Johnson Fare Box Company v. National Rejectors, Inc., 16115.

• Decision Date: 21 August 1959
• Docket Number: No. 16115.,16115.
• Citation: 269 F.2d 348
• Parties: JOHNSON FARE BOX COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation, Appellant, v. NATIONAL REJECTORS, INC., a Missouri Corporation, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

269 F.2d 348 (1959)

JOHNSON FARE BOX COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation, Appellant, v. NATIONAL REJECTORS, INC., a Missouri Corporation, Appellee.

No. 16115.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

August 21, 1959.

Edward C. Threedy, Chicago, Ill. (Clarence E. Threedy, Bernard Hoban, Robert J. C. Damon, Chicago, Ill., Albert L. Jeffers, Fort Wayne, Ind., and Richard M. Stout, St. Louis, Mo., on the brief), for appellant.

Albert F. Mecklenburger, Chicago, Ill. (James R. Dowdall, Olson, Mecklenburger, von Holst, Pendleton & Neuman, Chicago, Ill., Walter R. Mayne, Fordyce, Mayne, Hartman, Renard & Stribling, and Rey Eilers, St. Louis, Mo., on the brief), for appellee.

Before SANBORN, VOGEL and VAN OOSTERHOUT, Circuit Judges.

SANBORN, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal by the plaintiff in a patent infringement action from a judgment dismissing its complaint.

The Johnson Fare Box Company, on February 3, 1954, brought this action for an injunction and damages against National Rejectors, Inc., which makes and sells "Simplex" coin changers, charging it with having infringed the claims of two patents owned by the plaintiff, namely, No. 2,555,486 issued to Charles F. Harris on June 5, 1951, covering a coin changer for vending machines, and No. 2,619,213 issued to Harris on November 25, 1952, for an antijackpotting device¹ for check or coin operated vending machines. The defendant, by amended answer filed December 22, 1954, denied infringement and asserted that the patents in suit were invalid for anticipation and want of invention. On September 19, 1956, the defendant filed a motion for a reference of the case to a Special Master for trial. The plaintiff resisted the motion. The District Court on September 26, 1956, after a hearing, granted the reference and appointed Mr. John H. Bruninga, of the St. Louis, Missouri, Bar, as Special Master to take and report the testimony, together with his findings of fact and conclusions of law thereon.

The case was tried to the Master from November 8 to November 21, 1956. His comprehensive, detailed, and painstaking report, which covers some 73 pages of the printed record, was filed June 3, 1957. He determined that Harris Patent No. 2,555,486 was invalid as to Claim 15 in suit and was not infringed by the defendant's accused device. The Master also determined that Harris Patent No. 2,619,213 was invalid as to Claims 22 and 24 thereof, because anticipated by Hartman Patent No. 1,586,950 for a pop corn vending machine, and that it had not been infringed by the defendant. The Master recommended that the complaint be dismissed. On August 5, 1957, the plaintiff filed objections to the Master's report, challenging his findings and conclusions with respect only to Claims 22 and 24 of the Harris Patent No. 2,619,213. The District Court on July 28, 1958, overruled the objections, confirmed the report, and adopted in full the findings and conclusions of the Master. Judgment dismissing the plaintiff's complaint "at plaintiff's costs" was entered July 29, 1958.

From this judgment "in so far as it relates to the validity and infringement of Patent No. 2,619,213 granted November 25, 1952 on an antijackpotting device for check operated vending machines and in so far as said final judgment awards costs to the defendant, and from the order for reference to a Special Master dated September 26, 1956," the plaintiff appeals.

Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., provides in part:

"* * * Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses. The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the court. If an opinion or memorandum of decision is filed, it will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law appear therein. * * *"

Rule 53(e) (4) states:

"The effect of a master\'s report is the same whether or not the parties have consented to the reference * * *."

There is no merit in the plaintiff's contention that "The District Court erred in approving the report of the Special Master which omitted Findings of Fact and in entering a final judgment which referred to, but omitted, Findings of Fact." The voluminous and carefully considered report of the Special Master shows exactly what he found to be the facts relative to the issues in suit. The plaintiff in its objections to the report of the Master recognized that the report contained the Master's findings, by referring therein to "the findings and conclusions of the Master's Report" four separate times. That neither of the parties saw fit to submit "separate Findings of Fact," as the Master in his report stated might be done, has no bearing upon the adequacy of the findings and conclusions which the trial court has adopted, and which, unless clearly erroneous, support its judgment. So far as this Court is concerned, the report of the Master is now the opinion, the findings, conclusions and final decision of the District Court.

The question whether the District Court abused its discretion in referring the issues of fact and law to a Special Master for trial, over the objection of the plaintiff, is, no doubt, debatable. Rule 53(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

"A reference to a master shall be the exception and not the rule. In actions to be tried by a jury, a reference shall be made only when the issues are complicated; in actions to be tried without a jury, save in matters of account, a reference shall be made only upon a showing that some exceptional condition requires it."

Judge Moore, the Chief Judge of the District Court, who granted the motion of the defendant for a reference, in his order stated that the dockets of the Court were extremely crowded due to the recent death of Judge Rubey M. Hulen (who had this case on his docket and had evidently intended to try it in the near future); that never before in Judge Moore's Division of the court had the docket been so congested; that only once before during his incumbency had he referred a case to a Special Master for trial, and then only because of the death of another member of the District Court; that he was informed that the instant case was more than usually complicated, and that it should be tried promptly and before the trial of a somewhat related case between the same parties pending in the Federal District Court in Chicago; that, although the trial of the instant case was tentatively set for October 22, 1956, it appeared that the condition of the Court's docket was such that sufficient time would not be available to complete the trial; that the public interest in the prompt dispatch of business, particularly of pending criminal cases, would be served by a reference; and that the Court was advised that the cost would not be an undue financial burden to either party. The Court ordered that the costs and expenses of the reference be borne initially by the parties in equal shares, but ultimately be taxed upon the further order of the Court.

Whether the combination of...