Johnson-Mosley v. Ala. Unified Judicial Sys.

• Decision Date: 29 May 2013
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 12–0184–CG–N.
• Citation: 981 F.Supp.2d 1167
• Parties: Linda JOHNSON–MOSLEY, Plaintiff, v. ALABAMA UNIFIED JUDICIAL SYSTEM, Administrative Office of Courts, and the Juvenile Court of Mobile County, Alabama, Hon. Edmond Naman and Lawrence Battiste, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama

981 F.Supp.2d 1167

Linda JOHNSON–MOSLEY, Plaintiff,

v.ALABAMA UNIFIED JUDICIAL SYSTEM, Administrative Office of Courts, and the Juvenile Court of Mobile County, Alabama, Hon. Edmond Naman and Lawrence Battiste, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 12–0184–CG–N.

United States District Court,

S.D. Alabama,

Southern Division.

May 9, 2013.

Order Denying Reconsideration May 29, 2013.

Ronnie L. Williams, Mobile, AL, for Plaintiff.

Benjamin Howard Albritton, Office of the Attorney General, Montgomery, AL, for Defendants.

ORDER

CALLIE V.S. GRANADE, District Judge.

This matter is before the court on the motion for summary judgment (Doc. 40) filed by the defendants, the Alabama Administrative Office of Courts (the “AOC”), the Juvenile Court of Mobile County, Alabama (the “Juvenile Court”), Judge Edmond Naman (“Judge Naman”), and Lawrence Battiste (“Battiste”) (collectively, the “defendants”). The court has reviewed the parties' briefs in support and opposition (Docs. 40, 44, 45, 50, 51) ¹ and the matter is now ripe for resolution. For the reasons stated below, the defendants' motion for summary judgment is due to be GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The plaintiff, Linda Johnson–Mosley (“Mosley”) is a 60–year–old African–American female who has been employed by the Juvenile Court as a Juvenile Probation Officer for over 37 years. Doc. 24 at 3. She has over 40 years of experience in the fields of psychology and counseling and holds a B.A. degree in Psychology, an M.A. degree in Counseling and Guidance, and an Ed.D. in Counseling and Counseling Psychology. Doc. 45 at 1–2, 7.

During her tenure with the Juvenile Court, Mosley performed a variety of supervisory roles and received several noteworthy appointments and awards. Doc. 45–1 at 1–4. She served on the Governor's Advisory Council on Juvenile Justice and the Children's Policy Council. Id. at 4. In 2002 she was recognized as the Probation Supervisor of the Year and was named Employee of the Year for Region III of the State of Alabama in 1993. Id. More recently, she was selected to participate in Leadership Mobile for the Class of 2010. Id.

Throughout her career, Mosley received “Excellent” and “Outstanding” ratings on her performance evaluations. Id. at 5. On her most recent evaluation, performed on October 6, 2009, Larry Harris, the outgoing Chief Juvenile Probation Officer (“CJPO”), rated Mosley “outstanding” (35 out of 35). Id. at 7.

Mosley alleges the “atmosphere” at the Juvenile Court changed in early 2009, after she complained to Judge Naman about racially insensitive remarks directed toward her by a white supervisor, Pat Cannedy, at a conference in February 2009. Id. at 5. In a written complaint addressed to Judge Naman shortly thereafter, Mosley voiced two complaints. First, she complained that Cannedy referred to her as a “slave driver.” Doc. 45–7. Second, she complained that Cannedy improperly disclosed the identity of a Juvenile Court Referee and made comments which, in Mosley's opinion, left the group with a negative impression of the Referee. Id. Mosley contends that Judge Naman did not acknowledge her written complaint as evidenced by the fact that he appointed Cannedy and other white supervisors to a Leadership Team for the Juvenile Court shortly after receiving Mosley's letter. Doc. 45–1 at 5. Cannedy was also appointed to the Probation Reform Team, which was responsible for “completely restructuring and overhauling the entire Probation Department.” Id. Mosley states that she met with Judge Naman to discuss her concern that the Leadership Team consisted of all white supervisors who, in Mosley's opinion, had less education and experience than she did. Id.

