Johnson v. Arkansas State Police

• Decision Date: 29 November 1993
• Docket Number: No. 92-3611,92-3611
• Citation: 10 F.3d 547
• Parties: 63 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 479, 63 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 42,725 Walter JOHNSON, Appellant, v. ARKANSAS STATE POLICE, Arkansas State Trooper Commission, Tommy Goodwin, in his official capacity, Gene Raff, in his official capacity; Winthrop Rockefeller, in his official capacity; John Gillespie, in his official capacity; Vada Sheid, in his official capacity; Bill Simpson, in his official capacity; Howard Woods, in his official capacity; Jerry Flippo, in his official capacity; David Rosegrant, in his official capacity; and Houston Talley, in his official capacity, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 547

10 F.3d 547

63 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 479,

63 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 42,725

Walter JOHNSON, Appellant, v. ARKANSAS STATE POLICE, Arkansas State Trooper Commission, Tommy Goodwin, in his official capacity, Gene Raff, in his

official capacity; Winthrop Rockefeller, in his official

capacity; John Gillespie, in his official capacity; Vada

Sheid, in his official capacity; Bill Simpson, in his

official capacity; Howard Woods, in his official capacity;

Jerry Flippo, in his official capacity; David Rosegrant, in

his official capacity; and Houston Talley, in his official

capacity, Appellees.

No. 92-3611.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted June 15, 1993.

Decided Nov. 29, 1993.

R.S. McCullough, argued, Little Rock, AR (Rita F. Bailey, on the brief), for appellant.

Ann C. Purvis, Asst. Atty. Gen., argued, Little Rock, AR, for appellees.

Before BOWMAN, Circuit Judge, HEANEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and BEAM, Circuit Judge.

BEAM, Circuit Judge.

Walter Johnson appeals the district court's ruling in favor of the Arkansas State Police ("ASP") and the individual defendants in his Title VII claim. We reverse and remand.

I. BACKGROUND

Walter Johnson, an African-American, was hired by the ASP as a uniformed trooper in June of 1980. His performance as a uniformed trooper was satisfactory. In 1984, he was assigned to the Criminal Investigation Division ("CID") and became an undercover narcotics agent. In 1986, complaints about Johnson's record-keeping began to surface. His poor record-keeping was the subject of several counseling sessions between Johnson and his superior officers. Subsequently, in 1987, an Internal Affairs audit of Johnson's case files revealed that his records had not been properly completed since August 1986. The auditors found that Johnson had falsified entries in his weekly reports, had dictated reports improperly, and was guilty of insubordination. Based on these findings, Johnson was suspended without pay for five days and was reassigned as a uniformed trooper with the highway patrol.

On August 18, 1987, Johnson was arrested and charged in state court with one count of theft of property in connection with money missing from a CID narcotics investigation. On August 21, 1987, Arkansas State Police Chief Tommy Goodwin informed Johnson that he would be suspended without pay pending the outcome of the criminal charge. A jury acquitted Johnson of the theft charge and he subsequently requested reinstatement to the highway patrol. Goodwin refused to reinstate Johnson and instead terminated his employment. Johnson appealed this decision to the Arkansas State Police Commission which unanimously upheld Goodwin's determination. Johnson filed an EEOC complaint and then filed this lawsuit.

Testimony at trial showed that in making his decision to terminate Johnson's employment, Goodwin relied on the ASP's Internal Affairs investigation which had concluded that despite the acquittal, Johnson had indeed taken the money from the narcotics investigation. He also relied on a letter from a prosecuting attorney concerning missing evidence in two other narcotics investigations, and the recommendation of Captain Talley, Johnson's superior at the highway patrol. Talley suggested that Johnson should not be reinstated because of his poor personal appearance, low work activity, and damaged credibility as a law enforcement officer in the community. Talley testified, however, that he had never reprimanded Johnson for his appearance or for the quality of his work product.

