Knight v. Fourteen D Enters., Inc.

Decision Date03 February 2014
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 12–00463–KD–C.
Citation995 F.Supp.2d 1311
PartiesUrsula B. KNIGHT, Plaintiff, v. FOURTEEN D ENTERPRISES, INC., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Ronnie L. Williams, Mobile, AL, for Plaintiff.

Carter H. Dukes, Joshua Stephen Thompson, Scott Dukes & Geisler, P.C., Birmingham, AL, for Defendant.

ORDER

KRISTI K. DuBOSE, District Judge.

This action is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 36) and supporting documents (Docs. 37–38) filed by Defendant Fourteen D Enterprises, Inc. (FDE) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, along with the Response in opposition (Doc. 44) and supporting documents (Docs. 45–47) filed by PlaintiffUrsula B. Knight (Knight), and FDE's Reply (Doc. 48) to said Response.2 The motion has been taken under submission and is ripe for adjudication. ( See Docs. 39, 43). Upon consideration, and for the reasons stated herein, the Court finds that the motion for summary judgment is due to be GRANTED.

I. Procedural History

On July 18, 2012, Knight initiated this action by filing a Complaint (Doc. 1) with the Court, asserting the following claims against FDE:

• Count I—discrimination on the basis of Knight's race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (Title VII), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (§ 1981).

• Count II—retaliation in violation of Title VII and § 1981.

• Count III—discrimination on the basis of Knight's age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (ADEA). 3

In her Complaint, Knight “contends that profanity is use [sic] on a regular basis at that McDonalds' [sic] location and none of the younger white Crew Members engaging [sic] such activity were ever fired or even disciplined for the use of profanity” and “contends that her termination was due to her race, age and in retaliation for raising complaints about the treatment of herself and other employees.” (Doc. 1 at 3, ¶¶ 10–11). On December 24, 2012, FDE filed its Answer denying any liability for Knight's claims. (Doc. 10). FDE timely filed the present motion, which requests summary judgment in favor of FDE on all of Knight's claims. (Doc. 36).

II. Standard of Review

“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Rule 56(c) governs procedures and provides as follows:

(1) Supporting Factual Positions. A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:

(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or

(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.

(2) Objection That a Fact Is Not Supported by Admissible Evidence. A party may object that the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence.

(3) Materials Not Cited. The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record.

(4) Affidavits or Declarations. An affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir.1991) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). As the Eleventh Circuit has articulated, however,

The nature of this responsibility varies ... depending on whether the legal issues, as to which the facts in question pertain, are ones on which the movant or the nonmovant would bear the burden of proof at trial.

... Celotex requires that for issues on which the movant would bear the burden of proof at trial,

that party must show affirmatively the absence of a genuine issue of material fact: it must support its motion with credible evidence ... that would entitle it to a directed verdict if not controverted at trial. In other words, the moving party must show that, on all the essential elements of its case on which it bears the burden of proof at trial, no reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party. If the moving party makes such an affirmative showing, it is entitled to summary judgment unless the non-moving party, in response, come [s] forward with significant, probative evidence demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of fact.

[United States v.] Four Parcels [of Real Property], 941 F.2d [1428,] 1438 [ (11th Cir.1991) ] (citations and internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original).

For issues, however, on which the non-movant would bear the burden of proof at trial,

the moving party is not required to support its motion with affidavits or other similar material negating the opponent's claim in order to discharge this initial responsibility. Instead, the moving party simply may show [ ]—that is, point[ ] out to the district court-that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Alternatively, the moving party may support its motion for summary judgment with affirmative evidence demonstrating that the non-moving party will be unable to prove its case at trial.

Four Parcels, 941 F.2d at 1437–38 (citations, footnote, and internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original).

If the party moving for summary judgment fails to discharge the initial burden, then the motion must be denied and the court need not consider what, if any, showing the non-movant has made. Coats & Clark, 929 F.2d at 608. If, however, the movant carries the initial summary judgment burden in one of the ways discussed above, responsibility then devolves upon the non-movant to show the existence of a genuine issue as to the material fact.

For issues on which the movant would bear the burden of proof at trial, the nonmovant, in order to avoid summary judgment, must come forward with evidence sufficient to call into question the inference created by the movant's evidence on the particular material fact. Only if after introduction of the non-movant's evidence, the combined body of evidence presented by the two parties relevant to the material fact is still such that the movant would be entitled to a directed verdict at trial-that is, such that no reasonable jury could find for the non-movant-should the movant be permitted to prevail without a full trial on the issues. Anderson [v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.], 477 U.S. [242,] 249–50, 106 S.Ct. [2505,] 2511[, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ].

For issues on which the non-movant would bear the burden of proof at trial, the means of rebuttal available to the non-movant vary depending on whether the movant put on evidence affirmatively negating the material fact or instead demonstrated an absence of evidence on the issue. Where the movant did the former, then the non-movant must respond with evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion at trial on the material fact sought to be negated. Where the movant did the latter, the non-movant must respond in one of two ways. First, he or she may show that the record in fact contains supporting evidence, sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion, which was “overlooked or ignored” by the moving party, who has thus failed to meet the initial burden of showing an absence of evidence. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 332, 106 S.Ct. at 2557 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Second, he or she may come forward with additional evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion at trial based on the alleged evidentiary deficiency. See Melissa L. Nelkin, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Summary Judgment After Celotex, 40 Hastings L.J. 53, 82–83 (1988).

Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115–17 (11th Cir.1993) (headings and footnotes omitted).

The mere existence of a factual dispute will not automatically necessitate denial; rather, only factual disputes that are material preclude entry of summary judgment. Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11th Cir.2004). “An issue of fact is material if it is a legal element of the claim under the applicable substantive law which might affect the outcome of the case. It is genuine if the record taken as a whole could lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party.” Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 594 F.3d 798, 807 (11th Cir.2010) (en banc) (citation omitted).

If a non-moving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of its case with respect to which it has the burden of proof, the moving party is entitled to summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. In reviewing whether a non-moving party has met its burden, the Court must stop short of weighing the evidence and making credibility determinations of the truth of the matter. Instead, the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in its favor. Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH–Siegen, 965 F.2d 994, 998–99 (11th Cir.1992) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

III. Facts4

On August 30, 2010, Knight, who is...

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