Johnson v. Board of Education of Wilson County
| Decision Date | 16 September 1914 |
| Docket Number | 61. |
| Citation | 82 S.E. 832,166 N.C. 468 |
| Parties | JOHNSON v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF WILSON COUNTY. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Superior Court, Wilson County; Bond, Judge.
Mandamus on application of J. S. Johnson against the Board of Education of Wilson County. From a judgment granting the writ, defendant appeals. Reversed.
This action was brought by the plaintiff for a mandamus to compel defendant to admit to the proper public school of said county for the white race his four children, who are of school age. He alleged that his oldest child, Arthur Johnson, attended school for two days, when he was refused further admission to and attendance, as a pupil, at the school. He thereupon made a demand upon the defendant for the admission of all his children to the proper public school of the county for the white race, and that defendant refused to comply with the said demand. He further alleged that he was lawfully married and the children, in whose behalf he made the demand upon the defendant, are the lawful issue of the union. The essential allegations of the complaint were virtually admitted in the answer, except the ninth, in which it is alleged that the plaintiff's children are entitled to admission to the schools for the white race, which is denied, and it is averred in the answer that said children are not entitled to attend the public schools for the white race, for the reason that they have negro blood in their veins. The presiding judge, at the hearing of the application for the writ of mandamus, entered the following judgment:
"This cause coming on to be heard, all parties being regularly before the court, both sides being represented by counsel and in addition to the facts admitted in the answer, the following specific fact is admitted, to wit: That each of said four minor children have a slight mixture of negro blood, the same being less in each child than one-sixteenth, and, this hearing being had on the 10th day of February, to which time it had been continued by consent, it is therefore, on the admissions in the answer, coupled with the admissions above referred to ordered, adjudged, and decreed as follows: That each of said children is entitled to attend the school for white children designated in the complaint, or any other school for white children in any other district in which said children, or either of them, may hereafter live, and the defendant board is hereby ordered and directed to allow all of said children all privileges with reference to said school which belong and appertain in any way to the white children of said school district. It is further adjudged that the plaintiffs recover of the defendant the costs of this proceeding, to be taxed by the clerk of the superior court of Wilson County.
The court bases its judgment upon the following facts:
First. It is admitted in the answer that the father of the said children was the husband by a valid marriage of the mother of said children.
The Constitution provides that the Legislature shall provide separate schools for the children of the white and colored races, and it also makes valid a marriage between a white man and a woman who has not as much as one-eighth admixture of colored blood. See section 2, article 9, and section 8 of article 14.
The court is of opinion that the Legislature exceeded its power when, in section 4086 of Pell's Revisal, it attempts to deny the offspring of a marriage which the Constitution says is valid the right which generally pertains to children of that particular race. In other words, the status of the child is fixed by the constitutional recognition of the marriage."
Defendant excepted to the judgment, and has brought the case here by appeal.
Barnes & Dickinson, of Wilson, for appellant.
W. A. Finch and H. G. Connor, Jr., both of Wilson, for appellee.
WALKER, J. (after stating the facts as above).
We are strongly of the opinion that the learned judge erred in rendering judgment for the plaintiff. The facts, as stated by him in the judgment, plainly imply that the children inherited the negro blood from their mother, and it is admitted in the pleadings that the father, J. S. Johnson, is a white man, having a pure strain of blood. But the wife has less than one-eighth admixture of negro blood. So the question is presented whether it was within the constitutional power of the Legislature to enact section 22, chapter 435, of the Public Laws of 1903, now Revisal, § 4086. In order to acquire an accurate conception of the question involved, it will be well to reproduce here the clauses of the Constitution and statute bearing upon it.
The Constitution provides as follows:
Article 14, § 8: "All marriages between a white person and a negro, or between a white person and a person of negro descent to the third generation inclusive, are hereby forever prohibited."
Should it be conceded, for the sake of discussion, that the marriage between J. S. Johnson and the woman who is the mother of his children is a valid one, it does not, by any means, settle the important and delicate question, presented in this record, in favor of the plaintiff. If article 14, § 8,prohibiting marriage "between a white person and a negro, or between a white person and a person of negro descent to the third generation inclusive," has the effect, contended for by learned counsel of plaintiff, to validate the marriage between plaintiff and the mother of his children, it does only that much, and legitimates the offspring of the union, but by no subtle alchemy known to the laboratory of logic can it be claimed to have extracted the negro element from the blood in the veins of such offspring and made it pure. The clause merely prohibited marriage between persons, one of whom is descended from a negro to and including the third generation. It does not even declare that marriages between persons, one of whom has negro blood though beyond the inhibited degree, shall be valid, but only that a marriage between a white person and one within the prescribed degree shall be void. But it is not necessary to the decision of this case that we should give an exact interpretation of that section of the Constitution and thereby fix its precise limits. If it validates the marriage and legitimates the progeny, it does not go far enough to deny to the Legislature the power of classifying school children, so as to exclude from the public schools of the white race any...
To continue reading
Request your trial