McCandless v. Pease

• Decision Date: 11 June 2020
• Docket Number: Docket No. 46936
• Citation: 465 P.3d 1104,166 Idaho 865
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Parties: Dana R. MCCANDLESS and Mabel Robin Blackeagle, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Max E. PEASE, Defendant-Respondent, and Brent Weddle, Charles Weddle, and John Does 1-5, Defendants.

166 Idaho 865

465 P.3d 1104

Dana R. MCCANDLESS and Mabel Robin Blackeagle, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v. Max E. PEASE, Defendant-Respondent,andBrent Weddle, Charles Weddle, and John Does 1-5, Defendants.

Docket No. 46936

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, April 2020 Term.

Opinion filed: June 11, 2020

Robin D. Dunn, Dunn Law Offices, PLLC, Rigby, for Appellants.

J. Nick Crawford, Brassey Crawford, PLLC, Boise, for Respondent.

MOELLER, Justice This appeal concerns personal injury and property damage claims arising from a motor vehicle collision. On June 30, 2011, Max E. Pease failed to stop his vehicle before rear-ending Brent Weddle's vehicle. The force of the collision caused Weddle's vehicle to cross over into oncoming traffic and collide with a pickup truck owned by Mabel Robin Blackeagle. Dana R. McCandless was the driver of the pickup truck and Blackeagle was a passenger. A Nez Perce County jury found Pease and Weddle negligent and awarded damages as a result. Dissatisfied with the amount of the verdict, McCandless and Blackeagle moved for a new trial on the issues of comparative negligence and damages, and asserted additional issues of impropriety that occurred throughout the trial. The district court granted their motion in part and ordered a new trial unless Pease agreed to an additur of $4,000. Pease accepted the additur. McCandless and Blackeagle now appeal the district court's order on their motion for a new trial. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the district court's order.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 30, 2011, McCandless was driving Blackeagle's 2005 Dodge Ram 250 pickup truck eastbound on U.S. Highway 12 in Idaho County, with Blackeagle riding in the passenger seat. Pease and Weddle were both traveling westbound on U.S. Highway 12, with Weddle's vehicle following directly behind Pease's vehicle. Weddle passed Pease and then stopped in the middle of the westbound lane to make a left turn. Pease failed to observe Weddle's stopped vehicle and collided into the back of it. The force caused Weddle's vehicle to cross over into the eastbound lane and collide with Blackeagle's pickup truck.

On June 27, 2013, McCandless and Blackeagle (collectively "Appellants") filed a complaint against Weddle and Pease. Appellants alleged that they suffered personal injuries and damage to their property in the accident due to the negligence of Weddle and Pease. Prior to trial, Appellants settled with Weddle and he was dismissed from the action.

Following two days of testimony at trial, the case was submitted to the jury. The jury returned a special verdict, finding both Pease and Weddle negligent. The jury allocated fault 75% to Pease and 25% to Weddle. The jury awarded total damages of $36,600. This consisted of "property damages" of $15,500, McCandless's "actual expenses" of $4,900 and "general damages" of $5,000, and Blackeagle's "actual expenses" of $10,200 and "general damages" of $1,000. Pursuant to the jury's allocation of comparative negligence, the court reduced the jury's award by 25%, resulting in a total damage award of $27,450.¹

Appellants moved for a new trial arguing that "[t]he jury verdict does not conform to the evidence on the issues of liability and on damages." Appellants asserted four legal bases: (1) irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury, or adverse party ( I.R.C.P. 59(a)(1)(A) ); (2) misconduct by the jury ( I.R.C.P. 59(a)(1)(C) ); (3) inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice ( I.R.C.P. 59(a)(1)(F) ); and (4) insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is against the law ( I.R.C.P. 59(a)(1)(G) ).

As to liability, Appellants argued that "[t]he jury went against the great weight of evidence" and found Pease only 75% at fault when liability should have been a non-issue. As to damages, Appellants argued that the jury's entire award was not supported by the evidence. Regarding property damages, Appellants argued that the jury must have guessed when they valued Blackeagle's pickup truck at $15,500 because the evidence supported a value between $46,000 and $49,000. Regarding actual expenses, which consisted of medical expenses and lost wages, Appellants argued that "[t]he totals given by the jury match no [medical] records in evidence" and the jury failed to award anything for lost wages despite the evidence supporting the claim. Finally, regarding general damages, Appellants argued that the jury's award was so nominal "as to shock the conscience of the court" and "suggest the jury was inflamed or acting with passion."

