John Jeter, Plaintiff In Error v. James Hewitt, Melville Heron, and Mary Conrad

• Decision Date: 01 December 1859
• Citation: 16 L.Ed. 345,22 How. 352,63 U.S. 352
• Parties: JOHN P. JETER, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, v. JAMES HEWITT, MELVILLE HERON, AND MARY CONRAD
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

63 U.S. 352

22 How. 352

16 L.Ed. 345

JOHN P. JETER, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, v. JAMES HEWITT, MELVILLE HERON, AND MARY CONRAD.

December Term, 1859

THIS case was brought up by writ of error from the Circuit Court of the United States for the eastern district of Louisiana.

It was an action brought by John P. Jeter, a citizen of Louisiana, resident in New Orleans, against James Hewitt and David Heron, citizens of the State of Kentucky, temporarily within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court for the district of Louisiana.

The nature and history of the case are stated in the opinion of the court. It was submitted to the Circuit Court upon the pleadings, depositions, oral testimony, and arguments of counsel which found the facts substantially as they are narrated in the opinion of this court, and then dismissed the petition of the plaintiff. A writ of error was sued out, which brought the case up to this court.

It was argued by Mr. Carlisle, upon a brief filed by himself and Mr. Badger, for the plaintiff in error, and by Mr. Benjamin for the defendants.

As the judgment of this court turned upon the point that it was res judicata, only the arguments upon that subject will be reported.

The counsel for the plaintiff in error made the following points, amongst others:

VI. The validity of this title set up by the defendants is not res judicata, as maintained by counsel in the court below. The monition suit on which this pretension is founded could have no such effect, if the proceedings in the fifth District Court were a nullity. This seems clear upon principle.

5 Monition Act, B. and C.'s Dig., 586.

City Bank v. Walden, 1 Ann., 47.

16 Louisiana R., 596.

Besides, the court where the monition suit was prosecuted had no jurisdiction over the original suit, and could have none over that which was merely incidental.

Again: The judgment in the monition suit was not a judgment upon the merits, even against Mrs. Ford, and was not at all against Jeter.

C. C., 2265.

Finally: The decree of homologation, in its terms, seems really to come to nothing, since it only confirms and homologates the sale, 'in so far as the same has not been opposed,' while the record shows that it was totally opposed.

VII. Jeter is not estopped to claim against the sheriff's sale, or to show the nullity of the proceedings upon which it is based.

In this respect, this case is in striking contrast with Erwin v. Lowry, in 7 Howard. There, Hector McNeill, under whom Lowry claimed, had actively participated in the proceedings at the sale, had joined in the selection of appraisers, had requested the marshal to offer the land and negroes together, which was done, and all this in the presence of Erwin; and, upon the faith of this conduct, Erwin purchased. In the present case, on the contrary, it is distinctly proven, by two witnesses, that Jeter, 'in a loud and audible tone,' announced 'to the sheriff and the by-standers' that he was the owner of the property, and forbade the sale of it; and this announcement was made before the property was adjudicated to Hewitt & Heron.'

'He made his objections known publicly to the crowd.' The sheriff answered, that 'he would proceed with the sale.'

The only facts relied on by the defendants, as creating an estoppel, are, first, that Jeter was present at the sale, and, when the property was first offered, bid for it $70,000, and it was knocked down to him; and secondly, that in 1852 he joined with Mrs. Ford in making a deed for forty arpens of the land, to Hewitt Heron, for $2,000.

As to the first, his bid was for the protection of his own interest, and to avoid litigation. He had already paid Mrs. Ford $5,000, and he had agreed to pay, not only the debts charged on this property, but all the debts. Such a fact, even if the other party had acted upon it, could create no estoppel.

Hearne v. Rogers, 17 Eng. C. L. Rep., 451, 452.

But Hewitt & Heron did not act upon it. The sheriff refused Jeter's draft on Hill, McLean, & Co., of New Orleans, with whom he had arranged for the money, and refused him time to go to New Orleans to produce the money, and 'demanded that he should pay in cash the amount of his bid within half an hour, or he would set up the property and sell it again, which he did.'

Then it was that Jeter gave notice of his title, and forbade the sale; and Hewitt & Heron purchased under this notice.

As to the deed made in 1852, so far from importing a recognition of the title of Hewitt & Heron, it would rather signify an admission by them that, at least as to this fragment of forty acres, it required confirmation by a deed from Jeter.

