John H., In re

• Decision Date: 19 April 1978
• Docket Number: Cr. 19946
• Citation: 577 P.2d 177,21 Cal.3d 18,145 Cal.Rptr. 357
• Parties: , 577 P.2d 177 In re JOHN H., a person coming under the Juvenile Court Law. Clarence E. CABELL, as Acting Chief Probation Officer, etc., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOHN H., Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: California Supreme Court

Page 357

145 Cal.Rptr. 357

21 Cal.3d 18, 577 P.2d 177

In re JOHN H., a person coming under the Juvenile Court Law.

Clarence E. CABELL, as Acting Chief Probation Officer, etc., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOHN H., Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 19946.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

April 19, 1978.

Hearing Denied May 25, 1978.

Walter Lawrence Johnson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, Paul Halvonik, State Public Defender, Charles M. Sevilla, Chief Asst. State Public Defender, and Edward H. Schulman, Deputy State Public Defender, for defendant and appellant.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Jack R. Winkler, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., S. Clark Moore, Asst. Atty. Gen., Edward T. Fogel, Jr., and Gary R. Hahn, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

RICHARDSON, Justice.

John H., a minor, appeals from an order of the superior court declaring him to be a ward of the juvenile court and committing him to the Youth Authority. Among other contentions, appellant asserts that the superior court erred in failing to make and enter express findings which indicate the reasons for the order of commitment. We will conclude that, since neither the Constitution nor statutes require such findings, and since the record in such cases ordinarily is sufficient to permit adequate appellate review, we should not impose such an obligation as a judicial rule of procedure.

Appellant was found to have committed a robbery and to have inflicted great bodily harm upon the victim; he was adjudicated a ward of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 (all further statutory references are to that code unless otherwise specified); and a disposition hearing was held to determine a suitable placement (§§ 727-731). Appellant's probation officer recommended that appellant be sent to a county-maintained camp for delinquent youths. The referee disagreed, stating, on the record, that "this minor has and had for sometime been involved seriously and actively in gang activities. He was given a home on probation . . . and ordered to stay away from those gang activities. (P) This is not the first serious offense involving violence in which he has been involved, and with this extensive history, the court . . . finds that the mental and physical condition . . . of the ward is such as to render it probable that he will be benefited by . . . treatment provided by (the Youth Authority)." (See § 734, requiring such a determination of probable benefit from a Youth Authority commitment; see also In re Aline D. (1975) 14 Cal.3d 557, 121 Cal.Rptr. 816, 536 P.2d 65.)

Because it would result in removing appellant from his home the referee's order was not effective until approved by a juvenile court judge. (§ 249 (former § 555); see In re Edgar M. (1975) 14 Cal.3d 727, 731, 737-738, 122 Cal.Rptr. 574, 537 P.2d 406.) In the present case such approval was given by an order made by the juvenile court judge on a printed form which recited that the court had found (in the language of § 734) that appellant would probably benefit from the treatment provided by the Youth Authority. The order did not repeat, however, the referee's declared reasons for recommending such a commitment. Appellant neither objected to the absence of findings nor requested a rehearing of the disposition order in the juvenile court. (See § 252 (former § 558).)

We observe, initially, that there presently exists no due process necessity that express findings be made in cases of this kind. Thus far, the United States Supreme Court has recognized a constitutional requirement only in the "critical" situation in which a juvenile court has waived its own jurisdiction over the minor in favor of adult criminal proceedings. In such a case, the high court has required that the juvenile courts furnish a statement of the reasons supporting the waiver in order to assure an appellate review that has meaning. (Kent v. United States (1966) 383 U.S. 541, 561, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84; see In re Sturm (1974) 11 Cal.3d 258, 269, fn. 13, 113 Cal.Rptr. 361, 521 P.2d 97.) In contrast, the minor in the present case is retained within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. As we shall note, the decision to retain and commit a minor to the Youth Authority ordinarily is accompanied by a record which amply discloses the reasons supporting the commitment.

Furthermore, there is no statutory requirement that either the juvenile court or referee express the reasons which support a minor's commitment to the Youth Authority. Section 726 states that ". . . no ward or dependent child shall be taken from the physical custody of a parent or guardian unless upon the hearing the court finds . . . that the parent or guardian is incapable of providing . . . for the minor" (subd. (a)), that the minor has failed to reform while on probation (subd. (b)), or that "the welfare of the minor requires that his custody be taken from his parent or guardian" (subd. (c)). In addition, as previously noted, section 734 requires a determination of probable benefit to the minor from a Youth Authority placement. Apart from these two sections, the Legislature has not imposed any requirement that particular findings be entered in support of a commitment order.

