Johnson v. Anhorn
Decision Date | 31 January 2006 |
Docket Number | No. Civ.A. 04-146.,No. Civ.A. 03-2424.,Civ.A. 03-2424.,Civ.A. 04-146. |
Citation | 416 F.Supp.2d 338 |
Parties | Dwayne Richard JOHNSON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Guy A. ANHORN, et al., Defendants. Daniel A. Antonelli, Plaintiff, v. Guy A. Anhorn, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
David M. Cedar, Samuel Merovitz, Merovitz & Cedar, LLP, Philadelphia, PA, John I. Mcmahon, Jr., McMahon & McMahon, Norristown, PA, for Plaintiffs.
Anthony R. Sherr, Mayers Mennies & Sherr LLP, Blue Bell, PA, George H. Knoell, III, Kane, Pugh, Knoell & Driscoll, Norristown, PA, John P. Gonzales, Joseph J. Santarone, Jr., Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, King of Prussia, PA, for Defendants.
Plaintiffs Dwayne Richard Johnson ("Johnson"), Damian A. Graham ("Graham"), Charles Henry Covington ("Covington"), Phenix Crumpton ("Crumpton"), and Daniel A. Antonelli ("Antonelli") bring these related civil rights actions1 alleging that former Whitemarsh Township2 Police Sergeant Guy A. Anhorn ("Anhorn"), Whitemarsh Township Police Lieutenant Jesse Stemple ("Stemple"), Whitemarsh Township ("the Township"), the Whitemarsh Township Police Department ("the Police Department"), and Michael A. Zeock, William P. Rimel III, Peter B. Cornog, Anne Younglove, Ronald J. Derosa, and Lawrence Gregan (collectively, "the individual Township officials") violated their constitutional and state law rights. The plaintiffs are all African American residents of Pennsylvania. Under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, plaintiffs Graham, Covington, Crumpton, and Antonelli allege that Anhorn stopped them (in three separate incidents) without reasonable suspicion and on the basis of race, in violation of their rights under the Fourth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection clause, and state law. Plaintiff Johnson alleges that Anhorn undertook racially motivated official conduct against him, in violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and state law. The plaintiffs further allege that Stemple and Anhorn conspired to violate their civil rights, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and state law. In addition, they allege that Stemple, Whitemarsh Township, and the Whitemarsh Township Police Department are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for acquiescing in, promoting, or condoning Anhorn's alleged conduct. The plaintiffs also seek recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 against the individual Whitemarsh Township officials, Stemple, and the Township for allegedly neglecting to prevent Stemple and Anhorn's conspiracy to violate the plaintiffs' civil rights.
Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. The defendants have moved for summary judgment as to all counts and all plaintiffs. Anhorn and the individual Township officials move for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity as to all claims by all plaintiffs. For the reasons that follow, I will grant in part and deny in part summary judgment to Anhorn, without prejudice to raise certain claims in a motion in limine before trial. I will deny summary judgment to the individual Township officials without prejudice to raise in a motion in limine before trial. I will deny summary judgment to Stemple, the Township, and the Township Police Department, without prejudice to raise certain claims in a motion in limine before trial. Qualified immunity is denied to Anhorn and to the individual Township officials due to outstanding issues of material fact.
The allegations in this case arise primarily from four separate encounters in 2001 and 2002 between the plaintiffs and then-Sergeant Guy Anhorn ("Anhorn"). Because Anhorn's history with the Whitemarsh Township Police Department ("the Police Department") and Whitemarsh Township ("the Township") is relevant to the claims of all plaintiffs, I will begin with these facts. Then I will discuss each plaintiffs encounter with Anhorn, presenting the version of events most favorable to the plaintiff, as supported by evidence in the record.
During all relevant times, Anhorn was one of five sergeants in the approximately thirty-five-member Whitemarsh Township Police Department. As sergeant, Anhorn was the immediate supervisor of a platoon of officers. (Anhorn Dep., Township's Ex. D at 14.) Defendant Jesse Stemple ("Stemple") was the only lieutenant in the Police Department during the time in question and was Anhorn's immediate supervisor. As lieutenant, Stemple was second in command and oversaw the day-to-day operations of the Department. ...
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