John Stepp, Inc. v. First Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n of Miami
| Decision Date | 04 January 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 78-414,78-414 |
| Citation | 379 So.2d 384 |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
| Parties | JOHN STEPP, INC., Appellant, v. FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION OF MIAMI, Charles J. Kedl, Jr., andElena A. Kedl, his wife, et al., Appellees. |
Harry G. Carratt, of Morgan, Carratt & O'Connor, P. A., Fort Lauderdale, and Grimditch, Bentz, Witte & Wunker, Pompano Beach, for appellant.
Phillip G. Newcomm, of Shutts & Bowen, Miami, for appellee, J. Ervin Lewallen.
The issue involved on this appeal is appellant's right to exercise an equity of redemption after a judicial sale but prior to confirmation thereof.
The Kedls owned a parcel of residential real estate upon which appellee, First Federal Savings and Loan Association, held a mortgage. When the Kedls failed to make the mortgage payments First Federal filed suit to foreclose. The Kedls defaulted; final judgment was entered; the property was sold on January 9, 1978, to Lewallen for $66,000 and a certificate of sale was issued on that date.
On January 6, 1978, appellant acquired title to the property by warranty deed from the Kedls and recorded said deed on January 9, 1978, after the judicial sale of the property was concluded. On January 16, 1978, Charles C. Hibbs, president of appellant, paid into the Registry of the Court $55,800.35, the amount required to redeem the property. Simultaneously, Hibbs filed a motion for redemption signed by the Kedls. The motion was signed by the Kedls because the deputy clerk advised Hibbs that the motion should bear the Kedls' names since they were the defendant-mortgagors. On January 20, 1978, four days after the motion for redemption was filed, Lewallen filed a motion to confirm the sale. Several notices of hearing on this motion for confirmation were given to the Kedls but they refused to appear in support of the motion. No notice was given to appellant or Hibbs because their names did not appear on any pleadings.
On February 9, 1978, the trial court entered an order confirming the sale. On February 16, 1978, appellant learned of the confirmation and immediately filed motions for
and for leave to intervene, which were denied. Said motions alleged that appellant had purchased the property from the Kedls on January 6, 1978, and received a Warranty Deed therefor; that negotiations had taken place with the mortgagee for appellant to reinstate the mortgage, but insufficient time to examine the title indicated the better procedure was to redeem the property by paying the entire mortgage; that on January 16, 1978, appellant's president had tendered into the Registry of the Court the sum of $55,800.35 and filed a motion for redemption of the property signed by the Kedls because the deputy clerk had advised them that was the way to handle it; that it was not until February 16, 1978, that appellant learned of the confirmation of the sale or any other proceedings connected therewith.
Essentially the trial court held that the deposit into the Court Registry made by Hibbs was made by a stranger to the proceeding; that no payment had been made by the defendants-Kedls, and that the motion for redemption "constitutes a subversion of the sale procedure authorized by statute, and in reality, is an unlawful attempt to benefit other than the defendants."
It was conceded at oral argument that the real party in interest on this appeal is Lewallen, and he makes a very persuasive argument in support of the trial court's decision. The contention is that Lewallen must prevail because he relied upon the record title which gave only the Kedls the right to redeem; the Kedls did not pay the redemption price; did not pursue their motion for redemption and thus the trial court cannot be faulted for confirming the sale. While conceding the logic and technical nicety of appellees' position, we feel it favors form over substance and fails to recognize...
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In re Moore
...Stat. ch. 45.0315 (1994). See Hoffman v. Semet, 316 So.2d 649, 652 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1975); John Stepp, Inc. v. First Federal Savings & Loan Assoc. of Miami, 379 So.2d 384, 386 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980). The historical comparable for leases in many states is tender of payment of what is owed, a......
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Sudhoff v. Federal Nat. Mortg. Ass'n, 5D05-3137.
...Motel, Inc., 770 So.2d at 284; Saidi, 687 So.2d at 12; Indian River Farms, 777 So.2d at 1099; John Stepp, Inc. v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Miami, 379 So.2d 384, 386 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). "[T]he right of redemption is an incident of all mortgages and cannot be extinguished except by du......
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Morris v. Osteen
...the right of alienation, continues as long as the mortgagor's right of redemption exists. In John Stepp, Inc. v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 379 So.2d 384 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980), the mortgagor defaulted on his mortgage and a foreclosure judgment was entered in favor of the mortgagee. A......
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Sudhoff v. Federal National Mortgage Association, Case No. 5D05-3137 (Fla. App. 7/28/2006)
...Inc., 770 So. 2d at 284; Saidi, 687 So. 2d at 12; Indian River Farms, 777 So. 2d at 1099; John Stepp, Inc. v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Miami, 379 So. 2d 384, 386 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). "[T]he right of redemption is an incident of all mortgages and cannot be extinguished except by due p......
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