Johnson v. Blum

• Decision Date: 31 March 1983
• Citation: 461 N.Y.S.2d 782,448 N.E.2d 449,58 N.Y.2d 454
• Parties: , 448 N.E.2d 449 In the Matter of Ruth JOHNSON et al., Appellants, v. Barbara BLUM, as Commissioner of the New York Department of Social Services, et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 782

461 N.Y.S.2d 782

58 N.Y.2d 454, 448 N.E.2d 449

In the Matter of Ruth JOHNSON et al., Appellants, v. Barbara BLUM, as Commissioner of the New York Department of Social Services, et al., Respondents.

Court of Appeals of New York.

March 31, 1983.

Andrew M. Rothstein, Rego Park, and Rene H. Reixach, Rochester, for appellants.

Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen., Albany (Clifford A. Royael and Peter H. Schiff, Asst. Attys. Gen., Albany, of counsel), for respondents.

Bernard J. Reilly, Brooklyn, and Dana H. Freyer, New York City, for the New York State Bar Ass'n, amicus curiae.

OPINION OF THE COURT

PER CURIAM.

The issue on this appeal is the appropriate standard to be applied by the court before denying attorney's fees under section 1988 of title 42 of the United States Code.

Petitioners brought this proceeding to challenge the validity of respondents' rulings denying public assistance to petitioner's minor children. The denial was based upon the State Commissioner's Administrative Directive 80ADM-1 issued January 30, 1980. That directive, issued in response to our decision in Matter of Gunn v. Blum, 48 N.Y.2d 58, 421 N.Y.S.2d 835, 397 N.E.2d 347 provided that "in the absence of a demonstration of lack of need, financial assistance directed to dependent children may not be discontinued or reduced because their parents refuse to dispose of certain non-essenti assets belonging to the parents." It then went on to provide that did not apply to applicants. "When an applicant fails to dispose of an available resource * * * the entire family is ineligible for public assistance." Because of the refusal of petitioner Johnson, and in the case of petitioner Stone, her husband, to dispose of automobiles, respondents denied assistance to their minor children and petitioners commenced this proceeding. Special Term ordered respondents to provide assistance to the minors, declaring that the directive violated the equal protection clauses of the United States and the New York Constitutions because it treated recipients and applicants unequally. The court denied petitioner's request for attorney's fees without explanation. The Appellate Division affirmed in a memorandum in which it held that allowance of counsel fees pursuant to the 1976 Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act (U.S.Code, tit. 42, § 1988), was discretionary (83 A.D.2d 731, 442 N.Y.S.2d 618).

Section 1983 of title 42 imposes liability on those who under color of law, custom or usage of any State or territory deprive citizens of the United States or other persons of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Federal Constitution and laws. Section 1988 was enacted in 1976 and provides in pertinent part: "In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of section[s] * * * 1983 * * * the court, in its discretion, ¹ may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." It is settled that attorney's fees may be awarded pursuant to section 1988 in a State court proceeding (Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 11, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 2508, 65 L.Ed.2d 555; see, also, New York Gaslight Club v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 66-70, 100 S.Ct. 2024, 2032-2034, 64 L.Ed.2d 2024), and manifestly fees may be available where, as here, the court has decided in petitioners' favor because the challeng act violates their Federal constitutional rights. ² Although some courts have held, as did the court in this case, that the decision whether to grant an award is entirely discretionary (see Matter of Bess v. Toia, 66 A.D.2d 844, 411 N.Y.S.2d 651), this is incorrect. Under the Newman-Northcross rule, which we follow, the prevailing party ordinarily should recover reasonable fees "unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust" (Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S.Ct. 964, 966, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263; Northcross v. Memphis Bd. of Educ., 412 U.S. 427, 428, 93 S.Ct. 2201, 2202, 37 L.Ed.2d 48; see, also, New York Gaslight Club v. Carey, supra, 447 U.S. at p. 68, 100 S.Ct. at p. 2033). In Northcross, the Supreme Court recognized that in enacting the 1964 Civil Rights Act Congress intended to facilitate access to the judicial process for victims of civil rights violations who might not otherwise be able to afford it because either no money was involved or if financial recovery was available, the sum involved did not warrant the expense of the litigation required to secure their rights. It has also recognized that the imposition of attorney's fees would help to insure that those who violate the Nation's fundamental laws could not proceed with impunity (see Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257, n. 11, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1049, n. 11, 55 L.Ed.2d 252). In essence, the act created a system of "private attorneys general" to vindicate the national policy who could be paid by an award of attorney's fees f representing a successful party (see Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, supra; Northcross v. Memphis Bd. of Educ., supra ). These important remedial policies also motivated section 1988 of the 1976 act, and we should construe it broadly to require that respondents establish the special circumstances which militate against awarding a fee to a successful litigant (Mid-Hudson Legal Servs. v. G & U, Inc., 578 F.2d 34, 37-38 (2nd Cir.1978)). They do not meet that burden solely by submitting evidence that petitioner's counsel is a publicly funded legal service organization (see Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 457 U.S. ----, 102 S.Ct. 3187, 73 L.Ed.2d 896; New York Gaslight Club v. Carey, supra, 447 U.S. at pp. 70-71, 100 S.Ct. at 2034; Holley v. Lavine, 605 F.2d 638 [2nd Cir.1979] cert. den. sub nom. Blum v. Holley, 446 U.S. 913, 100 S.Ct. 1843, 64 L.Ed.2d 266; Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1245 [3rd Cir.1977] ), or that the relief afforded is personal to the petitioner (see Zarcone...