John J. Woodside Storage Co. v. Reese

• Decision Date: 15 March 1962
• Docket Number: Nos. 1,No. 39043,3,2,39043,s. 1
• Citation: 105 Ga.App. 602,125 S.E.2d 556
• Parties: JOHN J. WOODSIDE STORAGE COMPANY, Inc., et al. v. J. L. REESE
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 556

125 S.E.2d 556

105 Ga.App. 602

JOHN J. WOODSIDE STORAGE COMPANY, Inc., et al. v. J. L. REESE.

No. 39043.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division Nos. 1, 2, 3.

March 15, 1962.

Rehearing Denied March 29, 1962.

Robert E. Knox, Thomson, Gould B. Hagler, Fulcher, Fulcher, Hagler & Harper, Augusta, for plaintiffs in error.

Randall Evans, Jr., Thomson, for defendant in error.

Syllabus Opinion by the Court

FRANKUM, Judge.

James Louis Reese, hereinafter referred to as plaintiff, sued John J. Woodside Storage Company, Inc. and its insurance carrier, Transport Insurance Company, for damages on account of personal injuries he allegedly sustained in the collision referred to in the case of Carr v. John J. Woodside Storage Co., 103 Ga.App. 858, 120 S.E.2d 907; reversed 217 Ga. 438, 123 S.E.2d 261. The plaintiff was a guest passenger in the automobile involved in the collision. In the instant case the evidence adduced upon the trial was, in the main, substantially the same (except the evidence concerning the plaintiff's injuries) as in the Carr case, supra. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The defendants filed a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a motion for a new trial which contains the usual general grounds and several special grounds. The court denied each motion. The defendants appealed to this court assigning as error the denial of said motions. Held:

1. The court did not err in denying the defendants' motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, because there were issues of fact which the jury alone could determine.

2. Special ground four of the motion for a new trial assigns as error a portion of the court's charge. However, when such portion of the charge is considered together with the entire charge, no error is shown. As stated by Justice Bleckley in Brown v. Matthews, 79 Ga. 1(1), 4 S.E. 13: 'A charge torn to pieces and scattered in disjointed fragments, may seem objectionable, although when put together and considered as a whole, it may be perfectly sound. The full charge being in the record, what it lacks when divided is supplied when the parts are all united.'

3. As stated before, the evidence in the case sub judice is in substance the same as the evidence in the case of Carr v. John J. Woodside Storage Co., 217 Ga. 438, 123 S.E.2d 261, supra, which held that the evidence was sufficient to authorize 'the jury to find that the driver of the defendant Woodside's truck was operating it on a public highway while under the influence of an intoxicant at the time of the collision'. Accordingly, that part of special ground five of the amended motion for a new trial, which complains that there was no evidence to warrant a charge to the jury on the question as to whether the driver of the storage company's truck was under the influence of intoxicating liquors at the time of the collision, is without merit. Such charge was authorized by the pleadings and the evidence. Carr v. John J. Woodside Storage Co., 217 Ga. 438, 123 S.E.2d 261, supra. After careful consideration, we are of the opinion that the remaining portion of special ground five, which complains that certain language in the charge of the court was misleading and confusing, does not show a reversible error for any of the reasons assigned.

4. The court charged upon the socalled doctrine of last clear chance. In Carr v. John J. Woodside Storage Co., 103 Ga.App. 858, 120 S.E.2d 907, supra, the Court of Appeals held that a charge upon this subject was not applicable to the facts, and the plaintiff in that case, in his petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court, assigned this ruling as error. The Supreme Court (217 Ga. 438, at page 444, 123 S.E.2d 261, at page 265, supra), in reversing that case on one ground, viz., a requested charge of wilful and wanton negligence should have been given, stated: 'The remaining grounds alleged in the application for the writ of certiorari have been carefully examined and we have reached the conclusion that they do not constitute any reason for reversing the judgment complained of. This being true, the judgment rendered by the Court of Appeals is reversed only for the reasons stated in the foregoing division of the opinion.' As we understand the Supreme Court's ruling, the Court of Appeals decision stands unreversed except as what was held concerning wilful and wanton negligence. Accordingly, the court erred in charging on the doctrine of last clear chance. Carr v. John J. Woodside Storage Co., 103 Ga.App. 858, 120 S.E.2d 907, supra. See Southland Butane Gas Co. v. Blackwell, 211 Ga. 665, 88 S.E.2d 6.

5. In special ground 10 of the motion for a new trial movants contend that the judge, in charging the jury, misstated certain facts appearing in the evidence. It is obvious that any error in this respect was caused by a slip of the tongue, and since such is not likely to reoccur on a subsequent trial, it is not necessary to pass upon this ground of the motion.

6. Movants complain in special grounds 11 and 12 of the motion for a new trial that the court erred in overruling their motion for a mistrial because of improper argument made by plaintiff's counsel during the closing argument to the jury. The facts recited in these special grounds, which were certified as true by the trial court, show that plaintiff's counsel stated in the closing argument to the jury 'that the defendants had furnished Mr. Yelverton [a witness] transportation from Pensacola, Florida to Warrenton, Georgia when he testified in that case, and that the defendants could buy Mr. Hagler's airplane ticket to go to Pensacola for the taking of Mr. Yelverton's testimony. He then asked the jury if the jury thought that the plaintiff could buy his airplane ticket.' (emphasis ours); that 'the defendants should have brought Mr. Roy Yelverton from Pensacola to Thomson so that he could testify in person and be seen by the jury. He stated that he would like for the jury to see this witness who by his own admission testified this accident and death of one of the occupants of the car amounted to no more than a 'hill of beans' to him'; that 'Mr. Yelverton was brought from Pensacola to Warrenton to testify in a companion case, but that defendants had not brought him to Thomson to testify in this case'; and that 'it would not have cost the defendants any more to bring Mr. Yelverton to Thomson, than it cost them for Mr. Hagler, one of the attorneys for the defendants, to go to Pensacola to take his testimony.'

In the heat of a hard-fought case it is...