John Doe v. Jane Doe (In re Jane Doe)
| Decision Date | 18 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 48526 |
| Citation | 491 P.3d 644,169 Idaho 82 |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
| Parties | In the MATTER OF: Jane DOE II, A Child Under Eighteen (18) Years of Age. John Doe I and Jane Doe I, Husband and Wife, Petitioners-Respondents, v. Jane Doe (2020-54), Respondent-Appellant. |
Marilyn Paul, Twin Falls County Public Defender; Laura A. O'Connell, Deputy Public Defender, Twin Falls, for appellant.
Alan Goodman of Goodman Law Office, Rupert, for respondents.
Jane Doe (2020-54) appeals from a judgment terminating her parental rights. For the reasons set forth below, we vacate the judgment terminating Doe's parental rights and remand for further proceedings.
Doe is the mother of the minor child in this action, who was born in 2008. When the child was around two years old, Doe voluntarily placed the child in the care of Jane Doe I (Doe's cousin) and John Doe I (Jane's husband). In 2020, Jane and John petitioned to terminate the parental rights of Doe and the child's putative father and to adopt the child. Doe applied for counsel based on her indigent status and the magistrate court granted her application.
According to the court minutes of the pretrial conference,1 which Doe did not attend, Doe's counsel stipulated to the admission of Jane and John's exhibits for the termination hearing. The exhibits consisted of a power of attorney executed by Doe authorizing Jane and John to care for the child, documents related to a 2010 petition for deprivation that Jane and John filed in another state, the child's birth certificate, requests for admissions that Doe failed to answer, and fifty pages of handwritten notes. These handwritten notes are unsigned, unsworn and do not identify the authors, although there are indications that they were written by at least two people--Doe's mother and Jane. Some of the notes do not identify who is being discussed or give dates of when events occurred.2 Additionally, the court minutes show that Doe's counsel also stipulated to holding the termination hearing via online videoconference.
Doe was incarcerated in another state at the time of the termination hearing and briefly participated in the online videoconference using a telephone at the jail. At the beginning of the termination hearing, Doe's counsel represented that she had not spoken with Doe but had "left messages through the jail." Based on this representation, the magistrate court recessed to allow Doe's counsel to talk with Doe. Almost immediately after resuming the hearing, both Doe and her counsel were disconnected from the online videoconference. Doe's counsel eventually reconnected and explained that her office had lost its internet connection temporarily. Doe, however, did not reconnect.
Doe's counsel relayed that she had been able to talk with Doe, but stated, The magistrate court recessed again to allow Doe's counsel to contact Doe by telephone. After the recess, Doe's counsel informed the magistrate court that Doe intended to reconnect. Counsel also stated, "I don't think [Doe is] understanding what's going on at all."
When Doe failed to reconnect after another recess, the magistrate court asked Doe's counsel about the situation. Doe's counsel responded:
The magistrate court then asked for comments from Jane and John's counsel, who stated that he was ready to proceed and asked the magistrate court to terminate Doe's parental rights "based on the verified petition, unless the [magistrate court] would like us to produce some additional[3 ] testimony." When asked if she had a response, Doe's counsel stated, "No, Your Honor," and offered no argument regarding the merits of the petition to terminate Doe's parental rights.
Following these comments from counsel, the magistrate court proceeded with the hearing in Doe's absence. In doing so, the magistrate court reasoned as follows:
[Doe] did appear for a short time this morning, and where she's not logging back into our session and obviously has the ability to do so and [Doe's counsel] is able to reach [Doe] even after she left the session, the court can only find that she has voluntarily chosen to not reconnect with the session, and so she's voluntarily absent today.
After finding that Doe voluntarily absented herself, the magistrate court discussed the exhibits submitted by Jane and John at the pretrial conference4 and noted that "it seems like it's appropriate to terminate [Doe's] parental relationship under [ I.C. §] 16-2005, let's see, as abandonment, as neglect, and potentially for being unable to discharge parental responsibilities, though it's not been shown exactly why." The magistrate court continued:
The magistrate court also concluded that it was in the child's best interests to terminate Doe's parental rights. The magistrate court then asked Jane and John's counsel to prepare and submit findings of fact and conclusions of law "for review and signature."
Without altering anything of substance, the magistrate court signed and dated the findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted by Jane and John's counsel. The findings of fact and conclusions of law are limited and largely mirror each other.5 The magistrate court subsequently entered judgment terminating Doe's parental rights.6 Doe appeals.
Doe asserts she was denied her constitutional right to present testimony when the magistrate court proceeded with the termination hearing after she failed to reconnect. Doe also challenges the magistrate court's finding that termination is in the child's best interests. Jane and John respond that the magistrate court did not err by proceeding with the termination hearing without Doe and that the record shows that termination is in the child's best interests.7 Because Doe's procedural due process right was violated, we vacate the judgment terminating Doe's parental rights. As such, we do not address whether the magistrate court erred in concluding that termination is in the child's best interests.
Doe argues that proceeding with the online termination hearing in her absence violated her constitutional right to present testimony.8 However, as Jane and John note, Doe's counsel did not object to proceeding in Doe's absence at the termination hearing. Instead, Doe's counsel represented that Doe was not "very coherent" and "was not understanding what [they] were doing," but left "it to [the magistrate court's] discretion" whether to proceed in Doe's absence. By not objecting, Doe failed to preserve this issue for appeal. See McCandless v. Pease , 166 Idaho 865, 874, 465 P.3d 1104, 1113 (2020). Doe also did not argue to the magistrate court that she had a constitutional right to present her own testimony or that this right would be violated by proceeding with the hearing in her absence. We also note the magistrate court's pretrial order required Doe to file a list of witnesses she might call at the termination hearing and that she did not file such a list or otherwise indicate that she would testify. Issues not raised below are typically not considered for the first time on appeal. State, Dep't of Health & Welfare v. Doe (2019-16) , 166 Idaho 57, 63, 454 P.3d 1140, 1146 (2019). In addition, Doe does not provide any citation to legal authority in support of her argument on appeal. This Court generally does not address issues not supported by cogent argument and citation to legal authority, even in a case terminating parental rights. Idaho Dep't of Health & Welfare v. Doe (2018-24) , 164 Idaho 143, 147, 426 P.3d 1243, 1247 (2018). Normally, such failures would end our inquiry.
The Court, however, may address certain narrow, unpreserved issues involving due process violations. Idaho Dep't of Health & Welfare v. Doe (2017-32) , 163 Idaho 536, 538, 415 P.3d 945, 947 (2018) ; State v. Doe , 144 Idaho 534, 536, 164 P.3d 814, 816 (2007). For example, the Idaho Supreme Court has previously addressed due process errors affecting parents’ fundamental rights, including procedural errors and the application of an incorrect standard of review, even though the parties did not raise the issue on appeal. Doe (2017-32) , 163 Idaho at 538, 415 P.3d at 947 (addressing procedural error); Doe , 144 Idaho at 536, 164 P.3d at 816 (). We recognize the Idaho Supreme Court has also recently held that a parent failed to preserve his due process argument for appeal and that the "failure to preserve his argument [was] dispositive." Doe (2019-16) , 166 Idaho at 63, 454 P.3d at 1146. However, the Idaho Supreme Court did not expressly overrule the two prior opinions noted above in which it addressed unpreserved due process violations. Based on Idaho Supreme Court precedent and the record before us, we deem it appropriate to address Doe's argument because it raises due process concerns related to the termination of her parental rights.
Doe's...
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