152 S.E. 506

155 S.C. 323

SMITH v. TODD.

No. 12857.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

March 15, 1930

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Anderson County; M. L Bonham, Judge.

Action by W. D. Smith, as administrator of the estate of Rosa Belle Shaw, deceased, against Mrs. Minnie E. Todd, as administratrix of the estate of Floyd L. Shaw, deceased. From an order sustaining a demurrer and dismissing complaint plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed in part, and in part reversed, and cause remanded.

S. M Wolfe, of Anderson, and J. H. Marion, of Charlotte, N. C for appellant.

Watkins & Prince, of Anderson, for respondent.

STABLER J.

From the admitted facts, it appears that Floyd L. Shaw and Rosa Belle Shaw, husband and wife, resided in the county of Anderson, in this state. In December, 1928, Shaw shot and killed his wife and immediately thereafter committed suicide. At the time of her death, Mrs. Shaw had a policy of insurance covering her life, with her husband named therein as beneficiary. The insurance company paid the proceeds of the policy, the sum of $4,000, into the hands of the defendant, as administratrix of the personal estate of Floyd Shaw, and this action is brought by the plaintiff, as administrator of the estate of Rosa Belle Shaw, to recover, in view of the circumstances of her death, the amount of the insurance from the estate of her deceased husband.

The plaintiff attempts to plead two causes of action. The first is predicated upon the applicability of an act of the Legislature passed in 1924 (33 St. at Large, p. 1188), which provides that "*** no person who shall be convicted in any court of competent jurisdiction of unlawfully killing another person shall receive any benefit from the death of the person unlawfully killed, except in cases of involuntary manslaughter, whether by way of intestate succession, will, vested or contingent remainder or insurance or otherwise. *** That the interest which would devolve upon the person excluded from receiving any benefit by the terms of this Act, shall vest in and become the property of the estate of the person unlawfully killed. ***"

After pleading the manner in which Shaw and his wife were killed, and that the defendant as administratrix holds the proceeds of the insurance policy as a part of the personal estate of Floyd L. Shaw, the plaintiff, in his first cause of action, alleges:

"That *** the verdict of the Coroner's Court accordingly was that the said Rosa Belle Shaw came to her death on the said 8th day of December 1928, by gunshot wounds at the hands of the said Floyd L. Shaw, and that he did there and then, feloniously kill her, against the peace and dignity of the State.

"That the said Floyd L. Shaw, died intestate and without children, who would or could inherit from said deceased intestate.

"That by virtue of the facts as alleged herein, under the Statute in such cases, provided, to which reference is craved and the provisions of which are hereby invoked, said insurance in the amount of four thousand dollars, under the policy on the life of the said Rosa Belle Shaw, reverted to the estate of his victim, the said Rosa Belle Shaw, and the said Floyd L. Shaw, having murdered her and having been so convicted, neither he nor his estate can profit by said killing."

The second cause of action is predicated upon the theory that, in the absence of statute or clear implication conferring such right, the beneficiary under a life insurance policy cannot, under applicable principles of the common law, acquire and perfect title to the proceeds of such policy by murdering the insured.

In this cause of action, the plaintiff pleads that Shaw "unlawfully and feloniously" shot and killed his wife and then immediately committed suicide by shooting himself, and that the defendant, as the personal representative of the estate of Shaw, holds the proceeds of insurance as a part of Shaw's personal estate, and further alleges:

"That the said contract of insurance insofar as it applied to the beneficiary, the said Floyd L. Shaw, was rendered nugatory and in derogation of public policy.

"That as the result of said beneficiary murdering the said Rosa Belle Shaw, his wife, the insured, in the circumstances, his estate is denied the right to benefit therefrom and the said insurance, the proceeds of the said policy carried on the life of the said Rosa Belle Shaw, at her death, inured to the personal estate of the said Rosa Belle Shaw for and in behalf of her heirs-at-law, the plaintiff herein, her father, and her brother and sisters surviving."

The defendant demurred to the complaint upon the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, alleging with particularity numerous reasons therefor. The matter was heard by his honor, Judge Bonham, who, by an order dated June 6, 1929, sustained the demurrer and dismissed the complaint. From this order the plaintiff appeals.

