Johnson v. Anhorn

Decision Date31 January 2006
Docket NumberNo. Civ.A. 04-146.,No. Civ.A. 03-2424.,Civ.A. 03-2424.,Civ.A. 04-146.
Citation416 F.Supp.2d 338
PartiesDwayne Richard JOHNSON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Guy A. ANHORN, et al., Defendants. Daniel A. Antonelli, Plaintiff, v. Guy A. Anhorn, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

David M. Cedar, Samuel Merovitz, Merovitz & Cedar, LLP, Philadelphia, PA, John I. Mcmahon, Jr., McMahon & McMahon, Norristown, PA, for Plaintiffs.

Anthony R. Sherr, Mayers Mennies & Sherr LLP, Blue Bell, PA, George H. Knoell, III, Kane, Pugh, Knoell & Driscoll, Norristown, PA, John P. Gonzales, Joseph J. Santarone, Jr., Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, King of Prussia, PA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

ANITA B. BRODY, District Judge.

                                      TABLE OF CONTENTS
                I.   Facts.......................................................................... 348
                     Facts relating to Plaintiff Graham ............................................ 353
                     Facts relating to Plaintiff Covington ......................................... 354
                     Facts relating to Plaintiffs Antonelli and Crumpton ........................... 354
                     Facts relating to Plaintiff Johnson ........................................... 355
                II.  Legal Standard ................................................................ 356
                III. Discussion .................................................................... 356
                     A. Anhorn's Motion for Summary Judgment ....................................... 357
                        1. Plaintiff Graham's Claims ............................................... 357
                           a. The Initial Stop of Graham ........................................... 357
                           b. The Search of Graham ................................................. 359
                           c. Equal Protection Violation as to Graham .............................. 359
                           d. False Statements on Graham's Affidavit of Probable Cause ............. 360
                           e. Qualified Immunity as to Graham ...................................... 361
                                i. The Initial Stop ................................................ 362
                               ii. The Search ...................................................... 363
                              iii. The Equal Protection Claim ...................................... 364
                               iv. The Affidavit of Probable Cause ................................. 364
                                v. Outstanding Issues of Fact under Forbes ......................... 364
                        2. Plaintiff Covington's Claims ............................................ 365
                           a. The Initial Stop of Covington ........................................ 365
                           b. The Search of Covington's Jacket ..................................... 366
                           c. Equal Protection Violation as to Covington ........................... 367
                           d. False Statements on Covington's Affidavit of Probable Cause .......... 367
                           e. Qualified Immunity as to Covington ................................... 368
                                i. The Initial Traffic Stop ........................................ 368
                               ii. The Search of Covington's Jacket ................................ 368
                              iii. The Equal Protection Claim ...................................... 369
                               iv. The Affidavit of Probable Cause ................................. 369
                                v. Outstanding Issues of Fact Under Forbes ......................... 369
                        3. Plaintiffs Antonelli and Crumpton's Claims .............................. 370
                           a. The Initial Stop of Antonelli's Car .................................. 370
                
                           b. The Search of Antonelli's Car ........................................ 371
                           c. Equal Protection Violation as to Antonelli and Crumpton .............. 372
                           d. False Statements on Antonelli and Crumpton's Affidavit of
                               Probable Cause ...................................................... 372
                           e. Qualified Immunity as to Antonelli and Crumpton ...................... 374
                                i. The Initial Stop ................................................ 374
                               ii. The Search of the Car ........................................... 374
                              iii. The Equal Protection Claim ...................................... 374
                               iv. The Affidavit of Probable Cause ................................. 374
                                v. Outstanding Issues of Fact Under Forbes ......................... 374
                        4. Plaintiff Johnson's Claims .............................................. 375
                           a. Procedural Due Process Claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 .................. 375
                           b. Equal Protection Claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ........................ 375
                           c. Qualified Immunity as to Johnson ..................................... 377
                           d. Outstanding Issues of Fact Under Forbes .............................. 378
                        5. The Plaintiffs' Section 1981, Section 1985, and State Law Claims ........ 378
                     B. The Individual Township Officials' Motion for Summary Judgment ............. 378
                     C. Stemple's Motion for Summary Judgment ...................................... 379
                        1. Section 1983 Claim ...................................................... 379
                        2. Section 1985, Section 1981, Section 1986, and State Law Conspiracy
                             Claims ................................................................ 380
                     D. Township and Police Department's Motion for Summary Judgment ............... 381
                        1. Section 1983 Claim ...................................................... 381
                        2. Section 1986 Claim ...................................................... 381
                 IV. Conclusion .................................................................... 382
                

