John M. Deagan v. Daniel Mclaughlin
| Decision Date | 30 November 2001 |
| Docket Number | 01-LW-4594,99-C.A.-287 |
| Citation | 2001 Ohio 3458 |
| Parties | JOHN M. DEAGAN, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT v. DANIEL McLAUGHLIN, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES CASE |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Civil Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas of Mahoning County Ohio Case No. 96 CV 2240
Hon Cheryl L. Waite, Hon. Joseph J. Vukovich, Hon. Mary DeGenaro
For Plaintiff-Appellant: Atty. Thomas L. Brunn, Sr., The Brunn Law Firm Co., L.P.A., 208 Hoyt Block, 700 West St. Clair, Cleveland, Ohio 44113
For Defendant-Appellees: Atty. David S. Barbee, Atty. Kelly M. Burton, Roth, Blair, Roberts, Strasfeld & Lodge, 1100 Bank One Building, Youngstown, Ohio 44503-1576
This timely appeal arises from a judgment of the Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas in favor of the Defendants-Appellees Daniel McLaughlin ("McLaughlin") and John Petretich ("Petretich") in a negligence action. John Deagan ("Appellant") alleged that Appellees negligently rear-ended his automobile while he was stopped in traffic. For the following reasons, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.
On September 15, 1994, McLaughlin was driving along Route 224 in Poland, Ohio. (Tr. 187). McLaughlin's truck bumped into the car in front of him, which was driven by Petretich. (Tr. 188-89). Petretich was stopped at the time of the accident, as was the car in front of him which was driven by Appellant. (Tr. 166). Petretich testified that the impact with McLaughlin pushed his car into Appellant's automobile. (Tr. 165). Both Petretich and McLaughlin testified that the collision was light and caused only minor damage to their vehicles. (Tr. 166, 188-89).
The three men exchanged information at the accident scene and confirmed that no one was injured. (Tr. 170, 191). Four days after the accident, Appellant went to a physician claiming injury from the accident. (Tr. 53). Appellant testified that after the accident he began experiencing weakness in his hands. (Tr. 50). Appellant also complained of pain from his neck to his hands and pain in his lower back. (Tr. 50-51). Appellant, who is a dentist, testified that the loss of strength in his hands caused him to cut back his dental practice resulting in a loss of income. (Tr. 73).
Appellant was treated by a variety of health practitioners, including a physical therapist, a rheumatologist, a neurologist, a neurosurgeon, an orthopedic surgeon, an occupational therapist and a chiropractor. (Tr. 58-61, 71). Appellant stated that he suffered from arthritis in his hands prior to the accident. (Tr. 98). Appellant admitted that the arthritis caused him some stiffness and loss of strength prior to the accident. (Tr. 98-99).
On September 11, 1996, Appellant filed a civil complaint against Appellees alleging negligence. On the same date, Appellant filed a civil complaint against his own insurance company, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance ("State Farm"), for uninsured/underinsured motorist ("UM/UIM") coverage. State Farm filed a motion to consolidate the two cases, which was granted on January 17, 1997.
On August 27, 1998, State Farm filed a motion to exclude evidence of Appellant's UM/UIM policy at trial. Appellant filed a motion in opposition on September 11, 1998. The trial court determined that the issue of UM/UIM coverage was irrelevant in determining Appellant's damages in the negligence action, and the court granted State Farm's motion on September 25, 1998.
A jury trial commenced on September 20, 1999, and continued until September 22, 1999, when the jury returned a verdict in favor of Appellees. This timely appeal followed.
Appellant presents three assignments of error for our review. His first assignment of error asserts:
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF APPELLANT IN ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE UNAUTHENTICATED PHOTOGRAPHS."
Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted photographs of Petretich's vehicle into evidence. The photographs in question were taken by an unknown person. Appellant contends that the photographs were not authenticated and lacked proper foundation. Appellant argues that Evid.R. 901(A) requires that all evidence, including photographic evidence, be properly authenticated prior to its admission. Evid.R. 901(A) states:
"The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims."
