Johnson v. Artim Transp. System, Inc., 86-1133
| Decision Date | 29 July 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 86-1133,86-1133 |
| Parties | 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3417, 44 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 772, 43 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 37,282, 108 Lab.Cas. P 10,247 Johnnie Will JOHNSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ARTIM TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM, INC., and Teamsters Union Local 142, Defendants- Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Michael F. Lefkow, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff-appellant.
Barry M. Bennett, Asher, Pavalon, Gittler and Greenfield, Chicago, Ill., for defendants-appellees.
Before WOOD, COFFEY, and MANION, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Johnnie Will Johnson was fired from his position as a truck driver by Artim Transportation System, Inc. ("Artim") after Artim employees discovered him sleeping and allegedly drunk near the Artim dump truck he had been driving, which was still running and blocking traffic. Johnson sued Artim and Teamsters Union Local 142 ("Local 142") for violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5 (1982) (Title VII), alleging that he was terminated and the union refused to comply with grievance procedures because he is black. Johnson subsequently amended his complaint to include a hybrid section 301 (of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185 (1982))/breach of the duty of fair representation claim against Artim and Local 142. The district court dismissed the section 301/fair representation claim as barred by the statute of limitations, severed sua sponte Johnson's claim against Artim because Artim had filed a petition for bankruptcy, and, after a one-day bench trial, granted judgment for Local 142 on the Title VII claim, concluding that Johnson had not established a prima facie case of racial discrimination. Johnson appeals the dismissal of his hybrid section 301/fair representation claim and the grant of summary judgment for Local 142 on the Title VII claim. We affirm.
Plaintiff Johnnie Will Johnson, a black male, worked as a truck driver for Artim Transportation System, Inc., and was a member of Teamsters Union Local 142, the union that represented Artim employees. During the night of June 13, 1975, and until 4:30 a.m. of the next morning, Johnson was drinking beer and gambling at a farm outside of Gary, Indiana. Without sleeping, he went home, changed clothes, and reported for work at Artim at 6:00 a.m. After making a delivery, his return to Artim was delayed at approximately 9:00 a.m. by a long train that had stopped and blocked the road. Johnson got out of the cab of the truck to see why the train was standing still, could not see the end of the train, and sat down in a nearby doorway to shade himself from the sun because it was too hot in the cab.
Artim shortly thereafter received a call that one of its trucks was stopped and blocking traffic. Two Artim employees, John Harkema and Tony Ballas, arrived on the scene and discovered the Artim tractor and trailer still running and partially off the street, at an angle blocking traffic. Employees from a nearby company were flagging traffic around the truck. Harkema and Ballas found Johnson asleep across the street and awakened him. Harkema smelled alcohol on Johnson's breath and accused him of being drunk, which Johnson denied. Harkema drove Johnson back to Artim and at the Artim terminal Johnson was informed that he was terminated for being drunk.
At approximately 2:00 or 2:30 p.m. that day, Johnson had a blood alcohol test taken. The results showed that as of the time he took the test, his blood alcohol level was .06 percent. The same day, Harkema called Dominic Damato, an Artim employee who acted as one of Local 142's business agents, and told Damato Johnson had been discharged for being intoxicated while driving his truck. Damato went to Artim's terminal and was told the company's side of the events.
The following Tuesday, June 17, Johnson spoke with Damato, who was accompanied by Ernest Porter and another man, who were both Local 142 officials. Johnson said that the day of the incident he had had a kink in his back and had left the truck and fallen asleep in a doorway. In response to Damato's questioning, Johnson denied having been drunk when he was found asleep and said he had taken a blood alcohol test. Damato claims Johnson then said the test results showed alcohol in his system; Johnson says he said he had not yet received the test results.
On June 18, Johnson met with Damato, Porter, and other Local 142 agents, and Jack McMahon, the terminal manager. Damato told Johnson that he was fired. Johnson then asked Damato if he would file a grievance in Johnson's behalf. Damato refused. The next day, Damato refused a second time to file a grievance.
The following day, June 19, Johnson filed discrimination charges against Artim and Local 142 with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Gary Human Rights Division. The charges were summarily dismissed for lack of cause, but the EEOC did issue Johnson a right-to-sue notice on September 15, 1977.
Johnson filed a pro se complaint with the district court on November 17, 1977, alleging that Artim and Local 142 had discriminated against him because of his race, in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5. The district judge denied Johnson a court-appointed attorney, but allowed Johnson to proceed in forma pauperis.
On September 15, 1978, Johnson moved to amend his complaint to add a hybrid claim against Artim and Local 142 for breach of the collective bargaining agreement, in violation of section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185, and for breach of the duty of fair representation. 1 The court granted Johnson leave to amend the complaint on October 3, 1978.
On May 6, 1982, the court appointed counsel for Johnson. On June 7, 1983, the court granted summary judgment for Artim and Local 142 on the hybrid section 301/fair representation claim on the ground that it was untimely filed. The court denied the defendants summary judgment, however, on the Title VII claim.
Artim filed notice on June 1, 1984, that it was in Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings. The court severed Johnson's claim against Artim on December 13, 1984, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b), 2 and directed that the Title VII claim against Local 142 go forward for trial. After a one-day bench trial the court granted judgment for Local 142 under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) on December 13, 1985, finding that Johnson had failed to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination as required under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5 because "[t]here [was] no evidence that similarly situated white employees of the defendant were treated more favorably than was the plaintiff." 3 Johnson appeals this ruling and the grant of summary judgment for defendants on the hybrid section 301/fair representation claim. Local 142 asks for attorneys' fees and costs in connection with this appeal.
Johnson argues that the district court erred in dismissing under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) 4 his Title VII claim on the ground that Johnson had failed to establish a prima facie case against Local 142. In an appeal of a dismissal under Rule 41(b), we will affirm the district court's decision unless we determine that the court's findings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) 5 supporting that judgment were clearly erroneous. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985); Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 290, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 1791, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982); Bugg v. International Union of Allied Industrial Workers Local 507, 674 F.2d 595, 599 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 805, 103 S.Ct. 29, 74 L.Ed.2d 43 (1982); Patterson v. General Motors Corp., 631 F.2d 476, 487 (7th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 914, 101 S.Ct. 1988, 68 L.Ed.2d 304 (1981). "A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 542, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948).
The district court's determination that Johnson did not establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination rests on its finding that Johnson did not show "some indication" that Local 142 was motivated by racial animus in refusing to file a grievance. We are not left with a firm conviction that the district court committed a mistake in reaching this finding. The court applied the three-part test enunciated in Bugg v. International Union of Allied Industrial Workers Local 507, 674 F.2d 595, 598 n. 5 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 805, 103 S.Ct. 29, 74 L.Ed.2d 43 (1982), to analyze whether Johnson had established a claim against Local 142. Under Bugg, an employee/plaintiff establishes a prima facie case against a union when the plaintiff shows by a preponderance of the evidence:
(1) that the company committed a violation of the collective bargaining agreement with respect to the plaintiff; (2) that the Union permitted that breach to go unrepaired, thus breaching its own duty of fair representation; and (3) that there was some indication that the Union's actions were motivated by racial animus.
Id. The district court found that plaintiff Johnson had shown that Artim had breached its collective bargaining agreement with respect to Johnson and that Local 142 had breached its duty of fair representation. 6 The court also found, however, that Johnson had failed to satisfy the third prong of this test, and thus failed to establish a prima facie case because he did not show "some indication" that Local 142's actions were motivated by racial animus.
We recognize that "[t]he burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous." Texas...
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