John Doe v. Cox
| Decision Date | 09 November 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:14-cv-02140-APG-GWF |
| Parties | JOHN DOE, Plaintiff, v. JAMES COX. et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nevada |
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Application for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (#1), filed on December 16, 2014. This matter is also before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File a Longer than Normal Complaint (#31), filed on August 14, 2015. This matter is also before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order to Allow Plaintiff to Proceed Using Pseudonym (#34), filed on August 14, 2015.
Plaintiff challenges Defendants' policies regarding the treatment and housing of HIV positive inmates in the Nevada prison system. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants' policy of "House Alike/House Alone" resulted in the inadvertent disclosure of his HIV status to the general prison population. Plaintiff filed this § 1983 action claiming that Defendants have violated his 8th and 14th Amendment rights. Plaintiff also argues that Defendants are liable for disability discrimination and for violating various state privacy laws.
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Plaintiff filed this instant action and attached a financial affidavit to his application and complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Reviewing Plaintiff's financial affidavit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court finds that Plaintiff is unable to pre-pay the filing fee. As a result, Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis in federal court is granted.
Federal courts must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).
In addition to the screening requirements under § 1915A, pursuant to the PLRA, a federal court must dismiss a prisoner's claims, "if the allegation of poverty is untrue," or if the action "is frivolous or malicious," "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted is provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and the Court applies the same standard under Section 1915(e)(2) when reviewing the adequacy of a complaint or amended complaint.
Review under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is essentially a ruling on a question of law. See Chappel v. Laboratory Corp. of America, 232 F.3d 719, 723 (9th Cir. 2000). Dismissal for failure to state a claim is proper only if it is clear that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle him or her to relief. See Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 759 (9th Cir. 1999). In making this determination, the Court takes as true all allegations of material fact stated in the complaint, and the Court construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Warshaw v. Xoma Corp., 74 F.3d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1996). Allegations in a pro se complaint are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (per curiam). While the standardunder Rule 12(b)(6) does not require detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff must provide more than mere labels and conclusions. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-1965 (2007). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action is insufficient. Id., See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).
All or part of a complaint filed by a prisoner may therefore be dismissed sua sponte if the prisoner's claims lack an arguable basis either in law or in fact. This includes claims based on legal conclusions that are untenable (e.g. claims against defendants who are immune from suit or claims of infringement of a legal interest which clearly does not exist), as well as claims based on fanciful factual allegations (e.g. fantastic or delusional scenarios). See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989); see also McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his right to Due Process and Equal Protection under the 14th Amendment and his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the 8th Amendment. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant is liable for disability discrimination and for violating the medical privacy laws of the State of Nevada.
Plaintiff brings his claims against the Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. § 1983 creates a path for the private enforcement of substantive rights created by the Constitution and Federal statutes. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989). In order to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff "must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of law." West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988); see also Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982). A person acts "under color of law" if he "exercise[s] power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law." West, 487 U.S. at 49.
Any governmental entity that is considered "an arm of the state" is not a "person" within the meaning of § 1983. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 69 (1997). § 1983 claims against an arm of the state are legally frivolous. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 629, 641(9th Cir. 1989), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Nevada Department of Corrections ("NDOC") and the Nevada Board of State Prisoner Commissioners ("the Board") are considered arms of the state, and any claims for damages against them must be dismissed with prejudice. Mauwee v. Nevada Dept. of Corrections, 2013 WL 5202301 at *7 (D. Nev. 2013) citing Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat'l Laboratory, 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997); Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1398-99 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc). However, Plaintiff may maintain a claim against NDOC and the Board for injunctive relief. Mauwee, 2013 WL 5202301 at *7. Similarly, Plaintiff's claims against prison officials in their official capacity may be maintained only for injunctive relief, and not damages. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 69 n.24 (1997); Hafer v. Melo, 5032 U.S. 21, 27 (1991), Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 n.10 (1989); Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d 816, 824-25 (9th Cir. 2007).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his rights to Equal Protection and the Due Process clause by placing him in segregated housing and revealing his HIV positive status to the general prison population. Plaintiff accuses Defendants of knowingly creating the policy of "House Alike/House Alone" that led to disclosure of Plaintiff's HIV status. Plaintiff argues that an Equal Protection violation occurs when one group is singled out and treated differently. To establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment, Plaintiff must present evidence of discriminatory intent. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-40; Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff argues that Defendants' deliberate policies discriminate against those with HIV, and that NDOC and other Defendants are aware of these policies. Besides working in the prison and utilizing the policies, Defendants were placed on notice, according to Plaintiff, when the United States Department of Justice and the American Civil Liberties Union opened an investigation into the "House Alike/House Alone" policies at High Desert State Prison. Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to show that he was discriminated against by the prison due to his HIV status and that the prison intended to discriminate against him. Plaintiff has therefore sufficiently pled a claim for violation of the Equal Protection clause.
An inmate's right to procedural due process only arises when a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest is at stake. Cepero v. High Desert State Prison, Case No. 3:12-cv-263-MMD-VPC, 2015 WL 1308690 at *13 (D. Nev. 2015) citing Wilkingson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). Plaintiff alleges that a liberty interest was created by Nevada's medical privacy laws; specifically, Plaintiff cites Nev. Rev. Stat. § 208.385(4), which requires that HIV positive prisoners be segregated from other offenders, and NDOC policy AR 610.03, which is the administrative regulation outlining measures taken with HIV positive inmates. Plaintiff's allegations appear to be that Plaintiff has been removed from the general population, had his medical information disclosed, and has received threats from other inmates for not disclosing his HIV status.
An inmate does not have a liberty interest in actions by prison officials that fall within "the normal limits or range of custody which the conviction has authorized the State to impose." Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 478 (1995). An inmate does not have a liberty interest in remaining part of the general prison population. Cepero, 2015 WL 1308690 at *13 citing Anderson v. Cnty. of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1315 (9th Cir. 1995). Plaintiff therefore cannot base his due process claim on his removal from the general population and placement in specific housing.
State law creates a liberty interest deserving of protection under...
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