Johnson v. Adams

• Decision Date: 26 June 1985
• Docket Number: No. 84-460,84-460
• Citation: 18 Ohio St.3d 48,479 N.E.2d 866,18 OBR 83
• Parties: , 18 O.B.R. 83 JOHNSON et al., Appellees, v. ADAMS, Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 48

18 Ohio St.3d 48

479 N.E.2d 866, 18 O.B.R. 83

JOHNSON et al., Appellees, v. ADAMS, Appellant.

No. 84-460.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

June 26, 1985.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Those sections of amended R.C. Chapter 3111 that became effective on or after June 29, 1982 have no application to paternity actions in which judgment was entered prior to that date.

2. A man who marries a woman while she is pregnant is presumed to be the natural father of any child born from such pregnancy. This presumption of paternity can be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. (Miller v. Anderson [1885], 43 Ohio St. 473, 3 N.E. 605, and Hall v. Rosen [1977], 50 Ohio St.2d 135, 363 N.E.2d 725 , overruled.)

In May 1981, appellees, Carmen Jean Johnson, Christopher Denver Johnson, and the Washington County Welfare Department, filed an action for necessaries against the appellant herein, George Denver Adams. The appellees alleged that the appellant was the natural father of Christopher Johnson (who was born on September 27, 1980), and sought judgment for expenses incurred on Christopher's behalf, an order for support, and a declaration of paternity. In a deposition taken during discovery, Carmen Johnson (Christopher's natural mother) stated that she had had sexual intercourse with the appellant during November and December 1979 and January 1980. She also stated that (1) she had married another man, Robert Glen Riggle (her sister's husband's brother), on May 19, 1980, (2) Riggle was aware that she was pregnant at the time of their marriage, (3) she had "seen" Riggle for only one week prior to their marriage, and (4) she and Riggle separated one week after their marriage.

Adams did not deny that he had had sexual intercourse with Carmen Johnson in November and December 1979 and January 1980, but he filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Riggle, under the common law of Ohio, was conclusively presumed to be the father of Christopher Johnson. In support of this motion, the appellant cited Hall v. Rosen (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 135, 363 N.E.2d 725 , which held:

"The biological father of a child can not be held for its support where the mother, during pregnancy, contracts marriage with another man, who marries her with full knowledge of her condition and thereby consents to stand in loco parentis to such child and to being the father of the child. (Miller v. Anderson, 43 Ohio St. 473, 3 N.E. 605, approved and followed.)"

Upon the authority of Hall v. Rosen, the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County granted summary judgment for the appellant in September 1981.

In January 1983, the court of appeals reversed the trial court by holding, first, that R.C. Chapter 3111, as effective on June 29, 1982, was a "legislative reversal" of the conclusive presumption of paternity set forth in Hall and, second, that the amended terms of R.C. Chapter 3111 would be applicable to the appellees' claim on remand. Adams filed a motion for reconsideration on the grounds that amended R.C. Chapter 3111 could not be applied retroactively to the appellee's action, wherein judgment was entered prior to the effective date of amended R.C. Chapter 3111. The appellate court granted appellant's motion for reconsideration and vacated its original decision; but, in its second decision, the court again reversed the trial court by distinguishing the facts of Hall from those of the instant case ¹ and remanding the cause for consideration of evidence to rebut the presumption that Riggle was the natural father of Christopher Johnson.

The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Susan E. Boyer, Asst. Prosecuting Atty., for appellees.

Eslocker & Grim and William A. Grim, Athens, for appellant.

SWEENEY, Justice.

