John v. Dobson

• Decision Date: 24 August 2022
• Docket Number: 2021–00801,Index No. 522474/16
• Parties: Lisa JOHN, appellant, v. Dwight DOBSON, et al., respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

208 A.D.3d 766

172 N.Y.S.3d 633 (Mem)

Lisa JOHN, appellant,

v.Dwight DOBSON, et al., respondents.

2021–00801

Index No. 522474/16

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Submitted—May 13, 2022

August 24, 2022

Buitrago & Associates, PLLC, New York, NY (Rick J. Lasher of counsel), for appellant.

Anna J. Ervolina, Brooklyn, NY (Harriet Wong of counsel), for respondents.

BETSY BARROS, J.P., CHERYL E. CHAMBERS, ROBERT J. MILLER, LINDA CHRISTOPHER, JJ.

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Rosemarie Montalbano, J.), dated September 10, 2020. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted those branches of the defendants’ motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendants Dwight Dobson and New York City Transit Authority.

ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and those branches of the defendants’ motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendants Dwight Dobson and New York City Transit Authority are denied.

In 2015, the plaintiff allegedly was injured when her hand became trapped between the front doors of a bus driven by the defendant Dwight Dobson and owned by the defendant New York City Transit Authority (hereinafter the NYCTA). The plaintiff subsequently commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries against Dobson, the NYCTA, and another defendant. The defendants moved, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against Dobson and the NYCTA. In an order dated September 10, 2020, the Supreme Court, among other things, granted those branches of the defendants’ motion, and the plaintiff appeals.

A "defendant moving for summary judgment in a negligence action has the burden of establishing, prima facie, that he or she was not at fault in the happening of the subject accident" ( Aponte v. Vani, 155 A.D.3d 929, 930, 64 N.Y.S.3d 123 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Gaudio v. City of New York, 189 A.D.3d 1546, 1547–1548, 140 N.Y.S.3d 102 ; Gobin v. Delgado, 142 A.D.3d 1134, 1135, 38 N.Y.S.3d 63 ). "There can be more than one proximate cause of an accident" ( Cox v. Nunez, 23 A.D.3d 427, 427, 805 N.Y.S.2d 604 ; see Jones v. Vialva–Duke, 106 A.D.3d 1052, 966 N.Y.S.2d 187 ), and "[g]enerally, it is for the trier of fact to determine the issue of proximate cause" ( Kalland v. Hungry Harbor Assoc., LLC, 84 A.D.3d 889, 889, 922 N.Y.S.2d 550 ; see Howard v. Poseidon Pools, 72 N.Y.2d 972, 974, 534 N.Y.S.2d 360, 530 N.E.2d 1280 ; Riccio v. Kid Fit, Inc., 126 A.D.3d 873, 5...