John B. Stetson University v. Hunt

• Decision Date: 20 December 1924
• Citation: 102 So. 637,88 Fla. 510
• Parties: JOHN B. STETSON UNIVERSITY et al. v. HUNT.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

102 So. 637

88 Fla. 510

JOHN B. STETSON UNIVERSITY et al. v. HUNT.

Florida Supreme Court

December 20, 1924

Rehearing Denied Jan. 21, 1925.

In Banc.

Error to Circuit Court, Orange County; C. O. Andrews, Judge.

Action by Helen Hunt against the John B. Stetson University and Lincoln Hulley. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants bring error.

Reversed.

Whitfield J., dissenting in part.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

'Expulsion' means to eject, banish, or cut off from the privileges of an institution or society permanently. [Ed. Note.--For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, Expulsion.]

A 'suspension' is a temporary cutting off or debarring one from the privileges of an institution or society. [Ed Note.--For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Suspend--Suspension.]

'Malice' in law is that condition of the mind which shows a heart regardless of social duty and fatally bent on mischief, the existence of which is inferred from acts committed or words spoken. Malice is also defined as the intentional doing of a wrongful act toward another without legal justification, or excuse, or, in other words, the willful violation of a known right. [Ed. Note.--For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Malice.]

A private institution of learning may prescribe requirements for admission and rules for the conduct of its students, and all who enter such institutions as students impliedly agree to conform to the rules of government. The only limit to this rule is as to institutions supported in whole or in part by appropriations from the public treasury. As to such institutions the rule is viewed more critically, and is generally subject to legislative regulation.

As to mental training, moral and physical discipline, and welfare of the public, college authorities stand in loco parentis and in their discretion may make any regulation for their government which a parent could make for the same purpose and, so long as such regulations do not violate divine or human law, courts have to more authority to interfere than they have to control the domestic discipline of a father in his family.

It is well settled that unless regulations or rules are unauthorized, against common right or palpably unreasonable, the courts will not annul or revise them. Neither will the courts afford relief in case of the enforcement thereof, unless those whose duty it is to enforce them act arbitrarily and for fraudulent purposes.

The relation between a student and an institution of learning privately conducted, and which receives no aid from the public treasury is solely contractual in character, and there is an implied condition that the student knows and will conform to the rules and regulations of the institution, and for breach of which he may be suspended or expelled.

In the school, as in the family, there exists on the part of the pupils the obligation of obedience to lawful commands, subordination, civil deportment, respect for the rights of other pupils, and fidelity to duty. These obligations are inherent in any proper school system, and constitute, so to speak, the common law of the school.

Under the law it is competent for the trustees or governing body of an institution of learning to vest in the president or superintendent authority to enforce discipline, and when acting lawfully in this capacity courts will not interfere.

It is proper to state in this connection that a mere mistake of judgment on the part of the school officer in governing his school either as to his duties under the law or as to facts submitted to him, does not make him liable, but it must be shown that he acted in the matter complained of wantonly, willfully or maliciously.

Where the rules and regulations of a private institution of learning receiving no aid from the public treasury, in effect provide that a student may forfeit his connection with the institution without any overt act if he is not in accord with its standards, it is not incumbent on the institution to prefer charges and prove them at trial before dismissing permanently or temporarily a student regarded by it as undesiarble.

In an action where malice is the gist of the offense, every presumption must be indulged in favor of the school authorities to the extent that they acted in good faith, for the best interests of the school and the pupil as they saw it, and no recovery can be had for error of judgment, but may be had for error grounded on malice.

COUNSEL

Mabry, Reaves & Carlton, of Tampa, Egford Bly, of Jacksonville, and Massey & Warlow, of Orlando, for plaintiffs in error.

Davis & Giles, of Orlando, and Baldwin & Vetter and Alex. St. Clair-Abrams, all of Jacksonville, for defendant in error.

OPINION

TERRELL J.