In no view of these facts can they operate an estoppel. The general current of authorities, English and American, establishes the principle that a declaration in pais shall not work an estoppel, unless it appears affirmatively that it was intended that the party for or to whom it is made should act on the faith of it, and that he actually did so act, and will be prejudiced by the contrary assertion. If it be necessary to cite authorities for this, they will be found collected in Hare & Wallace's note to Howard & Hudson, (2 Ell. and Bl., 13, Amer. ed.,) and in the principal case. Here there was express warning given.

Upon the question that the merits of the case were not open for review in this court, Mr. Benjamin made the following points:

I. This action, plainly, is based on the assumption that the proceedings in the State courts of Louisiana (under which the title of Ford's succession to the property was divested, and the property was sold to defendants) are an absolute nullity.

It is an attempt, indirectly, to bring before the Federal courts jurisdiction of a question which, under the decisions of this court, cannot be examined by them.

Had the courts of Louisiana jurisdiction of the property appertaining to Ford's succession, and have they exercised that jurisdiction by disposing of that property? Manifestly, yes.

How, then, can that disposition of the property be supervised or revised by the Federal courts?

This court has always declined to permit the proceedings of even the inferior State courts to be attached collaterally before it.

Tarver v. Tarver, 9 Peters, 174.

Gaines v. Chew et al., 2 How., 619, 644.

Fonvergne et al. v. City of New Orleans, 18 How., 471.

Hagan v. Preston, decided at present term.

In this case, the plaintiff goes to the extravagant length of calling on the court not to annul the proceedings of an inferior State court as irregular or illegal, but to treat the final decision of the Supreme Court of Louisiana as an absolute nullity.

The form chosen for the action (a simple petitory action or ejectment) is a transparent device used by plaintiff to avoid the necessity of bringing an action to set aside the judgment of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, he being conscious that such action would be utterly untenable.

II. Jeter was a party to the suit determined by the Supreme Court of Louisiana, and it forms res judicata.

It is true, he was not a party by name; but the opinion of the Supreme Court is explicit, that Mrs. Ford's action as executrix was for the use of Jeter. Its language is: 'We think it inequitable to permit this sale to be questioned by the executrix, whom we consider as merely attempting to aid Jeter, her vendee and agent, in a speculation, at the expense of these bona fide purchasers, under the guise of representing a small minority of the creditors, whom she personally and Jeter are bound to pay.'

But, aside from this decision, the record permits no doubt that the suit decided in Louisiana was Jeter's suit. In the sale from Mrs. Ford to him, he exacted a promise that she would furnish him 'my letter of substitution to appear for me and in my stead, to appear and act in any court, * * * touching matters or interests in any manner connected with the active or passive properties, goods, or effects, of the aforesaid succession.'

She did give him just such a power; and, having sold to him her entire interest in the estate, and obtained his obligation to pay the debts, she withdrew from the whole business, leaving to Jeter, who alone had an interest, permission to use her name, and it was Jeter who brought the suit.

Having once litigated his rights through all the courts of Louisiana, the plaintiff cannot renew the contest in the Federal courts. The exceptio rei adjudicatae is a complete bar to his suit.

III. The monition, proceedings, and judgment on them, are in the nature of proceedings in rem, and bind all the world even those ignorant of their pendency—a fortiori, do they bind one who, like Jeter, was not only conusant, but was active in opposition.

The monition law of Louisiana (Acts 1834, p. 125, Revised Statutes, 1852, p. 425) is a wise and beneficial statute, and should be liberally construed. It was passed for the protection of innocent purchasers at sheriff's sales, and by the fourth section the court that issued the process had jurisdiction.

By the sixth section, the judgment is conclusive evidence that the proceedings of the court on the monition were regular; and by the seventh section, the judgment of the court confirming the sale operated as res judicata, and a complete bar against all persons, whether of age or minors, whether present or absent; and the judgment is to be considered as 'full proof, and conclusive that the sale was duly made in virtue of a judgment or order legally and regularly pronounced on the interests of parties duly represented.'

There is nothing in the 8th section which can release the plaintiff from the effect of this estoppel, because 'notices of the sale and appraisement were served by the sheriff, by leaving them on the plantation with the overseer, and plaintiff had notice of the sale, and was present at it, and bid for the property.'

Besides, plaintiff was in the place and stead of Ford, and had his rights, and no more. But Ford had confessed judgment in the...