Johnson v. Baptist Mem'l Health Care Corp.

• Decision Date: 07 November 2019
• Docket Number: No. 2:18-cv-02509-SHM-cgc,2:18-cv-02509-SHM-cgc
• Parties: ANGELA L. JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. BAPTIST MEMORIAL HEALTH CARE CORPORATION and BAPTIST MEMORIAL MEDICAL GROUP, INC., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee

ANGELA L. JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. BAPTIST MEMORIAL HEALTH CARE CORPORATIONand BAPTIST MEMORIAL MEDICAL GROUP, INC., Defendants.

No. 2:18-cv-02509-SHM-cgc

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE WESTERN DIVISION

November 7, 2019

ORDER

This is an employment discrimination and retaliation case. Before the Court are three motions. The first motion is Defendant Baptist Memorial Medical Group, Inc.'s ("BMMG") July 26, 2019 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 43.) BMMG argues that Plaintiff Angela Johnson's claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq., are time-barred. Johnson responded on September 18, 2019. (ECF No. 49.) BMMG replied on October 2, 2019. (ECF No. 54.)

The second motion is BMMG's October 2, 2019 Motion to Strike Johnson's Late-Filed Response to BMMG's Motion to Dismiss (BMMG's "First Motion to Strike"). (ECF No. 54.) Johnson responded on October 15, 2019. (ECF No. 61.) BMMG replied on October 24, 2019. (ECF No. 67.)

The third motion is BMMG's October 22, 2019 Motion to Strike Johnson's Sur-Reply and Memorandum in Support (BMMG's "Second Motion to Strike"). (ECF No. 64.) Johnson has not filed a response, and the time to do so has passed.

For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS BMMG's Motion to Dismiss. The Court GRANTS BMMG's First Motion to Strike. The Court GRANTS BMMG's Second Motion to Strike.

I. Background

BMMG is a subsidiary of Baptist Memorial Health Care Corporation ("BMHCC"). (Am. Compl., ECF No. 41 ¶ 7.) Johnson is a former BMMG employee. (Id.) She worked for BMMG as a Patient Finance Representative from August 2013 to July 2016. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 17.)

On October 28, 2015, Johnson filed a Charge of Discrimination with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "EEOC") alleging that she had been denied a promotion because of her race. (Id. ¶ 12.) The October 28, 2015 Charge of Discrimination listed BMMG as the respondent. (Id. Ex. 1.) On April 26, 2018, the EEOC sent Johnson a Notice of Suit Rights based on this Charge of Discrimination. (Id. ¶ 13.)

On July 7, 2016, Johnson filed a second Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC alleging that she had been retaliated against for filing the October 28, 2015 Charge of Discrimination. (Id. ¶¶ 14-18.) The July 7, 2016 Charge of Discrimination listed BMHCC as the respondent. (Id. Ex. 3.) On May 22, 2018, the EEOC sent Johnson a Notice of Suit Rights based on this Charge of Discrimination. (Id. ¶ 19.)

On July 24, 2018, Johnson filed a Complaint against BMHCC alleging race-based discrimination and retaliation in violation of: (1) Title VII; (2) Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1981; and (3) the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. (ECF No. 1 at 1-2.) On July 12, 2019, Johnson filed an Amended Complaint adding BMMG as a defendant. (ECF No. 41.)

BMMG moves to dismiss Johnson's Title VII claims as time-barred.¹ (ECF No. 43.) BMMG moves to strike Johnson's untimely response to BMMG's Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 54.) BMMG moves to strike Johnson's sur-reply to its Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 64.)

II. Jurisdiction

The Court has federal-question jurisdiction. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, United States district courts have original jurisdiction "of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Johnson alleges that BMMG violated Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Those claims arise under the Constitution and laws of the United States.

III. Standard of Review

A. Motion to Dismiss

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows dismissal of a complaint that "fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." A Rule 12(b)(6) motion permits the "defendant to test whether, as a matter of law, the plaintiff is entitled to legal relief even if everything alleged in the complaint is true." Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 638 (6th Cir. 1993) (citing Nishiyama v. Dickson Cty., 814 F.2d 277, 279 (6th Cir. 1987)). A motion to dismiss tests only whether the plaintiff has pled a cognizable claim and allows the court to dismiss meritless cases that would waste judicial resources and result in unnecessary discovery. See Brown v. City of Memphis, 440 F. Supp. 2d 868, 872 (W.D. Tenn. 2006).

