John D. Justice v. State

• Decision Date: 10 April 2014
• Citation: 985 N.Y.S.2d 294,2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 02483,116 A.D.3d 1196
• Parties: John D. JUSTICE, Appellant, v. STATE of New York, Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

116 A.D.3d 1196

985 N.Y.S.2d 294

2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 02483

John D. JUSTICE, Appellant,

v.STATE of New York, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

April 10, 2014.

John D. Justice, Comstock, appellant pro se.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Kathleen M. Arnold of counsel), for respondent.

Before: PETERS, P.J., LAHTINEN, ROSE and EGAN JR., JJ.

ROSE, J.

Appeal from an order of the Court of Claims (Collins, J.), entered June 13, 2013, which, among other things, granted defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the claim.

Claimant is an insanity acquittee who is also incarcerated ( see People v. Justice, 202 A.D.2d 981, 609 N.Y.S.2d 734 [1994],lv. denied83 N.Y.2d 968, 616 N.Y.S.2d 21, 639 N.E.2d 761 [1994];People v. Justice, 173 A.D.2d 144, 146, 579 N.Y.S.2d 502 [1991] ). In 2008, he brought this claim, sounding in negligence, alleging that, while he has been incarcerated, the Commissioner of Mental Health has failed to, among other things, monitor his compliance with an order of conditions imposed in 2006 pursuant to CPL 330.20(12). Following joinder of issue, claimant unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability (80 A.D.3d 931, 2011 WL 102588 [2011],affg. on op of Collins, J. [Ct. Cl., Feb. 5, 2010, Collins, J., claim No.115070, UID No. 2010–015–109]; see66 A.D.3d 1182, 887 N.Y.S.2d 347 [2009] ). Thereafter, defendant moved for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the claim on the basis that, among other things, it did not owe claimant an actionable duty of care under CPL 330.20(12). The Court of Claims granted defendant's motion, prompting claimant's appeal.

We affirm. The rule is well established “that an agency of government is not liable for the negligent performance of a governmental function unless there existed a special duty to the injured person, in contrast to a general duty owed to the public” ( McLean v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.3d 194, 199, 878 N.Y.S.2d 238, 905 N.E.2d 1167 [2009] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Metz v. State of New York, 20 N.Y.3d 175, 179, 958 N.Y.S.2d 314, 982 N.E.2d 76 [2012] ). A special duty will only arise from a special relationship, which can be formed in three ways: “(1) when the [governmental entity] violates a statutory duty enacted for the benefit of a particular class of persons; (2) when it voluntarily assumes a duty that generates justifiable reliance by the person who benefits from the duty; or (3) when the [governmental entity] assumes positive direction and control in the face of a known, blatant and dangerous safety violation” ( Pelaez v. Seide, 2 N.Y.3d 186, 199–200, 778 N.Y.S.2d 111, 810 N.E.2d 393 [2004];see Metz v. State of New York, 20 N.Y.3d at 180, 958 N.Y.S.2d 314, 982 N.E.2d 76). Inasmuch as claimant asserts that CPL 330.20 creates a statutory duty for the benefit of the class of which he is a member, i.e., insanity acquittees, only the first of these categories is potentially applicable. ¹

Significantly, “[t]o form a special relationship through breach of a statutory duty, the governing statute must authorize a private right of action” ( Signature Health Ctr., LLC v. State of New York, 92 A.D.3d 11, 14, 935 N.Y.S.2d 357 [2011],lv. denied19 N.Y.3d 811, 951 N.Y.S.2d 721, 976 N.E.2d 250 [2012] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; accord Pelaez v. Seide, 2 N.Y.3d at 200, 778 N.Y.S.2d 111, 810 N.E.2d 393). Because CPL 330.20 does not expressly confer upon insanity acquittees the right to seek civil damages for any failure by the Commissioner to follow the statute's provisions, “recovery may be had only if a private right of action can be implied” ( Signature Health Ctr., LLC v. State of New York, 92 A.D.3d at 14, 935 N.Y.S.2d 357). A private right of action may be fairly implied when all of the prerequisites are fulfilled, namely: “(1) the [claimant] is one of the class for whose particular benefit the statute was enacted; (2) recognition of a private right of action would promote the legislative purpose of the governing statute; and (3) to do so would be consistent with the legislative scheme” ( id. at 14–15, 935 N.Y.S.2d 357;accord McLean v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.3d at 200, 878 N.Y.S.2d 238, 905 N.E.2d 1167;Pelaez v. Seide, 2 N.Y.3d at 200, 778 N.Y.S.2d 111, 810 N.E.2d 393).

In our view, the legislative history supports the finding of the Court of Claims that CPL 330.20 was primarily enacted to benefit the public, rather than insanity acquittees ( see generally 1981 Report of N.Y. Law Rev. Commn., Appendix A, The Defense of Insanity in New York State, reprinted in 1981 McKinney's Session Laws of N.Y., at 2268; Bill Jacket, L. 1980, ch. 548). As the Court of Appeals has noted, “[t]he postacquittal procedures now codified in CPL 330.20 and initially enacted into law as part of the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1980 (L. 1980, ch. 548) were intended to protect the public from persons found not...