Several months later, in August 2009, Mosley learned that the CJPO was due to retire, and met with Judge Naman to discuss her interest in the position. Id. at 5–6. In late September 2009, the Juvenile Court posted a job vacancy announcement for the newly-vacated CJPO position.² Doc. 40–8 at 14. Mosley applied, but was not selected. Doc. 45–1 at 7. Instead, the Juvenile Court hired Lawrence Battiste, a black male with a Bachelor's degree in human resources management and an extensive law enforcement background. Doc. 40–2 at 4.

On February 7, 2010, Mosley filed a grievance with the Administrative Office of the Courts (“AOC”) alleging that Judge Naman had retaliated against her by refusing to interview her for the CJPO position. Doc. 45–1 at 8. The next day, she filed a formal complaint with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) (the “2010 EEOC Charge”) alleging sex and age discrimination. Doc. 45–6 at 1.

Additionally, Mosley contends that Naman and Battiste retaliated against her for filing the 2010 EEOC Charge by promoting Cannedy to the position of Deputy Chief Probation Officer without posting public notice of the vacancy; by relocating her office to a less desirable location; by reducing the number of Juvenile Probation Officers she supervised from ten to zero; by adding to her workload; and ultimately informing her on March 31, 2011, that she was being laid off due to administrative restructuring in the Juvenile Court. Doc. 45–1 at 9–10.

On April 4, 2011, believing that her termination was retaliatory, Mosley filed anotherEEOC charge against the Juvenile Court (“2011 EEOC Charge”) alleging sex and age discrimination and retaliation. Doc. 45–6 at 2. Additionally, Mosley appealed the layoff decision to the AOC on April 15, 2011. Doc. 45–8. In June 2011, the Appeals Board ordered that Mosley be reinstated with benefits and back pay, and placed in a comparable position to the nearest classification to the one that had been abolished as part of the administrative restructuring. Doc. 40–4 at 1.

On December 21, 2011, the EEOC declined to file suit on Mosley's behalf, but issued her a right to sue letter for her 2010 EEOC Charge. Doc. 45–4 at 1. Mosley filed suit on March 13, 2012, but later filed an amended complaint (Doc. 24) on October 24, 2012, after receiving notice of a right to sue with respect to the 2011 EEOC Charge. Mosley asserts claims for sex-based discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, § 1981, and § 1983. See Doc. 24 at 12–13.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The trial court's function is not “to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). “The mere existence of some evidence to support the non-moving party is not sufficient for denial of summary judgment; there must be ‘sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.’ ” Bailey v. Allgas, Inc., 284 F.3d 1237, 1243 (11th Cir.2002) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505). “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–250, 106 S.Ct. 2505. (internal citations omitted).

The basic issue before the court on a motion for summary judgment is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251–252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The moving party bears the burden of proving that no genuine issue of material fact exists. O'Ferrell v. United States, 253 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir.2001). In evaluating the argument of the moving party, the court must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and resolve all reasonable doubts about the facts in its favor. Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1187 (11th Cir.1999). “If reasonable minds might differ on the inferences arising from undisputed facts, then a court should deny summary judgment.” Hinesville Bank v. Pony Exp. Courier Corp., 868 F.2d 1532, 1535 (11th Cir.1989) (citing Mercantile Bank & Trust v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 750 F.2d 838, 841 (11th Cir.1985)).

Once the movant satisfies her initial burden under Rule 56(a), the nonmoving party “must make a sufficient showing to establish the existence of each essential element to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Howard v. BP Oil Co., 32 F.3d 520, 524 (11th Cir.1994)(citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). Otherwise stated, the non-movant must “demonstrate that there is indeed a material issue of fact that precludes summary judgment.” Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir.1991). The non-moving party “may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading; rather, its response .... must be by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule be set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.” Vega v. Invsco Group, Ltd., 432 Fed.Appx. 867, 870 (11th Cir.2011). “A mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the [non-moving] party's position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party.” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir.1990) (citation omitted). “[T]he nonmoving party may avail itself of all facts and justifiable inferences in the record taken as a whole.” Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH–Siegen, 965 F.2d 994, 998 (11th Cir.1992). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (internal quotation and citation omitted).

III. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Claims Against Individual Defendants

Counts Three and Four of Mosley's second amended complaint...