John Doe v. Bishop of Charleston
Decision Date | 06 March 2014 |
Docket Number | No. 27345.,27345. |
Citation | 754 S.E.2d 494,407 S.C. 128 |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Parties | John DOE, Jane Doe 1, Jane Doe 2 and Jane Doe 3, Appellants, v. The BISHOP OF CHARLESTON, A Corporation Sole, and The Bishop of The Diocese of Charleston, in His Official Capacity, Respondents. Appellate Case No. 2011–199886. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Gregg E. Meyers, of Jeff Anderson & Associates, P.A., of Charleston, for Appellants.
Albert P. Shahid, Jr., of Shahid Law Office, LLC, of Charleston, for Respondents.
John Doe, Jane Doe 1, Jane Doe 2 and Jane Doe 3 (appellants) separately sued the Bishop of Charleston, a Corporation Sole, and the Bishop of the Diocese of Charleston in his official capacity (respondents). The cases were consolidated, and respondents moved to dismiss on the pleadings. The trial court granted the motion.1 We affirm in part and reverse in part.
In 2007, in a suit brought in Dorchester County, respondents entered into a class action settlement agreement (the settlement) to settle the claims of “[a]ll individuals born on or before August 30, 1980 who, as minors, were sexually abused at any time by agents or employees of the Diocese of Charleston” as well as their spouses and parents, except those whose claims had been independently resolved. The settlement provided for the establishment of a fund from which awards would be made to claimants who established their sexual abuse claims by arbitration.
Appellants allege they did not receive notice of the settlement. In 2009, after the claims and opt-out period provided for in the settlement had expired, they brought suit alleging claims of the type covered by the settlement. Three appellants (siblings) allege that, between 1965 and 1971, as children they were sexually abused by a priest assigned to St. William Church in Ward, South Carolina; one appellant is the parent of the allegedly abused children.
1. Did the trial court err when it ruled the terms of the settlement do not waive its res judicata effect?
2. Did the trial court err when it found appellants bound by the settlement?
3. Did the trial court err when it found appellants' claims barred by the statute of limitations?
The trial court held that appellants' claims were identical to those addressed in the class action settlement, that appellants were members of the class, and thus that their claims were barred by principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Appellants argue this was error because respondents waived the res judicata effect of the class action as to all future claims by the terms of the settlement. We disagree. When reviewing the dismissal of an action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP, the appellate court applies the same standard of review as the trial court. Doe v. Marion, 373 S.C. 390, 395, 645 S.E.2d 245, 247 (2007). If the facts alleged and inferences reasonably deducible from the allegations set forth in the complaint, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, entitle him to relief on any theory, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is improper. Id. The complaint should not be dismissed merely because the court doubts the plaintiff will prevail in the action. Id. at 395, 645 S.E.2d at 248.
As an initial matter, appellants argue that, for purposes of reviewing the trial court's grant of dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), this Court must accept as true their allegation that respondents waived a statute of limitations defense as to all putative class members. We disagree.
When reviewing a motion to dismiss 2 for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the pleadings must be construed liberally, and all well pled facts must be presumed true. Charleston County School Dist. v. Harrell, 393 S.C. 552, 557, 713 S.E.2d 604, 607 (2011). However, the interpretation of a judgment is a question of law for the court. 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 73. Questions of law are reviewed de novo. Town of Summerville v. City of North Charleston, 378 S.C. 107, 110, 662 S.E.2d 40, 41 (2008). Thus, we consider the interpretation of the terms of the underlying court-approved class action settlement de novo.
Weil v. Weil, 299 S.C. 84, 90, 382 S.E.2d 471, 474 (Ct.App.1989) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
In this case, the language in the settlement-related court orders on which appellants' argument depends arose in the context of discussions about notice to putative class members. The original design of the settlement included a 120–day period after the initial notice of final approval of the settlement for any person to make a claim under it. Notice was to be provided to potential claimants through publication in eleven South Carolina newspapers at least once a week for six weeks and in respondents' own periodical, the Catholic Miscellany, in three consecutive issues.
However, it came to light that respondents had been operating under an Instruction from the Vatican that required them to treat allegations of abuse with great secrecy and that their internal files contained the names of several dozen people about whose possible abuse respondents had already received some notice but who had not previously had any claims resolved. Half were already represented in the class action, and half were not. Of the latter group, all but four were located and notified of the pending class action before the Dorchester court approved the settlement. The Dorchester court remained concerned about these final four people. In its July 30, 2007, order approving the settlement, the Dorchester court stated that
[t]he Diocese has represented to the Court that 20 individuals who may be class members were identified by it in a search of its files. Sixteen of these were located, and as to the other four, I find, ..., that reasonable efforts were used to locate those individuals and that their present whereabouts are unknown. The Diocese has further stated that it understands that any person who should have had notice, but did not receive notice for whatever reason, would not be bound by the res judicata effect of the settlement. Further, the Diocese has stipulated before me in open Court and on the record that any person who comes forward at a later date and can show that he or she should have received notice but did not could participate in an arbitration process with terms identical to the Settlement and Arbitration Agreement before the Court for approval today.