In the first opinion that it filed in the instant case, the Court of Appeals for Washington County expressly held that amended R.C. Chapter 3111, as effective on June 29, 1982, would be applicable on remand to the appellees' cause of action. Later, in its opinion on reconsideration, the appellate court provided a different analysis and attempted to distinguish Hall v. Rosen, supra, so that the conclusive presumption of paternity set forth therein would not apply on remand to the instant case. Even under this new analysis, however, the court stated that "the [R.C.] Chapter 3111 provision which changes the irrebuttable presumption of paternity into a rebuttable presumptions [sic ], in this limited sense, [is] retroactive." Based upon this statement, the appellant raises the issue of whether amended R.C. Chapter 3111, as effective on June 29, 1982, has any applicability to the trial court's grant of summary judgment, which was rendered for appellant in September 1981. We find that it does not.

A basic rule of statutory construction, as codified at R.C. 1.48, provides that "[a] statute is presumed to be prospective in its operation unless expressly made retrospective." The legislation in this case, amending R.C. Chapter 3111, was enacted in 1982 upon passage of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 245. Section 3 of this bill provides that "[a]n action may be commenced pursuant to sections 3111.01 to 3111.19 of the Revised Code * * * to establish the father and child relationship * * *, irrespective of whether a child is born prior to, or on or after, the effective date of this act." In the sense that this section of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 245 makes amended R.C. Chapter 3111 applicable to causes of action accruing prior to its effective date, R.C. Chapter 3111 is "expressly made retrospective." However, such retrospectivity clearly does not allow the reversal, on appeal, of a judgment rendered prior to the June 29, 1982 effective date of amended R.C. Chapter 3111. To permit such a result in this case would cross the line between permissible "retrospectivity" and unconstitutional "retroactivity," ² while inviting the legislature to become a super-judiciary with the power to reverse judgments previously rendered in specific cases. For these reasons, we hold that those sections of amended R.C. Chapter 3111 that became effective on or after June 29, 1982 have no application to paternity actions in which judgment was entered prior to that date.

The second issue presented herein is whether Hall v. Rosen, supra, and Miller v. Anderson (1885), 43 Ohio St. 473, 3 N.E. 605, which effectively establish a conclusive presumption of paternity in cases in which a man married a woman with knowledge that she is pregnant, should continue to serve as valid, binding precedent in those paternity cases that are not governed by amended R.C. Chapter 3111.

We start our analysis by noting that " '[p]ermanent irrebuttable presumptions have long been disfavored under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, especially when they are 'not necessarily or universally true in fact, and when the state has reasonable alternative means of making the crucial determination.' " Hall v. Rosen, supra, at 142, 363 N.E.2d 725 (Justice William B. Brown, dissenting, quoting Vlandis v. Kline [1973], 412 U.S. 441, 446 and 452, 93 S.Ct. 2230, 2233 and 2236, 37 L.Ed.2d 63). The conclusive presumption of paternity set forth in Hall and Miller deprives a child of support from its biological father, while imposing a duty of support upon another man who may have had no intention of accepting such a burden at the time that he married the child's mother. In that this conclusive presumption cannot be said to be founded upon a "universal truth," we continue our analysis with a critical eye towards the rationale behind the presumption.

The majority opinion in Hall offered two major bases for continued adherence to a conclusive presumption of paternity. The Hall majority focused primarily on the relationship between the child's mother and the man that she married during her pregnancy and concluded that, by marrying the pregnant woman, "the husband has voluntarily assumed the burden of supporting the child." Id. at 139, 363 N.E.2d 725. We cannot reach the same conclusion so readily. As Justice William Brown noted in his dissent in Hall, "common sense dictates that a man's temporary concern for an unwed mother does not necessarily include a permanent concern for the welfare of her offspring." Id. at 142, 363 N.E.2d 725. This "common sense" approach prevents us, in the instant case, from transforming Riggle's two-week relationship with a pregnant Carmen Johnson into a commitment to provide support for the first eighteen years of Christopher Johnson's life. ³ Intent cannot always readily be discerned from conduct; and, in light of this state's statutory framework governing adoptions (which provides a specific vehicle for a man to clearly express his intent to adopt his wife's children), we conclude that it is unwise to create an adoption by judicial...