John Doe v. Attleboro Pub. Sch.

Decision Date14 March 2013
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 12–cv–10266–DJC.
Citation960 F.Supp.2d 286
PartiesJohn DOE, a minor child by and through his parents and next friends James and Jane DOE, Plaintiffs, v. ATTLEBORO PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Massachusetts Bureau of Special Education Appeals, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

James Doe, pro se.

Jane Doe, pro se.

Alisia E. St. Florian, Regina W. Tate, Murphy, Hesse, Toomey, and Lehane, LLP, Quincy, MA, Annapurna Balakrishna, Office of the Attorney General, Boston, MA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CASPER, District Judge.

I. Introduction

The Court discussed the factual background, statutory framework of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401 et seq., and procedural history of this matter in its Memorandum and Order, dated August 31, 2011, (“2011 Order”) resolving the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment and remanding the parties' prior action to the Massachusetts Bureau of Special Education Appeals (BSEA). Doe v. Attleboro Pub. Sch., No. 09–12127–DJC, 2011 WL 3854649 (D.Mass. Aug. 31, 2011). The Court will not repeat that history here, but in relevant part, the 2011 Order remanded the prior action to the BSEA to apply the correct legal standard to Defendant Attleboro Public Schools' (APS) motion to dismiss James and Jane Doe's (the “Does” or Plaintiffs) request for a hearing regarding reimbursement from APS for the cost of transporting their son to their school of choice during the 2007–08 school year.1 The 2011 Order denied the Does' request for attorney's fees and costs without prejudice to be renewed at the end of the BSEA proceedings. The Does now seek judicial review of the BSEA Hearing Officer's decision on remand denying their request for reimbursement of transportation costs for the 20072008 school year. They also press their request for attorney's fees and costs. APS has filed a counterclaim for attorney's fees from the Does. Both parties have now filed cross-motions for summary judgment. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is DENIED, Plaintiffs' request for attorney's fees is DENIED, but Plaintiffs may submit a request for costs (excluding attorney's fees) regarding the litigation of the 20082009 transportation costs at the November 2009 Hearing. Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and APS' request for attorney's fees is DENIED.

II. Relevant Procedural History and Factual Background since the 2011 OrderA. December 1 Hearing

1. Pre–Hearing Motions before the BSEA Hearing Officer

Upon remand, on November 29, 2011, APS moved to dismiss on the grounds that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted by the BSEA Hearing Officer. AR 89.2 As basis for dismissal, APS argued that since Plaintiffs had rejected its offer of settlement for the 2007–08 transportation costs because it did not include attorney's fees and the BSEA did not have the authority to grant attorney's fees, the Hearing Officer could not grant the additional remedy the Does seek.3See AR 91–92; AR 218–19.

The BSEA Hearing Officer scheduled a hearing for December 1, 2011 (December 1 Hearing”) and identified four issues for the hearing: (1) whether APS violated the Does' due process rights during the IEP team meeting on June 12, 2007; (2) whether APS coerced the Does into signing an intra-district placement form in June 2007; (3) whether Attleboro must reimburse the Does for transportation costs for the 2007–08 school year; and (4) whether APS's motion to dismiss with prejudice should be granted. AR. 113–14. See AR 27–29. In connection with the December 1 Hearing, the Does moved to strike evidence of APS' settlement offer and their subsequent rejection as irrelevant. AR 71. The Hearing Officer denied Plaintiffs' motion on the basis that the offer and rejection were relevant to APS's ability to pursue attorney's fees from the Does in this Court pursuant to the IDEA. See AR 117–18, 184–85.

2. Evidence Presented at the December 1 Hearing

At the December 1 Hearing, the Does represented themselves and APS was represented by counsel. Prior to the commencement of the hearing that day, APS reiterated its offer to reimburse the Does the total amount of transportation for the 2007–08 school year. AR 87. APS also advised the Does that this was the maximum amount that they could obtain from the BSEA hearing and if they proceeded with the hearing, the school district intended to seek its attorneys' fees dating back to its first settlement offer in June 2010. AR 113, 316. Although APS agreed to postpone the hearing to allow the Does further consideration of this matter and the Hearing Officer offered to suspend the hearing for the same purpose, the Does declined the offer and chose to proceed with the hearing. AR 113, 227–31.

