John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Dutton

• Decision Date: 11 December 1978
• Docket Number: No. 77-1361,77-1361
• Parties: 3 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1323 JOHN HANCOCK MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mattie B. DUTTON et al., Defendants-Appellees, Mamie Ann Sheley, Defendant-Appellee, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 1289

585 F.2d 1289

3 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1323

JOHN HANCOCK MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mattie B. DUTTON et al., Defendants-Appellees, Mamie Ann Sheley, Defendant-Appellee, Appellant.

No. 77-1361.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Dec. 11, 1978.

John M. Tatum, Savannah, Ga., for plaintiff-appellant.

William E. Callaway, Jr., Claxton, Ga., James M. Thomas, Savannah, Ga., for defendant-appellee, appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia.

Before WISDOM, AINSWORTH and CLARK, Circuit Judges.

CHARLES CLARK, Circuit Judge:

As a result of a domestic quarrel between Wensley Sheley and his wife Mamie Ann, Mr. Sheley was fatally wounded. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company insured Sheley's life. John Hancock disputed its liability under an accidental death provision of the policy in the portion of the action tried to a jury. Sheley's widow contested the rights of Sheley's former wife, Mattie B. Dutton, to receive the insurance proceeds in the remaining portion of the action tried to the court. Mrs. Sheley and John Hancock appeal adverse judgments received in these trials. We affirm.

I. The Liability of John Hancock

A. The Facts

Wensley Sheley married Mamie Ann Sheley on September 7, 1974. Their relationship was characterized by frequent violent quarrels. Prior to their marriage, Mr. Sheley had held a gun to Mrs. Sheley's head, while she, then his landlady, was trying to collect rent. During the marriage, Mrs. Sheley was the victim of a number of beatings at the hands of Mr. Sheley, and, on various occasions, he threatened and attempted to shoot her and to run over her with a car. The Sheley's decided their differences could not be resolved and sought a divorce. Mr. Sheley demanded that Mrs. Sheley return his rings and, when she refused, he threatened to cut off her finger with his Boy Scout knife. Their divorce became final on January 7, 1975.

Subsequently, Mrs. Sheley entered a hospital because of injuries received in an automobile accident. During her convalescence, Mr. Sheley visited her daily. The Sheley's were remarried on March 3, 1975.

The series of events that culminated in Mr. Sheley's death occurred on March 15, 1975, just twelve days after the second marriage. On that evening, the Sheleys left their home in Claxton, Georgia, to attend a motion picture theater. Mr. Sheley had been drinking heavily that afternoon and continued to drink during the movie. On the return trip, Mr. Sheley stopped and bought some french fried potatoes for Mrs. Sheley. He became angry when Mrs. Sheley refused to eat them, and the argument continued after the Sheley's had arrived at their home. Mrs. Sheley's daughters heard the quarreling and entered the Sheleys' bedroom to check on their mother. The daughters became involved in the argument, and Mr. Sheley made a threatening remark to one of them. He then removed a gun case from under his bed and began unsheathing a shotgun which Mrs. Sheley knew was loaded. Already fearful because of Mr. Sheley's prior assaults, she had acquired a pistol. Mr. Sheley knew she possessed the pistol. As he removed the shotgun, Mrs. Sheley took her pistol from her purse and shot him. A policeman called to the scene testified that Mr. Sheley, before his death, said, "I didn't think she'd shoot me."

John Hancock had issued two policies of ordinary life insurance on Mr. Sheley's life in the total amount of $26,000. The policies also provided for the payment of double indemnity benefits in the event of accidental death. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, John Hancock brought an interpleader action in district court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 22, admitting liability for the proceeds of the ordinary life insurance, but denying the claims of additional liability based on the accidental death clause in the policy. The jury found John Hancock liable for the accidental death proceeds. John Hancock then moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and, in the alternative, for a new trial. The district court denied these motions. John Hancock appeals these rulings.

B. The Accidental Death Issue

John Hancock contends that the trial judge should have granted its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Even though Georgia law governs the substantive issues in this case, the federal law standard is to be applied in assessing whether the judgment n. o. v. should have been granted, Brown v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Casualty Insurance Co., 506 F.2d 976, 978 (5th Cir. 1975); Messick v. General Motors Corporation, 460 F.2d 485, 494 (5th Cir. 1972). "Under federal law, if the evidence is of such a character that reasonable men exercising impartial judgment may differ in their conclusion," then the jury verdict must stand. Brown, 506 F.2d at 978.