Appellant, while acknowledging the absence of any constitutional or statutory requirement of express findings, nonetheless urges that, as a policy matter, we should compel such findings pursuant to "our supervisory authority over state criminal procedure." (See In re Podesto (1976) 15 Cal.3d 921, 938, 127 Cal.Rptr. 97, 107, 544 P.2d 1297, 1307.) In Podesto we imposed a requirement that trial courts render a brief statement of reasons in support of an order denying a motion for bail on appeal, to insure significant appellate review. It should be noted, in passing, that denials of bail occur in the absence of any previous formal hearing on the matter, and generate no substantial reviewable record. We explained in Podesto that findings serve several worthy purposes: They help to assure a realistic review by providing a method of evaluating a judge's decision or order; they guard against careless decision making by encouraging the trial judge to express the grounds for his decision; and they preserve public confidence in the fairness of the judicial process. (Id., at p. 937, 127 Cal.Rptr. 97, 544 P.2d 1297; see also In re Bye (1974) 12 Cal.3d 96, 110, 115 Cal.Rptr. 382, 524 P.2d 854 (statement of reasons supporting revocation of out-patient status for narcotics addict); In re Sturm, supra, 11 Cal.3d 258, 269-272, 113 Cal.Rptr. 361, 521 P.2d 97 (statement of reasons for denying parole).)

Courts, however, have not required findings, or a statement of reasons, in every type of proceeding. (E. g., People v. Edwards (1976) 18 Cal.3d 796, 805-806, 135 Cal.Rptr. 411, 557 P.2d 995 (denial of probation); Kawaichi v. Madigan (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 461, 466, 126 Cal.Rptr. 63 (denial of release on one's own recognizance pending trial); People v. Ruiz (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 715, 717-718, 125 Cal.Rptr. 886 (revocation of probation).) In declining to impose a requirement that trial courts state their reasons for denying probation in a criminal case, we explained in Edwards that, unlike the Podesto situation, such a requirement was unnecessary to insure a proper appellate review, for the record on appeal from a judgment denying probation is usually sufficient for that purpose, containing "a full record of all proceedings including the probation and sentencing hearing itself; there is thus a solid basis for review . . . ." (18 Cal.3d at p. 804, 135 Cal.Rptr. at p. 418, 557 P.2d at p. 1002.) Furthermore, we pointed out that a judge who is aware that his judicial conduct is subject to review on a full record "is not likely to make a hasty or careless decision. Thus an element of compulsion to exercise care and sound judgment is present without the requirement of an articulated statement of reasons . . . ." (P. 805, 135 Cal.Rptr. at p. 418, 557 P.2d p. 1002.)

Similar considerations move us herein. The record of a disposition hearing in juvenile court ordinarily will provide an adequate appellate record from which to determine the reasons supporting any Youth Authority commitment. The probation report, together with a transcription of the hearing and the referee's remarks and conclusions usually will accompany every record on appeal. As noted above, the record herein does contain the various reasons given by the referee in support of his order, and we discern no valid purpose which would be served by requiring the juvenile court judge to repeat those or other reasons in his commitment order. In the absence of any contrary indication in the record, we think it fair to presume from the judge's approval of the order that the judge relied upon the same or similar reasons as those stated by the referee.

Appellant relies on In re Lawrence B. (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 671, 673, 132 Cal.Rptr. 599, wherein the court held that an order couched only in the conclusionary terms of section 726 is insufficient to support a Youth Authority commitment. We are more persuaded, however, by the force of the dissenting opinion of Justice Jefferson who observed in Lawrence B., "By its express terms, Welfare and Institutions Code section 726 requires a finding only in the language of the statute. (P) . . . Additional, express findings are neither mandated by any provision of the State of California Constitution, nor the United States Constitution, nor by any section of the Welfare and Institutions Code, nor by the decisional law of this state. An appellate court ought not, by judicial fiat, (to) interpret the plain and unambiguous language of Welfare and Institutions Code section 726 as requiring anything additional to what the statute itself explicitly requires." (P. 676, 132 Cal.Rptr. p. 602; italics in original.) The dissent further found significance in the fact that in 1975 the...