John Jenkins and Others, Appellants v. Sarah Pye and Edward Arell Pye, Infants By James Pye, Their Father and Next Friend, Appellees

• Decision Date: 01 January 1838
• Parties: JOHN J. JENKINS AND OTHERS, APPELLANTS v. SARAH M. PYE AND EDWARD ARELL PYE, INFANTS, BY JAMES B. PYE, THEIR FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND, APPELLEES
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

37 U.S. 241

12 Pet. 241

9 L.Ed. 1070

JOHN J. JENKINS AND OTHERS, APPELLANTS v. SARAH M. PYE AND EDWARD ARELL PYE, INFANTS, BY JAMES B.

PYE, THEIR FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND, APPELLEES.

January Term, 1838

ON appeal from the circuit court of the United States of the District of Columbia, for the county of Alexandria.

In the circuit court, the appellees filed their bill against John J. Jenkins, and Mary, the wife of Robert Morrow, children of George Jenkins by a second wife; the said George Jenkins having died on the 8th day of April, 1831; to set aside a certain deed executed by Eleanor Jenkins, who was the daughter of George Jenkins and the had first intermarried with Mary died in 1818. George Jenkins had first intermarried with Mry Arell, who, as one of the heirs of Richard Arell, was entitled to considerable real estate; of which partition was made in 1797. She died, leaving but one child, the mother of the complainants; and her estate descended to her daughter, subject to a life estate in George Jenkins, as tenant by the curtesy. George Jenkins, after her decease, married and had children by his second wife, one of whom is one of the appellants in the case. The deed was duly executed by the mother of the complainants, on the 15th of March, 1813, and recorded on the 3d of November, in the same year; and conveyed in fee simple to George Jenkins, for a nominal consideration, all the real estate and ground rents to which she was entitled as the heir of her mother. The bill also sought to recover the value of certain real estate, part of that conveyed to George Jenkins, which was afterwards sold by him to different persons; and also the rents of part of the real estate left unsold at the death of George Jenkins, and received by the executor, after his decease. The complainants charge in their bill, that the deed executed by their mother, being made wholly without consideration, operated to create a resulting trust in favour of Eleanor Jenkins and her heirs: and they claim, if this cannot be sustained, that the deed was obtained by the undue influence of paternal authority; and was therefore void against the grantor and her heirs, in equity: and ask that it be vacated as to all the property conveyed by it, which was unsold at the decease of George Jenkins.

The answer of the defendants denies that any undue influence was exercised by George Jenkins over his daughter; who, when she executed the deed, was twenty-three years of age, and was at the time well acquainted with her rights, and with the value of the property. On the trial it was admitted, that no undue influence was exercised by the father; and it was in evidence, that when the deed was recorded, George Jenkins gave to his daughter two thousand dollars in bank stock. This, and the further consideration that the daughter was to receive a proportionate part of her father's estate, who, in addition to the property conveyed by the deed, was wealthy; and the estate conveyed being such as required large expenses for its preservation and improvement; were asserted to be a valuable consideration for the deed.

The circuit court decreed the deed to be null and void; because the same was made without 'any consideration,' and because the same was obtained 'soon after the minority of said Eleanor, and while she yet remained under his power and control, and uninformed of the nature and extent of her rights;' and having decreed also, that one of the appellants, John J. Jenkins, as administrator aforesaid, should pay three thousand six hundred and seventy-seven dollars and one cent, being a balance due, after deducting two thousand dollars, paid on the 3d of November, 1813, with interest from 8th of April, 1831, on account of money received for sales of part of said property; and also, the sum of one thousand one hundred and sixty-seven dollars and five cents, amount of rents alleged to have been received since the death of the said George Jenkins; and also, the sum of eighteen dollars and twenty-five cents, with interest from said 8th of April, 1831, which had been received by George Jenkins on the partition of the estate, for owelty of partition, awarded in 1797.

The defendants appealed to this Court. The case was argued by Mr. Robert I. Brent and Mr. Jones for the appellants, and by Mr. Simmes, and Coxe for the appellees.

Mr. Brent contended,

1st. That there can be no resulting trust as charged in the bill; because that doctrine is confined to cases where the trust results to a purchaser taking a conveyance in the name of a third person, or similar cases; 2 Atkyn's Rep. 256; 2 Mad. Chan. Prac. 113; 4 Kent's Com. (ed. 1832,) 305.

2d. The bill takes the alternative ground, in case the resulting trust fails; that the deed of March, 1813, executed by Eleanor Jenkins (the daughter) to George Jenkins, (the father,) was obtained by the undue influence of paternal authority.