During the December 1 Hearing, the Hearing Officer heard opening statements, took evidence, heard testimony from several witnesses and allowed closing arguments. Both Mr. and Mrs. Doe testified and they offered testimony from Gaylene Heppe, the principal of the Willett School during the school years between 2005 and 2008, AR 368–69, and Maureen Morgan, a student services coordinator for early childhood for APS, AR 388–89. In relevant part, Mrs. Doe testified that their son was diagnosed with Pervasive Developmental Disorder Not Otherwise Specified (“PPD–NOS”) in 2005 and entered the Early Learning Center in the APS with an Individualized Education Plan (“IEP”) in the fall of 2005. AR 236, 245. Their son attended kindergarten at the Willett Elementary School for the 20062007 school year. AR 254. An IEP meeting was held at the end of that school year, on June 12, 2007, to discuss where their son would attend the same school the following year. AR 256–57. Both Mr. and Mrs. Doe were present at the meeting along with Heppe, Dickens–Weil and other members of the IEP team including the kindergarten special education teacher, occupational therapist, regular education teach and school psychologist. AR. 122. Maureen Morgan was not present and the Does signed a form excusing Morgan's absence from the meeting. Although she was not present, a memorandum from Morgan was presented during the meeting that described an earlier June 8, 2006 IEP meeting in which the IEP team decided to place their son at the Studley Elementary School because the team thought that he might be a candidate for the Insights program located there. AR 264–65, 268, 318.4 Mrs. Doe disputed this characterization of the team's earlier decision and claimed that their son was assigned there because his home school, Hill Roberts Elementary School, did not have enclosed classrooms. AR 276–77. Mrs. Doe did not dispute that she signed the intra-district form and did so not on the day of the June 12, 2007 meeting, but after that meeting and after a visit to the Hill Roberts Elementary School. AR 277, 298. Mrs. Doe agreed that she was permitted to participate fully in the June 12, 2007 meeting and that meeting led to no change in IEP services for their son. AR 304, 313. Mrs. Doe claimed that she had not been given a notice of the procedural safeguards at the June 12, 2007 meeting, AR 313–14, but had received back in 2005 and had read them then. AR 313–14, 356. Mr. Doe noted that if they had not signed the intra-district transfer form, their son would not have been able to return to the Willett School. AR 330. He did not recall receiving any notice of procedural safeguards before 2008. AR. 352.

Neither Heppe nor Morgan offered much testimony that supported the Does' contentions. Heppe, the principal of the Willett Elementary School in the 20062007 and 20072008 school years, AR 368–69, also attended the June 12, 2007 meeting. AR 369. As school principal, she was responsible for signing off on all intra-district transfer requests. AR 381. Although she agreed that if the Does had not signed the form, their son would not be assigned to the Willett Elementary School for the coming year, she denied threatening the Does to sign the form. AR 382. Morgan was not present for the 2007 meeting, but had been present for the June 8, 2006 meeting when the IEP team recommended that the Does' son attend the Studley Elementary School for the Insights Program. AR 390. (This was later changed to the Willett Elementary School when the location of the program changed, AR 406). She testified that his home school, Hill Roberts Elementary School, had some enclosed classrooms, but the team thought that if he needed more support, he should have access to the Insights program. AR 401. She also confirmed that the notice of procedural safeguards was sent to the Does in August 2005. AR 407.

APS put on one witness, Michelle Dickens–Weil, a student services coordinator for the elementary schools in APS. AR 440–41. She was also present for the June 12, 2007 meeting. AR 443. She explained the purpose of the meeting was not to consider a change in the IEP services, but just the child's school assignment. AR 443–45. Dickens–Weil noted that at the meeting, the IEP team reviewed an opinion letter from Dr. Kerim Munir, offered by the Does, that recommended that their son be in an enclosed classroom. AR 448; see AR 309. She recalled Heppe explaining the intra-district request form to the Does and that no threats were made to the parents to sign it. AR 450. Dickens–Weil testified that no notice of the procedural safeguards was presented to the parents in connection with the June 12, 2007 meeting. AR 451, 462–463. She did, however, author the meeting notes for the June 12, 2007 meeting, AR 708, that were later distributed to the Does. AR 455. These notes reflect the IEP team's conclusion that the Does' child could be successful at the Hill Roberts Elementary School, but that if the Does wanted to keep him at the Willett Elementary School, they would have to complete an intra-district transfer form. AR 708.

B. Hearing Officer's Decision

1. Denying APS's...

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