John L. v. Superior Court
| Citation | 91 P.3d 205,33 Cal.4th 158,14 Cal.Rptr.3d 261 |
| Decision Date | 17 June 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. S098158.,S098158. |
| Court | California Supreme Court |
| Parties | JOHN L., Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT Of San Diego County, Respondent; The People, Real Party in Interest. The People, Petitioner, v. The Superior Court of San Diego County, Respondent; Matthew F., Real Party in Interest. The People, Petitioner, v. The Superior Court of San Diego County, Respondent; Jonathan G., Real Party in Interest. |
Steven J. Carroll, Public Defender, Matthew Braner, Gary Nichols and Jo Pastore, Deputy Public Defenders, for Petitioner John L. and for Real Parties in Interest Matthew F. and Jonathan G.
Paul J. Pfingst and Bonnie M. Dumanis, District Attorneys, Thomas F. McArdle and Peter J. Cross, Deputy District Attorneys, for Petitioner and for Real Party in Interest the People.
No appearance for Respondent.
Effective March 8, 2000, the Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Initiative (Prop. 21, Primary Elec. (Mar. 7, 2000)) (Proposition 21) amended Welfare and Institutions Code section 777.1 Section 777, subdivision (a)(2) (section 777(a)(2)) establishes the juvenile court procedure for finding probation violations and modifying prior dispositions when new misconduct is committed by those on probation for crimes previously adjudicated under section 602.
As we recently explained in In re Eddie M. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 480, 494-502, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 119, 73 P.3d 1115 (Eddie M.), former section 777 could be used to find a new criminal violation by one already a probationer under section 602, and thus to increase the person's maximum term of juvenile confinement. Accordingly, case law established that the new misconduct adjudicated under former section 777 must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt by evidence competent in a criminal trial. (In re Arthur N. (1976) 16 Cal.3d 226, 234-240, 127 Cal.Rptr. 641, 545 P.2d 1345 (Arthur N.).)
However, Proposition 21 prevents use of section 777(a)(2) to produce new criminal adjudications and to thereby increase the maximum term of confinement for the original section 602 offense. Even if criminal in fact, new misconduct may be treated, under section 777(a)(2), only as a probation violation. If a violation is found, the violator may, at most, receive a more restrictive juvenile placement within the original maximum term.
Consistent with section 777's changed role, and in an effort to streamline proceedings under this statute, Proposition 21 reduced the standard of proof in such proceedings from beyond a reasonable doubt to a preponderance of the evidence. (§ 777, subd. (c) (section 777(c)).) Certain evidentiary changes also were made. For example, Proposition 21 allows the use of reliable hearsay evidence in section 777(a)(2) proceedings, insofar as such evidence is admissible in adult probation revocation proceedings, to prove juvenile probation violations. (§ 777(c); see In re Antonio A. (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 700, 703-706, 275 Cal.Rptr. 482.)
In Eddie M., supra, 31 Cal.4th 480, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 119, 73 P.3d 1115, we unanimously held that the state and federal due process clauses permit use of the "preponderance" standard in all section 777(a)(2) proceedings covered by Proposition 21. As we explained, contrary to what statutory law provided when Arthur N., supra, 16 Cal.3d 226, 127 Cal.Rptr. 641, 545 P.2d 1345, adopted the old reasonable-doubt rule, juvenile probation violation proceedings now "differ from criminal prosecutions in purpose, operation, and effect." (Eddie M., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 486, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 119, 73 P.3d 1115.)
Here, we address another constitutional challenge to section 777. Petitioners committed their section 602 offenses before the adoption of Proposition 21. However, after Proposition 21's effective date, they committed alleged probation violations that the People seek to adjudicate under the amended version of section 777. Petitioners claim that, as applied to them, the preponderance and evidentiary provisions of new section 777(c) violate state and federal guarantees against ex post facto laws. (U.S. Const., art. I, § 10; Cal. Const., art. I, § 9.) Petitioners equate section 777(a)(2) proceedings with criminal trials, in which the "quantum" and standard of proof cannot be retroactively eased. Petitioners also claim that Proposition 21's rules for proving probation violations retroactively increase the "punishment" for their section 602 crimes.
The juvenile court issued conflicting rulings on the ex post facto defenses in separate hearings below. In a consolidated writ proceeding, the Court of Appeal found no ex post facto bar to applying Proposition 21 in this case.