The district court analyzed this case as a disparate treatment case under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). After a bench trial, the court concluded that Johnson was not qualified to be a state trooper and that Johnson therefore failed to establish a prima facie case. In the alternative, the district court found that the ASP advanced legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for Johnson's dismissal and that Johnson failed to prove that these reasons were pretextual. Johnson appeals these findings.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Prima Facie Case

McDonnell Douglas provides a three-stage framework for analyzing employment discrimination cases: (1) prima facie case; (2) nondiscriminatory reasons; and (3) pretext. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801-04, 93 S.Ct. at 1823-25; Adams v. Nolan, 962 F.2d 791, 794 (8th Cir.1992) (citing Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)). Under McDonnell Douglas a Title VII plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case. In this case, Johnson had the initial burden of showing: (a) that he is a member of a protected class; (b) that he was qualified for the position; and (c) that he was fired from the position. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824. If Johnson succeeded in establishing a prima facie case, the burden then shifted to the ASP to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Johnson's termination. Id. Should the ASP have succeeded in carrying this burden, Johnson must then have had the opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the reasons articulated by the defendant were a pretext for discrimination. Id. Under a mixed-motives analysis, however, " '[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.' " Saint Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2753, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)).

The district court concluded that Johnson failed to demonstrate that he was qualified to be a state trooper and that he therefore failed to establish a prima facie case. Our review of the record reveals that this determination is an error of law. The threshold of proof necessary to make a prima facie case is minimal and the district court improperly conflated the prima facie case with the ultimate issue in this Title VII case. See Saint Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (describing requirements of the prima facie case as minimal); see also United States Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-15, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 1480-81, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983) (distinguishing between the prima facie case and the ultimate issue in a Title VII case).

In deciding that Johnson failed to establish a prima facie case, the district court relied heavily on evidence of Johnson's performance at CID. The court concluded that because Johnson was not qualified to be an undercover investigator, he was similarly unqualified to be a uniformed patrol officer. If Johnson were making a Title VII claim requesting reinstatement to CID, we would agree with the district court that he could not establish a prima facie case. However, the district court considered the wrong job description when analyzing Johnson's prima facie case. The fact that Johnson was not qualified to be an undercover narcotics investigator is not material to his qualifications to be a highway patrol officer. This misunderstanding infected the rest of the court's analysis.

The other evidence on which the district court relied to determine that Johnson failed to make a prima facie case similarly does not support a finding that Johnson was not qualified for the position of a state trooper. The court noted that Talley recommended to Goodwin that Johnson not be reinstated because his uniform was below par and because he wrote too few tickets. ¹ These facts do not render him unfit for the job for Title VII purposes. Given the fact that Johnson was neither reprimanded nor given any indication that there were problems with his job performance, Transcript Vol. I, pp. 55-56, this information is legally insufficient to support the conclusion that Johnson failed to present a prima facie case.

The court also credited the ASP's assertions that Johnson had lost "credibility as an officer." In the abstract, it may seem reasonable to conclude that a police officer accused of a felony loses credibility with the public as a result of the notoriety and publicity of a trial, regardless of outcome. However, evidence was adduced at trial that white officers accused of felony offenses were not deemed by ASP to have lost their credibility as a result of the attendant publicity of a trial. Goodwin testified that the Mullenax and Booher cases, involving white officers accused of felonies, generated significantly more media coverage than Johnson's case. ² However, neither Mullenax nor Booher was terminated because of a loss of credibility. We cannot accept that Johnson lost his credibility as a state trooper while similarly situated white officers were not so affected. Accordingly, the district court erred as a matter of law in concluding that Johnson failed to make a prima facie case of discrimination.

B. Finding of No Discrimination

In the alternative, the district court concluded that the defendants had advanced legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for Johnson's termination and that Johnson failed to prove that these reasons were pretextual. Our review of the district court's findings of fact is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) which provides that a finding of fact "shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." A factual finding is clearly erroneous if it is not supported by substantial evidence in the record, if it is based on an erroneous view of the law, or "if the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 542, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948). In addition, a...