Appellants also argued that there were several "other" issues that warranted a new trial. First, Appellants argued that Blackeagle is Native American, yet the Nez Perce County jury contained "none of her peers." Second, Appellants argued that they were denied a fair trial because they were not allowed to mention that Pease had insurance due to the restrictions found in Idaho Rule of Evidence 411, which they argued is unconstitutional. Finally, Appellants argued that they were denied due process because the district court refused to subpoena Dr. Anne P. McCormack, the out-of-state doctor retained by Pease to perform Independent Medical Examinations (IME) on Blackeagle and McCandless.

On March 28, 2019, the district court entered its order on Appellants' motion for a new trial. Relying on Rule 59(a)(1)(F), the district court found that although there was some disparity between the jury's valuation of property damages and actual expenses, it was not so great that it could determine the jury was influenced by passion or prejudice. However, the district court found Blackeagle's significantly smaller award of $1,000 for general damages as compared to McCandless's award of $5,000 to be "unusual." The court explained that, had it been the trier of fact, "it would have granted general damages in approximately equal amounts to McCandless and Blackeagle." As such, the court held that the $1,000 award "appears to [have] be[en] given under the influence of passion or prejudice," thereby providing grounds for a new trial. Nevertheless, the court decided that the issue could better be resolved with an additur.² Therefore, the court granted a new trial unless Pease accepted an additur of $4,000.

As for Appellants' "other" arguments, the district court found no basis to hold Rule 411 unconstitutional. The court also did not permit Appellants to subpoena Dr. McCormack, the IME examiner who was also Pease's retained expert witness, because, "[a]s an expert retained by [Pease], I.R.C.P. 26(4)(A)(v) prevented [Appellants] from contacting Dr. McCorm[a]ck," let alone from subpoenaing her. Appellants also failed to show error in their inability to call Dr. McCormack because "[i]f [Appellants] wished to rebut the report of Dr. McCorm[a]ck they were capable of hiring similar experts to offer contrasting opinions." The court did not address Appellants' argument regarding the racial makeup of the jury.

On April 1, 2019, Pease accepted the $4,000 additur to the jury's damage award. Accordingly, the district court did not order a new trial. Appellants timely appealed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"The decision by a trial court to grant or deny a motion for a new trial rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of a clear and manifest abuse of discretion." Litke v. Munkhoff , 163 Idaho 627, 632, 417 P.3d 224, 229 (2018) (quoting Barnett v. Eagle Helicopters, Inc ., 123 Idaho 361, 363, 848 P.2d 419, 421 (1993) ). Accordingly, "[t]he standard of review applicable to a district court's decision to grant or deny a new trial under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) is abuse of discretion." Id. (internal citation omitted). Moreover, "[a] trial court's grant of additur is reviewed for abuse of discretion." Ellefson v. Palmer, 162 Idaho 393, 398, 397 P.3d 1152, 1157 (2017).

When this Court reviews an alleged abuse of discretion by a trial court, the Court considers the following: "Whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason." Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Although Appellants' arguments on appeal are frequently inadequate and difficult to discern, they are not so lacking in coherency that we decline to address them.

Preliminarily, Pease contends that we should decline to address Appellants' arguments on appeal because they are nothing more than a general disagreement with the district court's ruling. According to Pease, Appellants fail to assert how the district court abused its discretion. Pease also contends that Appellants' arguments are not supported by cogent argument and authority. Although we agree that most of Appellants' arguments are inadequately supported with cogent argument and authority and at times are difficult to discern, some are coherent enough that we will address those on appeal.

Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(6) provides that the arguments of the parties "shall contain the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented on appeal, the reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and record relied upon." This Court "will not consider an issue not ‘supported by argument and authority in the opening brief.’ " Bach v. Bagley , 148 Idaho 784, 790, 229 P.3d 1146, 1152 (2010) (quoting Jorgensen v. Coppedge , 145 Idaho 524, 528, 181 P.3d 450, 454 (2008) ). Moreover, "[a] general attack on the findings and conclusions of the district court, without specific reference to evidentiary or legal errors, is insufficient to preserve an issue." Id. Consequently, "to the extent that an...