John Doe v. Marion Indep. Sch. Dist.
| Decision Date | 29 November 2018 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL NO. SA-17-CV-01114-OLG |
| Parties | JOHN DOE, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NEXT FRIEND OF SARAH DOE, A MINOR; Plaintiff, v. MARION INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, KYLE KELSO, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS TEACHER OF MARION HIGH SCHOOL; AND STACI SNYDER, INDIVIDUALLY AND PRINCIPAL OF MARION HIGH SCHOOL; Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This Report and Recommendation concerns Defendants Marion Independent School District and Matthew Connor's Corrected Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint [#29]. This case was referred to the undersigned for all pretrial proceedings pursuant to Rules CV-72 and 1(c) of Appendix C of the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas on January 30, 2018 [#2]. The undersigned has authority to enter this recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that Defendants' Motion [#29] be GRANTED.
Plaintiff John Doe, individually and as next friend of Sarah Doe, originally filed this action on November 2, 2017 against Defendants Marion Independent School District ("Marion ISD"), Staci Snyder (Principal of Marion High School), and Kyle Kelso (a teacher at Marion High School), asserting various federal and state causes of action related to an alleged sexual relationship between Kelso and his minor student, Sarah Doe. (Orig. Compl. Defendants were served with summons and a copy of the Complaint, and in response Marion ISD and Snyder filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on June 21, 2018 [#14]. Plaintiff thereafter moved for leave to file an amended pleading [#18]. Kelso did not join in the motion to dismiss and filed a Suggestion of Bankruptcy on July 26, 2018 [#22]. The undersigned subsequently stayed all of Plaintiff's claims against Kelso pursuant to the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362 [#23]1 and issued a report and recommendation recommending Plaintiff's motion for leave to amend be granted and Defendants' motion to dismiss be dismissed as moot without prejudice to refiling in light of the amended complaint [#24]. The District Court adopted the recommendation on November 13, 2018 [#32].
Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint was docketed on October 9, 2018 [#26] and is the current live pleading in this case. The Amended Complaint again sues Marion ISD and Kelso but replaces Snyder with Defendant Matthew Connor, the Vice Principal of Marion High School at the time of the events underlying this suit. (First Am. Compl. [#26] at ¶¶ 1-5.) Plaintiff alleges that Kelso showed favoritism toward Ms. Doe during the 2014 school year, and Marion ISD allowed Kelso to travel with five minor female students for an overnight school funded trip without another adult chaperon or supervision. (Id. at ¶ 10.) According to Plaintiff, during thetrip Kelso would enter the girls' rooms and leave flowers, notes, and other signs of affection. (Id.) Following the trip, Plaintiff alleges that Kelso contacted Ms. Doe via text messaging, by phone, and in person during school and at her home and ultimately Kelso and Ms. Doe engaged in sexual intercourse. (Id. at ¶¶ 11-13.) Plaintiff claims that Marion ISD did not have a policy in place to protect female students from sexual predation on school trips, and Defendant Connor was the policy enforcer who approved Kelso's overnight travel plans with his female students. (Id. at ¶ 10.) Plaintiff asserts the following causes of action: violations of the 14th Amendment's equal protection and due process clauses pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all Defendants; violations of Title IX against Marion ISD; intentional infliction of emotional distress against Kelso; negligence by Marion ISD and Connor; and assault and battery against unidentified Defendants. (Id. at ¶¶ 14-28.) Defendants Marion ISD and Connor promptly filed the renewed motion to dismiss that is the subject of this report and recommendation.
Plaintiff's response to the motion to dismiss was due on or before October 31, 2018. See Loc. R. CV-7(e) (). To date, Plaintiff has not filed a response to the motion. Pursuant to Local Rule CV-7(e), if there is no response filed within the time period prescribed by the rules, the court may grant the motion as unopposed. The Court therefore reviews the sufficiency of Plaintiff's allegations both in light of the arguments raised in Marion ISD's and Connor's motion to dismiss and the lack of response from Plaintiff.
Motions filed under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow a party to challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court to hear a case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1); Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). The burden of proof fora Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is on the party asserting jurisdiction. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 104 (1998). Accordingly, the plaintiff constantly bears the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist. Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 511 (5th Cir. 1980).
Where a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is limited to a facial attack on the pleadings, as here, it is subject to the same standard as a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6). See Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 557 (5th Cir. 2008); Benton v. United States, 960 F.2d 19, 21 (5th Cir. 1992). In either case, the Court must "take the well-pled factual allegations of the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Lane, 529 F.3d at 557; In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007). Under Rule 12(b)(6), a claim should not be dismissed unless the court determines that it is beyond doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove a plausible set of facts that support the claim and would justify relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This analysis is generally confined to a review of the complaint and its proper attachments. Fin. Acquisition Partners LP v. Blackwell, 440 F.3d 278, 286 (5th Cir. 2006). However, in ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, the court may consider any of the following: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by the undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed jurisdictional facts. Walch v. Adjutant Gen.'s Dep't of Tex., 533 F.3d 289, 293 (5th Cir. 2008).
When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with other Rule 12 motions, a court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before addressing any attack on the merits. Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161. This requirement prevents a court without jurisdiction from prematurely dismissing a case with prejudice. Id. The court's dismissal of a plaintiff's case because the plaintiff lacks subject-matter jurisdiction is not a determination of the merits anddoes not prevent the plaintiff from pursuing a claim in a court that does have proper jurisdiction. Id.
"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. "Although a complaint "does not need detailed factual allegations," the "allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The allegations pleaded must show "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court "accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Martin K. Eby Const. Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation omitted). However, a Court need not credit conclusory allegations or allegations that merely restate the legal elements of a claim. Chhim v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 836 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). In short, a claim should not be dismissed unless the court determines that it is beyond doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove a plausible set of facts that support the claim and would justify relief. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. When the issue is a statute of limitations defense, the court may only order dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) "where it is evident from the plaintiff's pleadings that the action is barred and the pleadings fail to raise some basis for tolling or the like." Jones v. Alcoa, Inc., 339 F.3d 359, 366 (5th Cir. 2003).
The motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Marion ISD and Defendant Connor should be granted. Plaintiff's Section 1983 against these two Defendants and Title IX claims against Marion ISD should be dismissed for failure to state a claim, and Plaintiff's negligence and intentional tort claims against Marion ISD and Connor should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Plaintiff sues Marion ISD and Vice Principal Connor for violations of her Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and substantive due...
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