We agree with the Court of Appeal's conclusion that no ex post facto problem is presented. Even if retroactivity is measured from the date of the original section 602 crimes, as petitioners necessarily claim, no ex post facto law is at stake. First, Proposition 21's amendments to section 777 did not affect the standards of proof or evidence used to adjudicate those crimes. There is no authority for extending the ex post facto clause's evidentiary concerns beyond the criminal trial itself to subsequent probation violation proceedings in which nothing akin to a criminal conviction is produced. Second, for reasons set forth at length in Eddie M., supra,31 Cal.4th 480,3 Cal.Rptr.3d 119,73 P.3d 1115, the challenged amendments do not inflict new or increased punishment, in the ex post facto sense, for the original section 602 crimes. While Proposition 21's new procedural rules may increase the chance that a probation violation will be found, there has been no material adverse change in the standards used to modify the original disposition, or in the choice of placements available as a result. Therefore, we will affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
Petitioners underwent separate proceedings in juvenile court. The district attorney filed section 602 petitions accusing each petitioner of violating one or more laws "defining crime," while under the age of 18. (§ 602, subd. (a).) The offenses occurred before Proposition 21 took effect on March 8, 2000, as discussed further below.
At the jurisdictional phase of the section 602 proceedings, petitioners each admitted at least one alleged offense. The juvenile court found such crimes true beyond a reasonable doubt (§ 701), and dismissed the remaining counts.
At the dispositional phase of the section 602 proceedings, petitioners were declared wards of the court, and were placed in the custody and control of the probation department on various conditions. (See §§ 725, 726, 727, 730.) All three dispositional orders specified a maximum period of physical confinement for the section 602 crimes sustained against petitioners. (§ 726, subd. (c).)
As a result, John L. entered the Youth Correctional Center on the condition that he follow all rules and instructions. Matthew F. was committed to a residential program and ordered to undergo treatment for his sex crime. Jonathan G. received at-home supervision on the condition that he remain drug free and take random drug tests.
The probation department later learned that petitioners violated probation. It appears the Youth Correctional Center ejected John L. because he breached disciplinary rules and orders by provoking racial unrest and harassing Black inmates. Matthew F.'s treatment program was reportedly ended because he refused to participate. Jonathan G. apparently tested positive for drug use several times.
The district attorney filed motions alleging probation violations on the foregoing grounds, and seeking more restrictive placements under section 777(a)(2), Proposition 21. The alleged probation violations occurred, and the section 777 proceedings began, after Proposition 21's March 8, 2000 effective date.
In each case, petitioners moved both orally and in writing for a ruling applying the former version of section 777, in effect when they committed their section 602 crimes. All three petitioners argued against ex post facto application of Proposition 21's new standards of proof and evidence.
In John L.'s case, the juvenile court rejected the ex post facto claim and denied the motion. As to Matthew F. and Jonathan G., another juvenile court granted their motions, and exempted their section 777 proceedings from Proposition 21.
The Court of Appeal summarily denied John L.'s petition for mandate, and he sought review in this court. We granted review and transferred the matter to the Court of Appeal with directions to vacate its denial of mandate and to issue an order to show cause. Meanwhile, the People, represented by the district attorney, sought writs of mandate in the Court of Appeal to overturn the rulings granting both Matthew F. and Jonathan G. relief on ex post facto grounds. The Court of Appeal issued orders to show cause in the latter cases, and consolidated them with John L.'s mandate proceeding.
The Court of Appeal concluded that insofar as the challenged amendments are used to litigate probation violations committed after Proposition 21's effective date, "an essential element necessary to an ex post facto violation appears to be absent; new section 777 does not appear to operate retroactively by applying to conduct completed before its enactment." Rejecting a contrary assumption in In re Melvin J. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 742, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 917, the Court of Appeal declined to use the section 602 offenses as the "pivotal date" for its constitutional analysis. (See post, fn. 7.) Hence, the panel issued writs of mandate directing the juvenile court to vacate its orders concerning Matthew F. and Jonathan G., and to conduct their probation violation hearings under section 777, Proposition 21. Mandate was denied in the John L. case, where the juvenile court had applied Proposition 21.
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Appendix E
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