John Hancock urges that under this federal procedural standard the substantive law of Georgia requires that reasonable men must find that Mr. Sheley's death was not accidental. In Georgia, in order to recover on an accidental death policy, a claimant must show that the act causing the insured's death was "unforeseen, unexpected, or unusual." Life Insurance Co. of Georgia v. Williams, 109 Ga.App. 264, 265, 135 S.E.2d 925, 926 (1964). Even when the insured is the aggressor in a situation, a claimant can still recover under an accidental death clause if he can show that the insured reasonably believed that the victim of his aggression would not kill him. Johnson v. Southern Life Insurance Co., 95 Ga.App. 625, 628, 98 S.E.2d 382, 385 (1957); Green v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 67 Ga.App. 520, 526-528, 21 S.E.2d 465, 470-71 (1942). The Georgia courts have applied this rule in domestic quarrels.

In Riggins v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 64 Ga.App. 834, 14 S.E.2d 182 (1941), a quarrel between insured and his wife began at a carnival. The insured followed his wife home and the argument flowed in and out of the house. The wife shot her husband as he was breaking down the door. The evidence showed that the insured had previously beaten his wife and that she had not taken any steps to protect herself. The court held that the facts created a jury issue as to whether the insured reasonably believed that his wife would not shoot him.

In Carolina Life Insurance Co. v. Young, 99 Ga.App. 848, 110 S.E.2d 67 (1959), while the insured was beating his wife and threatening her with a knife, the wife got a gun. She warned her husband that she would shoot him if he did not leave her alone. The husband grabbed the gun, and, in the ensuing struggle over it, he was killed. There had been a number of fights between the insured and his wife, and the wife had never resorted to a weapon to stop the fight before. The Georgia court held, as a matter of law, that despite the wife's prior reticence, the husband must have anticipated that the product of his struggle with his wife could have been his death. On rehearing, the court distinguished Riggins, noting that, "Here the deceased insured actually undertook to struggle for possession of a loaded firearm and the evidence of previous altercations with his wife did not involve the use of a dangerous instrumentality on her part." 99 Ga.App. at 856, 110 S.E.2d at 73.

In Life & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Hulsey, 109 Ga.App. 15, 134 S.E.2d 880 (1964), the insured and his wife were arguing about the insured's drinking and poker playing. During the quarrel, the husband got a rifle and held it to his wife's head, threatening to shoot her. He had made similar threats before, and the wife had not retaliated. Subsequently, the insured shot his wife and she blacked out. When she regained consciousness, she and her husband struggled over the rifle, and the husband was fatally injured. The court held that a jury issue was created with regard to the husband's accidental death, relying on the fact that the wife had never before responded to the husband's attacks. The court distinguished Young on the grounds that "there was a family quarrel history but not with deadly weapons." 109 Ga.App. at 17, 134 S.E.2d at 882.

John Hancock argues that Young should control this case. John Hancock contends that Mr. Sheley must have anticipated that Mrs. Sheley might shoot him since (1) it was the first quarrel in which Mrs. Sheley was armed, (2) Mr. Sheley knew that she was armed, and (3) it was the first time Mr. Sheley had threatened one of Mrs. Sheley's daughters. John Hancock reads Young to require that a claimant, in order to prove an accidental death, must show that the insured had threatened or assaulted his wife with a deadly weapon when she also had access to a deadly weapon and that she did not attempt to defend herself. John Hancock urges that since the altercation in question was the first one in which Mrs. Sheley was armed, Young requires that the accidental death issue be taken from the jury.

We reject John Hancock's arguments. The courts in Riggins and Hulsey did not even mention whether the wife had been armed during previous assaults, and the facts in Young are clearly distinguishable from those in this case. In Young, the parties were struggling over a loaded weapon when the insured was shot, and the wife had actually warned the insured that she would shoot him. The court held that these facts, together with the showing that the wife had never before attempted to use a deadly weapon in the couple's domestic fights, conclusively established that the insured could not reasonably have believed that his wife would not kill him. In the case at bar there was no struggle between the parties involving a loaded weapon, and Mrs. Sheley never warned Mr. Sheley that she was about to shoot him.

Even if Young established the proposition that John Hancock relies on, the Hulsey court, in a situation very similar to that in Young, retreated from the broad implications of Young. In Hulsey, the Georgia court interpreted its prior decision in...