The first question presented for our consideration is whether the allegations of the first cause of action bring it within the terms of the act of 1924, so as to entitle the plaintiff to recover thereunder.

As already pointed out, it is alleged, and for the purposes of the demurrer, the allegations are taken to be true, that Shaw killed his wife, and that the coroner's court investigated the case and found by its verdict that he ""feloniously" killed her. The statute provides, as stated, "that no person who shall be convicted in any court of competent jurisdiction of unlawfully killing another person shall receive any benefit from the death of the person unlawfully killed." The contention of the appellant is that the act of Shaw, in committing suicide immediately after slaying his wife, did not relieve him from the consequences of taking the life of the insured; and that the coroner's court being the only court having jurisdiction of Shaw's dead body, the verdict of the jury of that court fulfilled the requirements of the statute as to a conviction.

With regard to this contention, the circuit judge has this to say in his order:

"The word 'conviction' has phases of meaning dependent upon the connection in which it is used. Argument upon a given proposition may carry 'conviction' to the mind of the person to whom it is addressed; may convince him; but it does not 'convict' him of any offense. It seems inescapable from the context of the Act of 1924 that the General Assembly used the words 'convicted by a Court of competent jurisdiction' to mean that a person should be convicted after a trial in a Court in which he has had the opportunity to meet and cross-examine the witnesses against him, to offer evidence in his own behalf, and to be represented by counsel, and to be tried by a jury of his peers, consisting of twelve jurors. A coroner's jury consists of six persons, the proceedings are wholly ex parte. Rarely is a suspected person represented at an inquest by counsel. He cannot introduce witnesses in his own behalf.

"'Conviction, in its legal sense, means a final judgment conclusively establishing guilt.' (13 Corpus Juris, 907, § 4.)

"'Conviction in its legal sense, is the determination of guilt in a criminal prosecution.' 1 Words and Phrases, Second Series, page 1045.

"'A man is convicted when he is found guilty, or confesses the crime before judgment had.' Shepherd v. People, 25 N.Y. 406.

"'The term "conviction" ordinarily signifies a finding of a jury by verdict that the person is guilty; or a plea of guilty by defendant, constitutes a conviction of him.' People v. Fabian, 126 A.D. 89, 111 N.Y.S. 140, 146.

"'The word "conviction" ordinarily signifies the finding of a jury by a verdict that the person is guilty.' Judge v. Powers, 156 Iowa, 251, 136 N.W. 315, 316, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 280.

"I find in 2 Words & Phrases, Third Series, page 506, reference to a Kansas Case (Hogg v. Whitham, 120 Kan. 341, 242 P. 1021) which apparently refers to a statute similar to ours. I have not access to the case. The citation in Words & Phrases is to this effect: 'Under a statute prohibiting any person convicted of killing another from inheriting from the person so killed, etc., it was held that a coroner's jury's findings of when and by what means death was caused did not satisfy the statute.' This would seem to be the rational conclusion."

The citation of additional authorities is unnecessary. We are satisfied, from a careful study of the statute as a whole, that the circuit judge was correct in his conclusions, and that it was not the intention of the Legislature to include the verdict of a coroner's jury as fulfilling the requirements of the act as to a conviction. Hence, the allegations of the complaint do not bring the first cause of action attempted to be pleaded within the terms of the act relied upon; and upon this ground alone we affirm the order of the circuit judge sustaining the demurrer to this cause of acion.

The second question raised by the appeal is whether the plaintiff can recover under any recognized rule of public policy in this state. The answer to this question will determine the sufficiency of the second cause of action. We have given the matter careful study and investigation, and agree with the position taken by the appellant; and, in the preparation of this opinion as to this phase of the case, have drawn largely upon the well-prepared argument of his counsel.

The issue here may be measurably clarified by stating it in this form: Prior to the enactment of the statute of 1924, above referred to, would a beneficiary who had murdered the insured acquire a valid title to the proceeds of the policy? To this question the law, as interpreted by the courts, uniformly gives a negative answer.

The general rule is thus stated in 37 C.J....