The answer of the defendants positively denies the charge of undue influence; and this denial is conclusive to negative the charge in the absence of all other testimony.

The case of the complainants stands alone on the broad and naked principle that all transactions or dealings between parent and child by which a benefit passes to the former is interdicted, 'ipso facto;' by the policy of the law. We deny that such is the settled rule of law, and confidently assert, that in every adjudged case there was some circumstance of undue influence proved, and required by the court as a material ingredient. Huguenir v. Basely, 14 Vesey, 291; 2 Atkyns, 254, 258; 1 Peere Williams, 607; 1 Peere Williams, 639; 1 Atkyns, 402; 2 Atkyns, 85; 2 Atkyns, 160; 1 Mad. Chan. Prac. 309; Green v. Green, 1 Bros. Parl. Cas. 143; Lewis v. Pead, 1 Ves. Jr., 19; Pratt v. Barker, 1 Simon's Rep. 1; King v. Hamlett; 2 Mylne and Keene, 474, 480; Pothier, Oblig. (old edit.) 22.

3d. Admitting that this deed was purely voluntary, an absolute gift of all the property by a daughter twenty-three years of age to her father; still the conveyance ought to be sustained, because it may have been the true interest of Eleanor Jenkins to place herself on the same footing with her brother and sister by a different mother: her father was a man of large fortune, and it might be greatly to her benefit to divest herself of her remote reversion, and come in, share and share alike, with her brother and sister.

At all events, such a settlement would be reasonable and just towards her half-brother and sister; and on that ground alone would be valid; 1 Atkyns, 5, 6.

4th. Whatever may have been the abuse of parental authority by George Jenkins in procuring the deed of March, 1813; the equity of the complainants is lost by the lapse of time, (nineteen years,) and the circumstances of the case.

On this point it appears that Eleanor Jenkins was not married for two years after the date of the deed; and that she lived several years after her intermarriage with James Pye (the next friend of the infant complainants); that George Jenkins lived until 1831; and that not a word of complaint against the fairness of the deed of March, 1813, was ever uttered in the lifetime of either of the original parties to that deed. The Court would make wild work to unravel the transaction under such circumstances. Bower v. Carter, 5 Vesey, 875, 879; 17 Vesey, 97, 100; 1 Jac. & Walk. 63.

5th. But conceding all previous propositions, it appears that two thousand dollars was paid by George Jenkins to Eleanor Jenkins on the 3d November, 1813, the day of recording the deed; this was a full and adequate consideration for the reversion dependant on a robust life, and considering the dilapidated situation of the property. And it farther appears, that George Jenkins applied one thousand dollars to the education of Sarah M. Pye (one of the complainants); these facts prove the consideration paid, and to be paid, for the purchase of Eleanor Jenkins' reversionary interest.

6th. On the hypothesis that the deed of March, 1813 is to be annulled, then the court below erred in not allowing the appellants interest on the sum of two thousand dollars paid to Eleanor Jenkins, on the 3d of November, 1813; and in not crediting George Jenkins' estate with the advances made by him to the children of Eleanor Jenkins; and which could not be considered in the light of donations, if this deed is pronounced invalid. Slocum v. Marshal, 2 Wash. C. C. R. 401.

7th. The court erred in charging George Jenkins' estate with a sum of money paid him in 1797, in right of his wife, (the mother of Eleanor Jenkins) for owelty of partition; because, first, the bill did not claim it, 9 Cranch, 19; second, the husband was entitled to the money as personalty not realty, 1 Har. & Gill, 277.

Mr. Jones stated that there was nothing in this case, upon the bill, answer and evidence, but the case of a daughter of full age, having conveyed her residuary interest in her estate to her father; he having an intermediate estate for life in the property, as a tenant by the curtesy. At the time of the conveyance, he was in full life and health; and he actually lived eighteen years after the conveyance was made. There is no allegation of undue parental influence. This is disclaimed; and the high character of the father forbids such a belief. The father appropriated two thousand dollars of stock to the benefit of the daughter, on the day the conveyance was recorded; which amount he received from the sale, in fee simple, of a part of the estate, which was at the same time sold for three thousand dollars.

If the deed is to be set aside, it will be on the principle that such a conveyance by a daughter to a father cannot be made. That the relations of a child to a parent are such, as to forbid her the exercise of a fair and just discretion and judgment; and that a court of chancery will presume all such conveyances fraudulent, and will avoid them.

Mr. Jones denied that such principles were just to the relations of a parent to a...