John Morrell & Co. v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 115
| Decision Date | 19 September 1967 |
| Docket Number | S,I,No. 230,No. 115,115,230 |
| Citation | 254 Cal.App.2d 455,62 Cal.Rptr. 245 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | JOHN MORRELL & CO., a corporation, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD, California Department of Employment and Albert B. Tieburg, Director, Defendants and Respondents. George Mesure on behalf of Butcher's Union LocalE. Thornton, on behalf of Butcher's Union Localntervenors and Respondents. Civ. 24023. |
Angell, Adams, Gochnauer & Holmes, Andrew H. Field, San Francisco, for appellants.
Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., Clayton P. Roche, Deputy Atty. Gen., San Francisco, for respondents.
Charles P. Scully, John B. Salazar, San Francisco, for intervenors.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the superior court denying a petition for writ of mandate to compel respondents, California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board, to set aside an award of unemployment compensation benefits to appellants' employees, and to strike certain charges made to appellants' reserve accounts.
Appellants are 44 wholesale meat companies operating in the San Francisco and East Bay areas under collective bargaining agreements with the Butchers and Sausage Makers Unions. Following expiration of the agreements and while the parties were holding meetings to negotiate a new agreement, a work stoppage occurred which lasted five weeks. The director of the Department of Employment determined that the employee members of the unions involved were entitled to unemployment benefits. His decision was approved, after a hearing before a referee, by the California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board. The board adopted the statement of facts proposed by the referee and benefits were thereafter paid to the employees.
The board's award resulted in charging appellants' individual reserve accounts with the unemployment insurance payments, thereby increasing appellants' rate of payment into the unemployment insurance fund. 1 The petition for writ of mandate sought to set aside the award and to require the department to credit appellants' reserve with the amounts paid.
Appellants' sole contention is that the work stoppage was due to a labor dispute within the meaning of section 1262 of the Unemployment Insurance Code and that the employees were thus ineligible for benefits.
Section 1262 of the Unemployment Insurance Code provides:
There is no material disagreement as to the facts. Appellants and the unions had a collective bargaining agreement which expired October 1, 1964, but which was extended to October 5, 1964. During August and September of that year, a number of meetings were held to negotiate the new agreement. On September 28 and 29, employees voted their representatives the authority to call a strike but set no date for stopping work. Appellants were not officially informed of the strike vote by the unions but learned of it from their employees, and, as a result, thereafter requested the union representatives to extend the existing contract or to give 72-hours notice before the calling of a strike. This request was refused.
Representatives of the union and appellants met on October 5 and at the conclusion of the morning session another request was made by appellants for an extension of the agreement or a strike notice. The unions were informed that on Monday, the next working day, the normal weekly supply of meat would be delivered to appellants' plants, and that an extension of their contract was mandatory if the plants were to continue in operation without fear of great loss in the event of a sudden strike. The unions refused the request and stated that during the negotiations the expiring agreement would be extended only from meeting to meeting or caucus to caucus.
During the evening of October 5, appellants notified the unions that, since their requests for a reasonable extension of the labor contract had been rejeced, the contract would expire on that date, and the plants would close operations. The unions replied that their members would report for work the next day, as usual.
Appellants posted a 'no work available' notice at their plants. After October 6, 1964, appellants' supervisors and salesmen were put to work disposing of the inventory on hand and spent the balance of the month doing maintenance, repair or cleaning of the plants. The plants ceased to operate as to all other employees. No ultimatum or date of strike action had been given by any union official. None of the union members refused to work, and there was no strike or picketing conducted by any union at any of the plants involved in the negotiations. The unions did not obtain the necessary approval to strike from either the international union or the San Francisco Central Labor Council. Negotiations between appellants and the unions continued throughout October, and a new contract was finally agreed to in principle on November 6, 1964, at which time the employees returned to work, having been paid unemployment insurance benefits during the work stoppage.
The word 'dispute,' 2 used in section 1262 of the Unemployment Insurance Code, if defined and applied literally, would prohibit employees from receiving benefits in every case where the employer's union contract had expired and new terms were being urged by either or both parties. But, as prior cases show, application of the statutory language to particular fact situations has given varied results. Although guideposts have been erected and directions given, the only clear rule established is that each case must be decided upon its own peculiar facts. (See Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California E. Com., 17 Cal.2d 321, 109 P.2d 935; Ruberoid Co. v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Board, 59 Cal.2d 73, 27 Cal.Rptr. 878, 378 P.2d 102; Bunny's Waffle Shop v. Cal. Emp. Com., 24 Cal.2d 735, 151 P.2d 224.)
The facts in Coast Packing Co. v. Cal. Unemp. Ins. Appeals Bd., 64 Cal.2d 76, 48 Cal.Rptr. 854, 410 P.2d 358, closely parallel the facts of the case now before us. In that case, as in this, the meat packers sought some assurance from the unions that a strike would not be called without first giving notice to the packers so that they could clear their pens and coolers and protect themselves against loss. There, as here, assurance was refused, and the packers closed their plants. The issue in Coast Packing was the same as in our case, namely,...
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Isobe v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd.
...whether a trade dispute exists, but it is clear each case must be decided on its own facts. (John Morrell & Co. v. California Unemp. Ins. App. Bd. (1967), 254 Cal.App.2d 455, 459, 62 Cal.Rptr. 245.) Similarly, whether an existing trade dispute continues and whether employees voluntarily rem......