Johnson v. Bi-State Justice Center/Arkansas Dept. of Corrections, Hart , Jordan , Johnson , Allen , Stringfellow , Webb , Gilbert , Sullivan
| Decision Date | 27 December 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 92-3061,BI-STATE,92-3061 |
| Parties | Clifton Roger JOHNSON, Appellant, v.JUSTICE CENTER/ARKANSAS DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS; Warden Rick Hart; Major Larry Jordan; Lt. Rodney Johnson; Staff Officer Evelyn Allen; Dr. Jerry Stringfellow; Lt. Webb; CO1 Gilbert; CO1 Sullivan, Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Barry A. Bryant, Texarkana, AR, argued, for appellant.
Reginald A. Rogers, Little Rock, AR, argued (Don Cooksey, Kaylin D. Kluge and David B. Eberhard, on brief), for appellees.
Before McMILLIAN, WOLLMAN, and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.
Arkansas inmate Clifton R. Johnson appeals the district court's order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 damage claims against various prison officials. We conclude that the district court applied the wrong legal standard in dismissing Johnson's excessive force claim before trial. Therefore, we reverse in part and remand for further proceedings.
Johnson's amended complaint alleged that Lt. Rodney Johnson placed Johnson in isolation without a hearing and without his personal effects in retaliation for filing a lawsuit and grievance; that Major Larry Jordan, staff officers Evelyn Allen, David Gilbert, and Mark Sullivan, and Lt. Mike Webb later assaulted and beat Johnson; and that Warden Rick Hart, Lt. Johnson, and Dr. Jerry Stringfellow failed to answer a grievance, denied Johnson medical attention after the beating, and then delayed his treatment. Claiming violations of his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, Johnson sought declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive damages, and a jury trial.
The magistrate judge conducted an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Johnson's claims warranted a jury trial. On the excessive force claim, Johnson testified that, after he was transferred to a more secure area, he sought the attention of prison officials by beating on the windows and doors of the day room. Defendant Jordan responded, and Johnson asked when he would be released from isolation. Jordan replied he did not want to hear from Johnson and started to leave. Johnson was standing in the doorway and held out his hands to prevent the door from closing. Jordan opened the door, pushed Johnson against a wall, and put his right hand around Johnson's throat. Jordan then hit Johnson on the head with the soft cast on Jordan's left arm and tripped Johnson, causing him to hit his head on the ground and rendering him "somewhat unconscious." When Johnson awoke, other officers were kicking him, stomping on him, and beating him unnecessarily before returning him to his cell. Johnson stated that he suffered severe headaches as a result of the blow to his head. He rested after the magistrate judge advised him that his excessive force claim was "alive."
Jordan testified that he received a call from staff officer Allen that Johnson was being disruptive. Jordan came to the scene and observed Johnson in the day room, beating on the glass, yelling, and demanding information about obtaining his personal items. Jordan told Johnson he would return when Johnson calmed down. Jordan attempted to close the door to leave but Johnson stopped the door from closing and tried to step out of the secure area. As Jordan pushed Johnson back into the pod and against the wall, Johnson grabbed Jordan's head. Jordan took him to the floor and Officers Webb, Sullivan, and Allen assisted in handcuffing Johnson and returning him to a cell. During the scuffle, Johnson kicked Officer Webb. Jordan denied hitting Johnson on the head or kicking him and stated that Johnson was never unconscious and did not request medical attention. Defendants Allen, Webb, Gilbert, and Sullivan likewise testified that Johnson was kicking and screaming and was totally out of control during the altercation, and denied that excessive force was used to subdue him.
The magistrate judge recommended that Johnson's excessive force claim be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(d). "Even if the amount of force used in returning [Johnson] to his cell was unreasonable in retrospect," the magistrate judge concluded, "the isolated incident could not be the basis for relief without a showing that the Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to or in reckless disregard of [Johnson's] constitutional rights." The district court accepted the magistrate judge's recommendations and dismissed Johnson's complaint.
As a procedural matter, the magistrate judge erred in recommending that Johnson's excessive force claim be dismissed under Sec. 1915(d). That statute permits the summary dismissal of in forma pauperis claims that are factually or legally frivolous. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). As the Supreme Court has recently emphasized:
[A] finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible.... An in forma pauperis complaint may not be dismissed, however, simply because the court finds the plaintiff's allegations unlikely.
Denton v. Hernandez, --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 1728, 1733, 118 L.Ed.2d 340 (1992). Johnson's disputed assertion that excessive force was used to subdue him is neither irrational nor wholly incredible. This is not a suitable case for a Sec. 1915(d) dismissal.
We have approved the use of a pretrial evidentiary hearing to determine whether a pro se inmate's nonfrivolous Sec. 1983 damage claims warrant a jury trial. See Pettengill v. Veasey, 983 F.2d 130, 132-33 (8th Cir.1993); Henson v. Falls, 912 F.2d 977, 979 (8th Cir.1990). However, we have stressed that such a hearing must be consistent with the plaintiff's right to a jury trial. Therefore, if only the plaintiff presents evidence, the standard is whether his case would survive a Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a) motion for judgment as a matter of law at trial (the former motion for directed verdict). Even if both sides present evidence, so that the procedure resembles a summary judgment motion with live evidence, the standard remains the same--"whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In either case, the court must apply the proper standard of proof, avoid credibility determinations, believe the inmate's evidence, and draw all justifiable inferences in the inmate's...
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