Plaintiffs Dwayne Richard Johnson ("Johnson"), Damian A. Graham ("Graham"), Charles Henry Covington ("Covington"), Phenix Crumpton ("Crumpton"), and Daniel A. Antonelli ("Antonelli") bring these related civil rights actions1 alleging that former Whitemarsh Township2 Police Sergeant Guy A. Anhorn ("Anhorn"), Whitemarsh Township Police Lieutenant Jesse Stemple ("Stemple"), Whitemarsh Township ("the Township"), the Whitemarsh Township Police Department ("the Police Department"), and Michael A. Zeock, William P. Rimel III, Peter B. Cornog, Anne Younglove, Ronald J. Derosa, and Lawrence Gregan (collectively, "the individual Township officials") violated their constitutional and state law rights. The plaintiffs are all African American residents of Pennsylvania. Under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, plaintiffs Graham, Covington, Crumpton, and Antonelli allege that Anhorn stopped them (in three separate incidents) without reasonable suspicion and on the basis of race, in violation of their rights under the Fourth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection clause, and state law. Plaintiff Johnson alleges that Anhorn undertook racially motivated official conduct against him, in violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and state law. The plaintiffs further allege that Stemple and Anhorn conspired to violate their civil rights, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and state law. In addition, they allege that Stemple, Whitemarsh Township, and the Whitemarsh Township Police Department are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for acquiescing in, promoting, or condoning Anhorn's alleged conduct. The plaintiffs also seek recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 against the individual Whitemarsh Township officials, Stemple, and the Township for allegedly neglecting to prevent Stemple and Anhorn's conspiracy to violate the plaintiffs' civil rights.

Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. The defendants have moved for summary judgment as to all counts and all plaintiffs. Anhorn and the individual Township officials move for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity as to all claims by all plaintiffs. For the reasons that follow, I will grant in part and deny in part summary judgment to Anhorn, without prejudice to raise certain claims in a motion in limine before trial. I will deny summary judgment to the individual Township officials without prejudice to raise in a motion in limine before trial. I will deny summary judgment to Stemple, the Township, and the Township Police Department, without prejudice to raise certain claims in a motion in limine before trial. Qualified immunity is denied to Anhorn and to the individual Township officials due to outstanding issues of material fact.

I. FACTS3

The allegations in this case arise primarily from four separate encounters in 2001 and 2002 between the plaintiffs and then-Sergeant Guy Anhorn ("Anhorn"). Because Anhorn's history with the Whitemarsh Township Police Department ("the Police Department") and Whitemarsh Township ("the Township") is relevant to the claims of all plaintiffs, I will begin with these facts. Then I will discuss each plaintiffs encounter with Anhorn, presenting the version of events most favorable to the plaintiff, as supported by evidence in the record.

During all relevant times, Anhorn was one of five sergeants in the approximately thirty-five-member Whitemarsh Township Police Department. (Johnson Am. Compl. ¶ 10; Hale Rep., Pls.' Resp. to Stemple's Mot. Summ. J. Ex. B at RMA-00005.) As sergeant, Anhorn was the immediate supervisor of a platoon of officers. (Anhorn Dep., Township's Ex. D at 14.) Defendant Jesse Stemple ("Stemple") was the only lieutenant in the Police Department during the time in question and was Anhorn's immediate supervisor. (Johnson Am. Compl. ¶ 11; Hale Rep., Pls.' Resp. to Stemple Ex. B at RMA-00005.) As lieutenant, Stemple was second in command and oversaw the day-to-day operations of the Department. (Hale Rep.,...

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