Appellants argue that the language of the July order both removes the ordinary res judicata effect of a class settlement and requires respondents to honor the terms of the settlement as to any future claimant notwithstanding the expiration of the claims period. While we agree with appellants regarding the import of the language of the July order, the Dorchester court entered another order related to the settlement on August 31, 2007. It clarified, in relevant part, that
in the Court's [July 30] Order ... approving the Class settlement, the Court made reference to the existence of individuals who, according to the Diocese, (1) were potential class members; (2) came forward to the Diocese at some time in the past with their allegations of child sexual abuse; (3) never resolved their potential claims; and (4) were entitled to receive actual notice of the proposed class settlement pursuant to the agreement of the parties and earlier instructions from this Court (hereinafter referred to as “Actual Notice Class Members”). The [Respondents] have asked the Court to clarify how the settlement process will treat the Actual Notice Class Members. Accordingly, this Order clarifies and, where in conflict, supersedes the Court's Order of July 30, 2007.
Actual Notice Class Members shall have 120 days from receipt of actual notice of the class settlement to present their claims to an Arbitrator in the same manner as provided for in the Settlement and Arbitration Agreement. Actual Notice Class Members who present their claims more than 120 days after they receive actual notice of the settlement shall be barred from participation in the settlement process and shall be treated like any other class member who has failed to timely present a claim to the class settlement fund.
Appellants argue that the August order alters the terms of the settlement only as to Actual Notice Class Members. They contend that, as general class members, they are entitled to be treated under the more generous terms of the July order. We disagree.
The August 2007 order clarifies that the Actual Notice Class Members have 120 days to file claims from the time they receive actual notice, rather than being limited to 120 days from the entry of judgment, as the other (constructive notice) class members were limited under the settlement. It also reiterates that any claimant who fails to present her claim within the 120–day notice period will be “barred from participation in the settlement process ... like any other class member who had failed to timely present a claim to the class settlement fund.” This language unambiguously indicates that the 120–day claims period for general class members established in the original settlement remained in place and any seemingly contrary language in the July order was superseded by the August order.
Thus, the terms of the July order do not permit appellants to avoid its res judicata effect and that respondents did not waive a...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
C.C. v. Harrison Cnty. Bd. of Educ.
...the misconduct of an employee attributable to the employer's negligent failure to supervise the employee."); Doe v. Bishop of Charleston , 407 S.C. 128, 754 S.E.2d 494, 500 (2014) ("An employer may be liable for negligent supervision when (1) his employee intentionally harms another when he......
-
Ernestine Wingate Representative Russell v. Byrd
...or pattern of behavior when examining causes of action for negligent supervision or negligent training. See e.g., Doe v. Bishop of Charleston, 754 S.E.2d 494, 500 (S.C. 2014), reh'g denied (Mar. 6, 2014) ("This rule has been applied to find an employer liable for negligent supervision when ......
-
Awkard v. Sharon Rammelsberg, Saundra Lavon Herrmann, Mary Stitcher, Sharri Una Rammelsberg, Myrtle Beach Resort Master Homeowners Ass'n, Inc.
...claim several times, but with some discrepancies (as indicated by the parties' objections below). Compare Doe v. Bishop of Charleston, 754 S.E.2d 494, 500 (S.C. 2014), James v. Kelly Trucking Co., 661 S.E.2d 329, 330 (S.C. 2008), and Degenhart v. Knights of Columbus, 420 S.E.2d 495, 496 (S.......
-
English v. Clarke
... ... a cause of action.” Doe v. Bishop of ... Charleston , 754 S.E.2d 494, 500-01 (S.C. 2014). As ... stated above, however, ... ...
-
Employees Behaving Badly
...392 S.C. 57, 64, 707 S.E.2d 456, 460 (Ct. App. 2011) (adopting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 317). [5] See Doe v. Bishop of Charleston, 407 S.C. 128, 140, 754 S.E.2d 494, 500 (2014), reh’g denied (Mar. 6, 2014). [6] See Degenhart, 309 S.C. at 116-17, 420 S.E.2d at 496; Kase, 392 S.C. at 6......