Johnson-Roberts v. Bonds

• Decision Date: 16 June 2016
• Citation: 34 N.Y.S.3d 421,2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 04785,140 A.D.3d 509
• Parties: Eleanor JOHNSON–ROBERTS, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Ira Judelson Bail BONDS, et al., Defendants–Respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

140 A.D.3d 509
34 N.Y.S.3d 421
2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 04785

Eleanor JOHNSON–ROBERTS, Plaintiff–Appellant,
v.
Ira Judelson Bail BONDS, et al., Defendants–Respondents.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York.

June 16, 2016.

34 N.Y.S.3d 422

Law Offices of Elizabeth A. Douglas, PLLC, White Plains (Elizabeth A. Douglas of counsel), for appellant.

Johnnie Woluewich, New York, for respondents.

Sweeny, J.P., Renwick, Moskowitz, Kapnick, Gesmer, JJ.

140 A.D.3d 509

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Cynthia S. Kern, J.), entered on or about May 1, 2015, which granted defendants' motion to vacate the default judgment that had been entered against them, unanimously reversed, on the law, with costs, and the motion denied.

As we have held often, there exists a strong public policy in favor of disposing of cases on their merits (see e.g. Goncalves v. Stuyvesant Dev. Assoc., 232 A.D.2d 275, 276, 648 N.Y.S.2d 441 [1st Dept.1996] ). However, this policy does not relieve a party moving to vacate a default from satisfying the two-pronged test of showing both (1) a reasonable excuse for the default; and (2) a meritorious defense to the action (id. ; see DTG Operations, Inc. v. Excel Imaging, P.C., 119 A.D.3d 410, 990 N.Y.S.2d 8 [1st Dept.2014] ).

Here, the motion court should not have granted defendants' motion to vacate the default judgment. As to the first prong, defendants failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for their default (see John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Grossman, 132 A.D.3d 559, 559, 18 N.Y.S.3d 610 [1st Dept.2015] ). Defendants' counsel never substantiated

34 N.Y.S.3d 423

or explained the nature of the “serious family matter” that purportedly caused the default. At most, counsel had an ex parte communication with the motion court about the facts of this action, and, during that communication, may or may not have revealed the facts surrounding the family...