When evaluating a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court must determine whether the complaint alleges "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above [a] speculative level." Ass'n of Cleveland Fire Fighters v. City of Cleveland, 502 F.3d 545, 548 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

A claim is plausible on its face if "the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations. However, a plaintiff's "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id.

B. Motion to Strike

Granting or denying a motion to strike is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Seay v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 339 F.3d 454, 480 (6th Cir. 2003). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not contemplate motions to strike documents other than pleadings. Fox v. Mich. State Police Dep't, 173 F. App'x 372, 375 (6th Cir. 2006); cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) (providing that "[a] court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter"). "[T]rial courts make use of their inherent power to control their dockets . . . when determining whether to strike documents or portions of documents [other than pleadings]." Zep Inc. v. Midwest Motor Supply Co., 726 F. Supp. 2d 818, 822 (S.D. Ohio 2010) (citing Anthony v. BTR Auto Sealing Sys., 339 F.3d 506, 516 (6th Cir. 2003)).

"District courts have broad discretion in interpreting, applying, and determining the requirements of their own local rules." Pearce v. Chrysler Grp., L.L.C. Pension Plan, 615 F. App'x 342, 349-50 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing S.S. v. E. Ky. Univ., 532 F.3d 445, 451 (6th Cir. 2008)). "The district court does not have to accept every filing submitted by a party." Ross, Brovins & Oehmke, P.C. v. Lexis Nexis Grp., a Div. of Reed Elsevier Grp., PLC, 463 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2006). A court acts within its discretion when it strikes a filing for, inter alia, untimeliness or a failure to comply with the local rules. See Ordos City Hawtai Autobody Co. v. Dimond Rigging Co., 695 F. App'x 864, 870-72 (6th Cir. 2017) (affirming trial court's striking of response brief because of failure to comply with local rules); Ross, 463 F.3d at 488-89 (affirming trial court's striking of reply brief because party failed to request the necessary leave to file); Jones v. Northcoast Behavioral Healthcare Sys., 84 F. App'x 597, 598-99 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming trial court's striking of untimely memoranda of law).

IV. Analysis

A. BMMG's First Motion to Strike

BMMG moves to strike Johnson's response to BMMG's Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 54.) BMMG filed its Motion to Dismiss on July 26, 2019. (ECF No. 43.) Under the Local Rules of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee (the "Local Rules"), Johnson had 28 days to respond. LR 12.1(b). Johnson filed her response 26 days late, on September 18, 2019. (ECF No. 49.)

When a filing deadline has passed, a court "may, for good cause, extend the time," but only "on motion made after the time has expired if the party failed to act because of excusable neglect." Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1). Johnson filed no motion to extend time. She filed her response late and did not explain why.

In her response to BMMG's First Motion to Strike, Johnson attempts to explain her delay. She says she missed the Court's automatic email notification about BMMG's Motion to Dismiss because her counsel's "server had a malfunction," and that, "[o]nce the malfunction was discovered and corrected, she got a notice in this case for [BMMG's] Motion to Dismiss." (ECF No. 61 at 1-2.) Johnson argues that this constitutes excusable neglect. (Id.)

In this Circuit, missing an email is not an excuse for missing a deadline. "[P]arties have an affirmative duty to monitor the dockets to keep apprised of the entry of orders." Yeschick v. Mineta, 675 F.3d 622, 629 (6th Cir. 2012) (affirming trial court's finding that "counsel's neglect in not checking the docket was not excusable"). The same goes for other docket events, like the entry of a motion. Failure to keep up with what happens in a case is not excusable neglect. See EEOC v. Indi's Fast Food Rest., Inc., No. 3:15-cv-00590, 2016 WL 7473130, at *5-6 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 28, 2016) (declining to consider late-filed reply brief because "counsel's non-receipt of emails d[id] not relieve his responsibility to monitor the Court's docket and keep apprised of developments within his active cases" and did not "constitut[e] excusable neglect"); Moncier v. Jones, 939 F. Supp. 2d 854, 861-62 (M.D. Tenn. 2013) (finding that "Plaintiff's failure to respond to [a] motion to dismiss as a result of his computer difficulties d[id] not constitute excusable neglect"); Dumas v. Hurley Med. Ctr., No. 10-cv-12661, 2013 WL 12309315, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 7, 2013) (declining to consider plaintiff's late-filed objections to magistrate judge's report and recommendation and noting that "[e]mail notification is a convenience, but its existence does not excuse Plaintiff from her duty to actively log-on to the CM/ECF system and check the docket"); see also Dudek v. Greektown Casino, LLC, ...