John Doe v. John Doe (In re Termination the Parental Rights John Doe)
| Decision Date | 28 May 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 42675.,42675. |
| Citation | 349 P.3d 1205,158 Idaho 614 |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
| Parties | In the Matter of the Termination of the Parental Rights of John DOE (2014–25). John Doe I and Jane DOE, Petitioners–Respondents, v. John DOE (2014–25), Respondent–Appellant. |
Bannock County Public Defender's Office, Pocatello, for appellant. Rilie M. Fry argued.
Thomas D. Smith Law, PLLC, Pocatello, for respondents. Thomas D. Smith argued.
This is an expedited appeal from a magistrate court's judgment terminating John Doe's parental rights and allowing his son C.C. to be adopted. Doe argues that the magistrate court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case. We affirm.
Doe and C.C.'s mother (Mother) are the biological parents of C.C., who was born in 2008. Doe, Mother, and C.C. are all members of the Shoshone–Bannock Tribes of the Fort Hall Reservation (Tribes). Doe and Mother were never married, but lived together sporadically during the initial portion of C.C.'s life until Mother ended the relationship in 2010.
In July of 2010, Doe shot Mother in front of C.C. Doe pleaded guilty to Attempted First Degree Murder and was sentenced to serve fifteen years, with nine years fixed. He is not eligible for parole until July of 2019. Doe has been an inmate in the custody of the Department of Correction in Boise throughout these proceedings. The Shoshone–Bannock Tribal Court (Tribal Court), granted Mother full legal and physical custody of C.C. with no visitation rights for Doe on July, 23, 2010. The Tribal Court also entered a protection order preventing Doe from contacting Mother and C.C. until July 23, 2035.1 Mother married C.C.'s stepfather (Stepfather) on October 15, 2010. Stepfather is also a member of the Tribes. Mother, Stepfather, and C.C. currently reside within the Fort Hall Reservation.
On February 6, 2014, Mother and Stepfather filed a petition in the Bannock County magistrate court, asking the magistrate court to terminate Doe's parental rights and allow Stepfather to adopt C.C.2 In response, Doe repeatedly claimed that the magistrate court lacked jurisdiction and that the Tribal Court had exclusive jurisdiction over the proceedings. On March 3, 2014, Doe's sister filed a Motion to Deny and Dismiss on Doe's behalf arguing the magistrate court lacked jurisdiction. The magistrate court denied this motion and ordered Mother and Stepfather to file an amended petition and provide notice to the Tribes. On May 7, 2014, Doe filed his second motion to dismiss, alleging the magistrate court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901 – 1963, and alleging the Tribes had not received notice. In the meantime, on May 23, 2014, Mother and Stepfather filed their amended petition and provided notice to the Tribes. The magistrate court denied Doe's second motion to dismiss. Doe filed an answer to the amended petition on May 28, 2014, denying the magistrate court's jurisdiction. Doe also filed a motion to reconsider, arguing the Tribes had exclusive jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 1911 of ICWA. The motion to reconsider was denied. Subsequently, Doe asked permission to file an interlocutory appeal on June 26, 2014. The permission for the interlocutory appeal was denied.
On July 15, 2014, the Tribes filed a petition for intervention, which was granted. The Tribes also filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. However, on July 30, 2014, the Tribes withdrew their motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and withdrew from the proceedings.
Trial was held on September 12, 2014. Regarding the conditions in Mother and Stepfather's home, an ICWA expert testified:
... I wish that there were lots of homes like this, because in child protection, there's not enough Native homes. And I wish that they [had] room for 15 kids.... They, they do all the things that—they really present the spirit of ICWA. You know, they provide what the child needs in that home. They have the Native customs and culture. And they're honored there and it was very impressive. I felt so good about being in that home and knowing that they have children that they are raising.
Ultimately, the magistrate court determined the requirements of ICWA were "amply satisfied" and terminated Doe's parental rights, granting leave for Mother and Stepfather to present C.C. to the magistrate court for adoption. Doe timely appealed.
"Whether a court lacks jurisdiction is a question of law that may be raised at any time ... and over which appellate courts exercise free review." State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757, 101 P.3d 699, 701 (2004). The meaning and application of a statute is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review. Idaho Dep't of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 150 Idaho 88, 90, 244 P.3d 232, 234 (2010). "Whether the trial court correctly applied ICWA to the facts of this case is a question of law and is subject to free review by this Court." Matter of Baby Boy Doe, 127 Idaho 452, 456, 902 P.2d 477, 481 (1995).