Appellant argues that a photograph cannot be admitted without testimony of the person who took the photograph or evidence of the reliability of the equipment which produced the photograph. Appellant cites Midland Steel Prods. Co. v. U.A.W. Local 486 (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 121, in support, which held that, "photographic evidence may be admitted upon a sufficient showing of the reliability of the process or system that produced the evidence." Id. at paragraph three of syllabus. Appellant's argument on this point is in error.
"The admission of evidence is generally within the sound discretion of the trial court, and a reviewing court may reverse only upon the showing of an abuse of that discretion." Peters v. Ohio State Lottery Comm. (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 296, 299. An abuse of discretion connotes more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219.
Evid.R. 901 provides many examples of how evidence may be authenticated. The first, and by far the most common, acceptable method of authentication is through the testimony of witness with knowledge that the matter is exactly what it is claimed. Evid.R. 901(B)(1).
This Court has repeatedly held that photographs may be authenticated in many ways, as long as there is some evidence that the photograph is an accurate representation of what it portrays. State v. George (Nov. 11, 1988), Mahoning App. No. 87 CA 77, unreported; State v. McQueen (June 30, 1988), Mahoning App. No. 86 CA 102, unreported; see, also, State v. Hill (1967), 12 Ohio St.2d 88, 90. "Photographs need not be identified by the person who took them in order to be admissible in evidence as long as there is preliminary proof that the photographs are correct representations of the subjects which appear therein and are of such a nature as to throw light upon a disputed point." Gorcheff v. Rambo (Apr. 11, 1985), Mahoning App. No. 83 CA 6, unreported.
Midland Steel is inapposite because in that case there was no independent corroboration that the events recorded on a videotape had actually occurred. Midland Steel at 130. The Court held that, in the absence of direct testimony about the events depicted in the video, authentication could be established by lay testimony regarding the reliability of the methods used to produce the video. Id. In the case at bar, we do not need to look for additional corroborating evidence. Petretich, who is undisputedly a person with knowledge of the subject matter, testified that the photographs accurately depicted what his vehicle looked like after the accident. (Tr. 168).
Appellant also argues that the photographs are inadmissible hearsay. This argument is likewise without merit. Under Evid.R. 801(C), "hearsay" is defined as, "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." The photographs in question are not statements or assertions, and they do not depict statements or assertions. Therefore, they cannot be inadmissible hearsay.
Appellant's first assignment of error is, thus, without merit.
Appellant's second assignment of error asserts:
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF APPELLANT BY EXCLUDING EVIDENCE OF UNINSURED/UNDERINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THIS CASE."
Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Appellant the ability to present evidence of his UM/UIM coverage. Appellant maintains that because the rules of evidence favor inclusion rather than exclusion of relevant evidence, he should have been allowed to mention his UM/UIM coverage.
Appellant also asserts that Civ.R. 17(A) requires that every civil action be maintained by the real parties in interest. Appellant argues that his insurance company was a defendant in the action and, therefore, the action should have been prosecuted in the name of the defendant. Appellant contends that information as to his insurance coverage was essential to the case. Appellant argues that, without being able to mention his insurance carrier, the jury did not even know who the involved parties were, making it impossible for the jury to reach a fair decision.
Appellee responds that Appellant failed to proffer evidence of insurance coverage at trial as required by Evid.R. 103(A)(2), and that he has waived this issue on appeal. In addition, Appellee argues that there is no connection between Appellee's liability for negligence and Appellant's insurance coverage. Finally, Appellee asserts that Appellant has not shown how his substantial rights were prejudiced by the exclusion of evidence regarding his own UM/UIM coverage. We agree with Appellee's arguments, here.
As previously noted, the admission or exclusion of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Peters, supra, 63 Ohio St.3d at 299.
Evid.R. 103(A) states, in pertinent part:
To continue reading
Request your trial