Helen Hunt sued John B. Stetson University, a corporation, and Lincoln Hulley, its president, in an action of tort. The declaration among other things alleging that she (Helen Hunt) was 'maliciously, wantonly, and without cause in bad faith expelled' from said University, and that such expulsion was confirmed, ratified, and approved by its board of trustees.

The case was tried in Orlando on the 16th of May, 1922, all pleas except the general issue having been stricken or withdrawn. The trial resulted in a verdict and judgment against both defendants in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of $25,000. Motion for a new trial was denied, and writ of error was taken to this court.

Defendants below contend that the plaintiff was suspended rather than expelled from the University. The catalog current at the time defined expulsion as 'a final separation from the University,' while it avers that 'suspension separates the student temporarily from the University.' These definitions are in harmony with Webster, who defines expulsion as ejecting, banishing or cutting off from the privileges of an institution or society permanently, and suspension as temporarily cutting off or debarring one from the privileges of an institution.

For the purpose of disposing of this case it is not material whether Miss Hunt was suspended or expelled, but to clarify the situation we have examined all the evidence on this point carefully, and it shows that she was suspended rather than expelled.

Was the suspension of Miss Hunt malicious? Malice in law as defined by the authorities is that condition of the mind which shows a heart regardless of social duty and fatally bent on mischief, the existence of which is inferred from acts committed or words spoken. Malice is also defined as the intentional doing of a wrongful act toward another without legal justification or excuse, or, in other words, the willful violation of a known right.

The Supreme Court of the United States in Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754, approved the famous definition of malice by Bayley, J., in Bromage v. Prosser (4 Barn. & C. 247), whose remarks have become a classic in the law and are as follows:

'Malice, in common acceptation, means ill will against a person, but in its legal sense it means a wrongful act, done intentionally, without just cause or excuse. If I give a perfect stranger a blow likely to produce death, I do it of malice, because I do it intentionally and without just cause or excuse. If I maim cattle, without knowing whose they are, if I poison a fishery, without knowing the owner, I do it of malice, because it is a wrongful act, and done intentionally. If I am arraigned of felony, and willfully stand mute, I am said to do it of malice, because it is intentional and without just cause or excuse. And if I traduce a man, whether I know him or not and whether I intend to do him an injury or not, I apprehend the law considers it as done of malice, because it is wrongful and intentional. It equally works an injury, whether I meant to produce an injury or not.'

In the light of the law as thus defined, how stands the charges against the defendants Dr. Hulley and John B. Stetson University? The evidence shows that Helen Hunt had been a student at the University for almost two years; that for some time immediately preceding her suspension, which took place April 6, 1907, numerous disorders took place in the girls' dormitory where Miss Hunt resided, some of which were described as hazing the normals, ringing cow bells and parading in the halls of the dormitory at forbidden hours, cutting the lights, and such other events as were subversive of the discipline and rules of the University. Some of the witnesses spoke of these disorders as bordering on insurrection.

Consequent to such infractions of the rules Miss Hunt and several other students were summoned before Dr. Hulley, and, on being briefly interrogated, Miss Hunt was commanded to go home that day, Miss Keeling was commanded to move from the dormitory and secure quarters down town, and Miss Webster was told that she would be dealt with later. Miss Tiffany and Mr. Wilder had been previously suspended, and Mr. Clayburg had been expelled. All these students were subsequently reinstated in the University except Miss Hunt, who entered another reputable college in about two or three weeks, though she and her parents within such time were advised by Dr. Hulley that she would be expected to return to the University.

John B Stetson University was incorporated under the name of De Land University by virtue of the provisions of chapter 3808, Acts of 1887, Laws of Florida. Its name was changed to the present designation by chapter 3985, Acts of 1889, Laws of Florida. It is a private institution of learning, and the act of incorporation fully empowers the trustees 'to make rules for the general management of the affairs of the institution and for the regulation of the conduct of...