The magistrate court rejected all of Doe's claims that it did not have jurisdiction. The issues presented in this appeal concern whether: (1) judicial estoppel precludes Doe from challenging jurisdiction; (2) the State and the Tribes have an agreement to exercise concurrent jurisdiction under ICWA; (3) the State has concurrent jurisdiction under Idaho Code section 67–5101 and Public Law 280 over terminations of parental rights; and (4) ICWA precludes the State from exercising concurrent jurisdiction in this case because C.C. resides within the Fort Hall Reservation. We address these issues in turn.
Mother and Stepfather argue that judicial estoppel should bar Doe from bringing this jurisdictional challenge because he previously challenged the Tribal Court's jurisdiction. In proceedings before the Tribes' Court of Appeals, Doe challenged the Tribal Court's jurisdiction to determine custody and enter a protective order. The Tribes' Court of Appeals issued its decision on November 30, 2010. Doe did not prevail in this prior jurisdictional challenge, but he did prevail on a separate argument that the custody and protection orders were entered in violation of due process.
"Judicial estoppel precludes a party from advantageously taking one position, then subsequently seeking a second position that is incompatible with the first." McCallister v. Dixon, 154 Idaho 891, 894, 303 P.3d 578, 581 (2013). This Court has described judicial estoppel as the principle "that a litigant who obtains a judgment, advantage, or consideration from one party through means of sworn statements is judicially estopped from adopting inconsistent and contrary allegations or testimony, to obtain a recovery or a right against another party, arising out of the same transaction or subject matter. " In re Pangburn, 154 Idaho 233, 241, 296 P.3d 1080, 1088 (2013) (quoting Heinze v. Bauer, 145 Idaho 232, 235, 178 P.3d 597, 600 (2008) ). The custody and protective order proceedings before the Tribal Court are distinct from this action to terminate Doe's parental rights. Moreover, Doe gained no advantage in the earlier proceeding, as his claim that the Tribal Court lacked jurisdiction was not successful. Thus, we decline to apply judicial estoppel.
As another defense to Doe's jurisdictional challenge, Mother and Stepfather argue that the Tribes and the State "have at least an implicit agreement to share concurrent jurisdiction," evidenced by the Tribes' decision to withdraw, that would authorize the State's exercise of jurisdiction under ICWA. 25 U.S.C. § 1919. In reply, Doe argues this Court should not imply an agreement between the Tribes and the State because nothing in the record shows why the Tribes withdrew.
ICWA provides a mechanism for "Agreements between States and Indian tribes:"
States and Indian tribes are authorized to enter into agreements with each other respecting care and custody of Indian children and jurisdiction over child custody proceedings, including agreements which may provide for orderly transfer of jurisdiction on a case-by-case basis and agreements which provide for concurrent jurisdiction between States and Indian tribes.
25 U.S.C. § 1919(a). The Nevada Supreme Court, in In re Parental Rights as to S.M.M.D., considered a jurisdictional challenge under ICWA when reservation-domiciled Native American children were removed from their mother. 272 P.3d 126, 128 (Nev.2012). The tribe and the state of Nevada notified the trial court of a "joint decision" to continue with Nevada maintaining jurisdiction and the tribe "being a co-agent and lending support." Id. However, there was no written agreement between the tribe and Nevada. Id. at 132 n. 6. The Nevada Supreme Court determined that 25 U.S.C. § 1919(a) was meant to be broad, looking to 25 U.S.C. § 1919(a)'s legislative history. Id. at 133. Ultimately, the Nevada Supreme Court determined the "joint decision" between the tribe and Nevada constituted a case-by-case agreement as contemplated by 25 U.S.C. § 1919 and found concurrent jurisdiction between Nevada and the tribe. Id.
The present case is not similar. Nothing in the record indicates why the Tribes withdrew. Unlike the "joint decision" in In re Parental Rights as to S.M.M.D., the record in this case is silent as to why the Tribes abandoned their initial position that the magistrate court lacked jurisdiction and withdrew from the action. We are unable to infer an agreement from silence. Therefore, there is no basis for determining the existence of an agreement to exercise concurrent jurisdiction under 25 U.S.C. § 1919(a).
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